

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



## THESIS

### SMALL STATES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

by

Insu Choi

June 1995

Thesis Advisor:

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
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


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
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## ABSTRACT

The key questions addressed by this study are; which of the two structural theories in international relations explains small state policies better and under what international system structure is the significance of small states enhanced so that they have greater freedom of maneuver. Using the two theories, balance of power and hegemonic change, this thesis extracts several hypotheses about the roles and significance of small states under varying conditions. The basic idea of this effort was that small states are affected largely by both global and regional international systems. Thus, the position, and policy, of a small state is determined more by its international context rather than by its own efforts to consolidate internal strength.

From the perspectives of small states, in the hegemonic system they are often constrained in the pursuit of their foreign policies, while in the balance of power system they often can play a role as a balancer. To test this developed hypothesis, and others, this thesis surveys the diplomatic history of the great powers, and selected small states, in Europe from 1815 to 1939; the US-Israeli patron client relationship of the Cold War era; and the nuclear policies of Ukraine and North Korea. These cases illustrate: how a small state is dealt with by stronger powers under varying international system structures, how it may make use of the system and achieve its objectives; and what the main factor is that makes a small state important or insignificant to the international equilibrium.

In its concluding chapter, this work derives some implications from the process of proving the hypotheses, and suggests some plausible policies for Korea, a quintessential small state in Northeast Asia, as to how she can play an important role as a balancer in the region.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There are two structural theories in international politics. One is hegemonic theory, the other is balance of power theory. With these theories, one can explain, predict, and describe the characteristics of the international system and, in general, the behavior of states. But, these theories of international politics have focused on describing great power behavior, because it is assumed that international relations are largely ruled by the great powers of the contemporary system. To the contrary, this thesis looks at international politics from the perspectives of small states, hypothesizing that their influence can, under certain conditions, prove quite substantial.

Small states are not all alike. Some of them have significant weight in the international system, while others do not. Geopolitical considerations can be one way to differentiate them. Some small states are important, not because of internal strength, but because of their positions in the international system, especially among or between great powers. The term, position, includes both physical location and other tangible factors, as well as less tangible psychological and ideological concerns.

Small states generally have some common characteristics. They have goals - survival, autonomy, and prestige, and limits too. They are vulnerable to external threats, and moreover, their internal countermeasures are considerably limited if the threats come from great powers. To overcome this inherent problem, they usually depend on allying with great powers. Balancing and bandwagoning are the two main strategies for their alliance policies.

The value of those policies differs, according to international system structure. In a hegemonic system, small states generally do not have any viable alternative to bandwagoning. Their first priority is survival. Thus, they are willing to give up freedom of maneuver or autonomy. On the other hand, in a balance of power system, they would have greater freedom of maneuver, even though they risk being caught in

a power vacuum, one of the worst conditions for a small state's security. In addition, if great powers are willing to deal with one another, and decide to divide spheres of influence among them, there would be great danger for small states in terms of both survival and autonomy. Conversely, if there is conflict among great powers, they may be willing to pay attention to small states and seek to ally with them. This is a favorable situation for small states, even though it comes at the price of a more conflictual international environment.

On the basis of these ideas, one can imagine that small states would prefer to be a balancer rather than to be a scavenger or protectorate of a hegemon, if the situation permits. However, they are prone to switch allies, if their survival is threatened. In that case, they bandwagon with the greatest power. This movement is likely to instigate the escalation of a crisis, by rapidly turning over the balance in favor of one side or the other. Thus, small states may, under some circumstance, actually become "holders of the balance."

History provides several useful illustrations. After the Napoleonic Wars, when European great powers agreed with one another not to fight, and tried to make peace above all, small states were generally unimportant. The fates of Saxony and Poland were completely determined by great powers. Many small states, during the Concert of Europe period, were partitioned within the spheres of influence of great powers, in the name of the equilibrium (or peace). Among the prominent cases featuring more important small states, one should note the Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry in the Far East and the Middle East. When the two imperial powers struggled, small states of the regions enjoyed greater freedom of maneuver than later on, especially after 1907, when an Anglo-Russian agreement was achieved.

This tendency ended with the experience of World War I. The Wilsonian idea of collective security enhanced the voice of small states. However, this optimistic period could not last long. 'Appeasement,' as practiced by Great Britain, and

'Isolationism' by the United States during the interwar period lessened the competition among great powers, and thus, marginalized small states' freedom of maneuver.

In the Cold War system, small states could take advantage of the superpower rivalry. Both superpowers were willing to pay attention to small states, and actually poured a lot of money into them. The case of Israel illustrates that this military and economic aid should be understood in the context of the international system rather than at the domestic level. The Jewish lobby in the United States was an important factor that induced the US aid, but it was less important than the strategic considerations of the United States.

Lastly, in the Post-Cold War era, the lack of great power conflict, and accordingly, the lack of great power control over the small states, make them more nervous as well as more ambitious. The nuclear adventures of Ukraine and North Korea illustrate this tendency. Moreover, through comparing these cases with the previous ones, one can extract some inferences for small state policies.

In Chinese, the word "crisis" has two meanings; danger and opportunity. This is an appropriate word to apply to the dilemma of small states in international politics. They may have greatest influence in a situation of great power conflict, that generally enhances their 'autonomy,' but endangers their 'security.' Thus, the ability to balance between security and autonomy, to search out prospective allies and to ally with them in crisis, is the vital interest of all small states.



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## I. INTRODUCTION

*World politics, in Organski's view, consists of the "doings" of America and Russia, Britain, China, "and of the other great nations. It is not much concerned with relations between Ireland and Liberia or with the latest twist of foreign policy in Paraguay." Why? "They are simply less powerful. What they or their governments do does not much effect on the rest of the world. The importance of power is obvious."*<sup>1</sup>

*Michael P. Sullivan*

*The majority of small states in Europe are not constituents in the exclusive club of the powerful, and these states have often had a considerable impact on events and on the machinations of the great powers. A failure to understand the conditions, concerns, and desires of the larger part of the membership of the continent would leave a glaring gap in our knowledge of the European setting."*<sup>2</sup>

*Allen Sens*

The end of the Cold War system has brought about power vacuums in some regions, and thus, the eruption of nationalism which had long been suppressed by the ideological solidarity or the imminent external threat of superpower involvement. Now, small states are given added opportunities to make their voices heard and their desires known. Witnessing this process, John L. Gaddis stated, "[in the post-Cold War era,] the new task could well be to balance the forces of integration [such as economic, institutional, cultural integrations which will be mainly achieved by education] and fragmentation [such as nationalism, religious conflicts and economic and social inequality which will be enhanced by the loosened control of the two superpowers] against each other."<sup>3</sup> A very similar situation existed previously.

The Benthamite rationalism of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' not only was the definition of the content of the natural law in the nineteenth century when the Great Powers saw eye

---

<sup>1</sup>Michael P. Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International Politics (Columbia, South Carolina: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1990) p.76.

<sup>2</sup>Allen Sens, "The Security of Small States in Post-Cold War Europe," in David G. Haglund Ed., From Euphoria to Hysteria (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1993) pp.229-230.

<sup>3</sup>John Lewis Gaddis, The US and the End of the Cold War (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1992) pp. 197-207.

to eye to keep peace and order (*status quo*), but also it legitimized the existence of the empires, "established through the sacrifice of *unfit* Africans and Asiatics," in the name of 'the harmony of interests.'<sup>4</sup> In other words, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' required the sacrifice of "those who are not included in the greatest number."<sup>5</sup> This utopian synthesis had been implemented into the international system at least up to 1890,<sup>6</sup> at which point the Great Powers divided into two opposing groups. Thereafter, small states were given more weight in the international system. This process was furthered by the collapse of empires (such as the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Chinese Empire) and the establishment of the League of Nations in the wake of World War I. Observing the demise of some empires, Thomas Masaryk put it:

"History is a process of integration, but at the same time of disintegration; the double process appears as the strengthening of individualism and simultaneous growth of collectivism. History tends not towards uniformity, but towards variety, towards organized variety, which very often is misrepresented as barren, monotonous, indiscriminate uniformity."<sup>7</sup>

From the viewpoint of small states, their positions both in the Concert of Europe and in the Cold War system were controlled by the Great Powers. Thus, the collapse of both systems meant that small states were released from the tight control and political leverage of the powerful. It is ironic that small states were more confined during the period of 'long peace' among the Great Powers. On the other hand, however, the end of the Cold War system implies some changes for small states' security

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<sup>4</sup>E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York; Harper & Row, 1939) Chapter 3 & 4, esp., pp. 23, 42, 49.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p.42.

<sup>6</sup>Rothstein mentions that after the 1848 revolution there had been the change of the intellectual environment which "slowly eroded the legitimacy of the hierarchical principle implicit in the Concert System. National self-determinism, liberalism, democracy, internationalism, and equality all served in various ways to dilute the acceptability of a distinction based solely on power calculation." Robert L. Rothstein, Alliance and Small Powers (New York; Columbia Univ., 1968) p.16.

<sup>7</sup>Thomas Masaryk, The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis ( Inaugural Lecture of the School of Slavonic Studies at King's College, Univ. of London, given on 19 Oct. 1915), (London; The Athlone Press, 1966) p.26.

policies. Previously, when a small state was in the camp of one of the two superpowers, it had the clear objective to 'balance' or 'bandwagon' and enjoyed the advantage of 'free riding' in some cases.

Then, which international system is more favorable to small states? Are their roles in the international system changing continuously? What should they do in order to survive in this dynamic 'real world'? To answer these questions, it is needed to "attempt to look at the international system through the eyes and experiences" of small states.<sup>8</sup>

Generally speaking, it is suggested that the study of small states' policies be conducted through the systemic approaches rather than the reductionist ones. Michael Handel explains why;

"Domestic determinants of foreign policy are less salient in weak states. Moreover, because of the reduced scale of complexity of bureaucratic and decision-making structures of weak states, there are *usually* fewer bureaucratic influences on foreign policy making."<sup>9</sup>

The contemporary systemic approaches are composed principally of the hegemonic theory and the balance of power theory. Thus, this thesis employs these structural theories to deduce some hypotheses on what relationships exist between each theory and the positions of small states in each theoretical framework. Then, the hypotheses will be evaluated by case studies, carefully selected from the period of 1815 to the present time.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London; Frank Cass, 1981) p.3.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.3-4. Also, see; J. E. Spence, Republic under Pressure: A Study of South African Foreign Policy (London: Oxford Univ., 1967) p.6, and Richard Kennaway, New Zealand's Foreign Policy 1951-1971 (Wellington: Hicks Smith, 1972) pp.153-155. Spence said, "the most obvious fact about small powers is that their foreign policy is governed by policy of others. It follows that the student of small power policy, even more than the student of great power policy, must concentrate on the environment in which his subject exists."

<sup>10</sup>Surely there were many cases of small states that played active roles as balancers, or trimmers, or mediators between the great powers such as Syracuse between Rome and Carthage and Venice in the sixteenth century played between France and Spain. See; Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York; Alfred A Knopf, 1973) pp.193-197; and Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) pp.25-37.

As Rothstein pointed out, however, the distinction between Great Powers and small powers was implicit in the political practice of earlier centuries. "[It] was not raised into a formal principle until the exigencies of the struggle against Napoleon made it convenient, even necessary to do so."

However, theories "are invented, not discovered," and they have explanatory power "gained by moving away from reality not by staying close to it."<sup>11</sup> In other words, there has been neither a purely hegemonic world nor a pure balance of power system, a completely evenly-distributed system. Several empires before the industrial revolution were at best regional hegemons. Also, the dominance of the Royal Navy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could not guarantee Great Britain the dominion on the Continent. Even today, though there is no comparable power to the United States, she cannot control the whole world at her pleasure. Yet, when one reduces the scope to survey to a certain region, he could find the hegemon and the hegemonic system. In other words, even if the balance of power system prevails at the global level, there would be regional hegemons at the subsystem level, and *vice versa*. On the other hand, even not complete, the balance of power system has generally dominated the world since 1815. Consequently, the hegemonic system and the balance of power system are not mutually exclusive but symbiotic. While the great powers balance one another, at the same time they have their own spheres of influence where they act as a hegemon. On the basis of this conceptualization, as for the balance of power theory, multipolar system (such as the Concert of Europe, Great Powers' rivalry in Asia in the late nineteenth century, and Central-Eastern Europe in the interwar period) and bipolar system (of the Cold War era) are selected, while the present American hegemonic system is assigned for the study of the hegemonic theory, though it's principally related to the post-1945 economic order of the world.

Then, why is this study important? Surely, small states do not have as much influence on the international system as the great powers do. However, it is also true that if there is no small state there is no great power. In addition, the fates of small states are not exclusively in the hands of the great powers. The ability to understand, predict, adopt, and adjust to the political changes of

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Because the primary obligation of the Treaty of Chaumont, concluded in March 1814, was the promise to provide 60,000 men each for the next twenty years in the event of another French aggression, and because small states were not able to conduct it, "the formal and institutionalized distinction between Great Powers and small powers" appeared. Robert L. Rothstein, (1968), p.12, Quoted in H.G. Schenk, The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (London; Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1947) p.127.

<sup>11</sup>Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York; Random House, 1979) pp.5-7.

international system is important for their survival. Rothschild's statement supports this point;

"Thus, despite major and avoidable failings (too little intra-regional solidarity, too much overpoliticization of human relations, too little strategic government intervention in the economy, too much petty government interference with the society), thanks to the political performance of East Central Europe during the interwar era, it is impossible today to conceive of the region without its at least formally independent states."<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, after the end of the Cold War, the weight of small states in the international system, at least at the regional level, considerably increased. So did their freedom of maneuver. Thus, they became more significant players in international politics. For example, most contemporary crises are occurred by small states released from the control of great powers. In this situation this study will offer comparative analysis of the two structural theories and general principles for small state policies.

Lastly, this study is expected to bring about some implications for the policies of South Korea or the reunified Korea in the future. It is generally believed that Northeast Asia would be again the arena for power competition among the regional states, especially between China and Japan, or China and Russia, or Japan and Russia. This so-called the 'back to the future' view,<sup>13</sup> demands Korea, the quintessential small state of the region, to prepare efficient countermeasures in order to survive. Through surveying theoretical as well as historical and practical significance and roles of small states, this paper tries to reply to that demand. As the first step, the following chapter will define the key concepts of this paper, such as 'power' and 'small states.'

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<sup>12</sup>Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: The Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) p.24.

<sup>13</sup>It argues that Asia could easily de-stabilize, with classical balance of power politics coming to dominate the international relations of the region. Buzan and Segal argue why this view has distinct possibilities in the region. See; Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1994, p.3.



## II . CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

*. . . right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in powers, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.*

Thucydides, *The History of Peloponnesian War*, Book V, chap. 17.

### A . POWER

#### 1 . Definitions and Characteristics

To study the relationships between men, or groups, or states, one has to begin with understanding the medium that establishes, preserves, or changes the relationships. Power is that medium. Thus, the study of power has been the main theme for the student of politics, especially for the realists.<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, it is still impossible to define the concept of power with several sentences because it is subjective to the perception or understanding of each person or group or state involved in the relationships.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, it is more meaningful to sort various kinds of definitions by the characteristics in order to grasp the concept of power.

*a . It is a psychological concept.* There is a group of scholars who give attention to psychological aspects of power instead of considering the mere brute force.

"When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men. . . . Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise over it and those who it is exercised."<sup>16</sup>

"Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor). Power can also be conceived in terms of control over outcomes. . . . There is rarely a one-to-one relationship between power measured by any type

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<sup>14</sup>Michael Sullivan put it; "Traditionally, it consists of the realpolitik view that nations operate solely for their own interests, that these interests focus around the question of the nation's power, that all nations interact with one another over the question of power, and that power is the ultimate goal of states. The central concept is normally considered to be power, and it is around this concept that much of the recent controversy surrounding the realist approach has centered." Michael Sullivan, *Power in Contemporary International Politics* (1990) p.9.

<sup>15</sup>David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics*, Vol. XXXI, No.2, Jan. 1979, pp.161-194.

<sup>16</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (1973), p.28

of resources and power measured by effects on outcomes."<sup>17</sup>

"Power . . . is the ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance with one's own ends. . . . There is a power aspect to every relationship."<sup>18</sup>

". . . at least three different meanings of power; power to persuade somebody to do something you want him to do, power to persuade somebody from doing something you do not want him to do, and power not to do what somebody wants you to do."<sup>19</sup>

"In a positive sense, it is the ability to influence others to believe in a manner desired by the one wielding the power. In a negative sense, it is the ability to prevent others from exerting influence on one's own behavior. Is power, then, the same as influence? Not quite. Power is the ability to exercise influence and the ability to prevent influence from being exercised over oneself."<sup>20</sup>

"The measure of state's power is the capacity of government to induce other states - or governments - to follow lines of conduct or foreign policy what they might otherwise not pursue; alternatively it is the capacity which are intent on deflecting it from a course which the national interest - or the interests of its leader - would appear to require."<sup>21</sup>

**b . It is a relative concept.** The second aspect of power is that it is a relative concept. This notion has two different meanings. One is that power is one of criteria that make a person (or group or state) perceive his (or its) relative position in the relationships (or systems). In other words, power of *A* is can be perceived only in the interactions with others. Accordingly, if there is no interaction between members, there is no existence of power. By the same token, when one say that *A* is powerful, it means *A* is powerful in a certain situation, not in every situation. That is, power is

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<sup>17</sup>Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston; Little Brown, 1977) p.11.

<sup>18</sup>A.F.K. Organski, World Politics(2nd ed.) (New York; Knopf, 1968) p.104.

<sup>19</sup>Erling Bjol, " The Analysis of Small Power Politics," in August Schou and Arne O. Bruntland ed., Small States in International Relations (Stockholm; Almquist and Wiksell, 1971) p.36.

<sup>20</sup>Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers, (New York; The Free Press, 1972) p.54.

<sup>21</sup>David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of Small States in the International System, (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1967)



contextual:

"That is, the pen, or the purse, or the army is powerful only if it used in an appropriate context. A brilliant, logical discourse may influence the behavior of people who hear it in the quiet of a lecture hall, but it could not possibly have any impact on them if they were in the midst of a battlefield."<sup>22</sup>

"Any statement about influence that does not clearly indicate the domain and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless. When one hear that A is highly influential, the proper question is over what matter? The failure to insist on this simple question often leads political observers astray."<sup>23</sup>

The other is that power increases or decreases relatively not absolutely. It is like a zero sum game. Let us assume there are two states. Surely, there could be an absolute growth of power for both states, like gaining surplus products through technological innovations. However, at the same time, there could be another aspect; one is losing ground, relatively, to the other. Sullivan quoted;

"For national security issues, maximizing relative power capability is the central objective of policy, even if this means sacrificing absolute utility."<sup>24</sup>

"If one nation is gaining power, then some other nation is losing it. One implication of this, of course, is that all nations cannot gain in relative power at the same time."<sup>25</sup>

Also, Morgenthau noticed the significance of understanding this characteristic of power;

"During the interwar period, France failed to perceive this characteristic of power, while Britain understood the relative concept of power and knew that not even victory in war could stop its decline, due to the relative growth of other powers."<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Marshall Singer (1972) p.55.

<sup>23</sup>David A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," International Organization, 34 (4), 1980, p.497.

<sup>24</sup>Krasner, Asymmetries in Japanese-American Trade: The Case for Specific Reciprocity, (Berkeley; Institute for International Studies, 1987) pp.67-68; Quoted in Sullivan, (1990) p.100.

<sup>25</sup>Siverson, "Theories of Hegemonic War and Soviet-American Relations," Prepared for Delivery at the 17th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Anaheim, CA, 1986, pp.8-9; Quoted in Sullivan, (1990) p.199.

<sup>26</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau (1973) pp.155-156.

c . *It is not a static but a ever changing concept.* The third one is that power is changing in accordance with technological, economic, political changes. Joseph Nye argued power is becoming less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible.<sup>27</sup>

d . *It is a diffusive concept.* Power is diffusing from the core of the international system to the periphery. Mainly the hegemonic theorists emphasize this aspect of power to explain the cause of the decline of the hegemon. Robert Gilpin said; "Through trade, foreign investment, and the transfer of technology, wealth and economic activities tend to diffuse from the old centers to new comers of economic growth."<sup>28</sup> Also, in terms of military power, "the spread of modern technology has enhanced the capability of backward states," and the growth of indigenous arms industries in small states has removed political leverage of the powerful over the diminutive and "increased the potential costs of regional intervention by large powers."<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York; Basic Books, 1990) pp.7, 189-196. He pointed out; "The fragmented structure of world politics among different issues has made power resources less fungible; that is, less transferable from one issue to another. . . Co-optive power is the ability of a nation to structure a situation so that other nations develop or define their interests in ways consistent with one's own nation. This type of power tends to arise from such resources as cultural and ideological attraction as well as the rules and institutions of international regimes. . . The changing nature of international politics has also made intangible power resources more important. National cohesion, universalistic culture, and international institutions are taking on additional significance." In terms of the changing concept of economic power, he exemplified; "For example, seventeenth-century mercantilist theorists, who focused on Spain's reserves of gold and silver bullion from the mines in the Western Hemisphere, would not have predicted Holland's commercial rise or the strength of France derived from larger population and improved administrative structures. In the eighteenth century, those who focused on France's population and rural industry would have missed the rise of Britain due to its political stability and favorable conditions for the Industrial Revolution. In 1900, American writer Brooks Adams used the control of metals and minerals as an index of future military and economic power; he predicted the decline of Britain and ascendancy of Russia and China."

<sup>28</sup>Robert Gilpin, War and Changes in World Politics (New York; Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981) p.178.

<sup>29</sup>Joseph Nye (1990) p.186. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it seems that the United States has made substantial gains in terms of relative power, even as it draws down in absolute terms.

The other aspect of power diffusion is that its components have diffused from a simple one to various and complex ones. As Keohane and Nye put it;

"The traditional view was that military power dominated other forms, and that states with most military power controlled world affairs. But the resources that produce power capabilities have become complex."<sup>30</sup>

Consequently, one can get another definition of power when he combines the whole characteristics of power enumerated so far; *Power is the practical or perceived ability of one to control over the minds or behavior of a certain counterpart, in a certain point of time and place.* It seems too limited definition. But, power is, first of all, an abstraction not a real thing. Also, power exists in every relationship of people (or groups, or states) but with different postures.

## **2 . The Functions of Power**

Then, what functions does power accomplish? Karl Deutsch explains it by comparing the role of power in politics to the role of money in economics;

"Just as money is the currency of economic life, so power can be thought of as the currency of politics. . . Here, power is a symbolic role taken by the government, and ascribed to it by the people, and made credible by an initial minimum of readiness, resources, and capabilities to govern. And this symbolic role of power, together with their real or reputed capability, serves as a currency which mediates the exchange of the many diverse needs and wishes - the interest - of the many for the single, legitimate, and widely supported role of decision-makers of the few."<sup>31</sup>

On the basis of this conceptualization, he considered power as not only an instrument but also an aim of a state in international politics.

- "But if people only spend their money, they end up penniless, and if politicians only spend their power, they end up powerless. . . Thus, to invest is to spend money to get more money, . . . again and again. In politics some people invest in power. They spend their power on other values in such a manner that these values in turn will bring more power back to them." <sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (1977) p.11.

<sup>31</sup>Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice-Hall, 1978) pp.45-46.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, p.49.

Also, Hans Morgenthau pointed out why a nation pursues power as its aim;

"... the nation must try to have at least a margin of safety which will allow it to make erroneous calculations and still maintain the balance of power. To that effect, all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not to a balance - that is, equality - of power but at superiority of power in their own behalf."<sup>33</sup>

Another one of the most important functions of power is that it determines the type and the context of the international systems. E. H. Carr stated that "Power is a necessary ingredient of every political order. . . The working hypothesis of an international order was created by a superior power. The hypothesis has been destroyed by the decline, relative or absolute, of that power."<sup>34</sup>

### **3 . Components of Power and the Ways of Categorization**

Then, how can we measure the power of a state? One cannot set an order in the international system unless this question is answered, since power is the "necessary" factor for doing that. At first, one should look at the components of power. Traditionally, power is perceived as "a mix of strategic, military, economic, and political strengths and weaknesses."<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, Michael Handel

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<sup>33</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau (1973) p.208. However, more widely adopted notion is power as an instrument, especially as the method to sanction or coerce. See; Alan C. Lamborn, The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France and Germany (Boston; Unwin Hyman, 1991) pp.15-16.

<sup>34</sup>E. H. Carr (1939) p. 232. Also, see; Robert Gilpin, (1981) p.xi:

<sup>35</sup>Ray C. Cline, World Power Assessment, 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drift, 2nd ed., (Boulder, Colo.; Westview Press, 1977) pp.33-34. Cline put it, more in detail; "It is determined by the military forces and the military establishment of a country but even more by the size and location of territory, the nature of frontiers, the population, the raw-material resources, the economic structure, the technological development, the financial strength, the ethnic mix, the social cohesiveness, the stability of political processes and decision-making, and finally, the intangible usually described as national spirit." Also, he tried to formalize the way of calculation like the following:

$$Pp = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$$

Pp = Perceived Power, C = Critical Mass = Population + Territory, E = Economic Capability, M = Military Capability, S = Strategic Purpose, W = Will to Pursue National Strategy. Also, see; Inis L.Claude, Power and International Relations (New York; Random House, 1962) p.6; Klaus Knorr, Power & Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power, (New York; Basic Books, 1973) p.4; Schwargenberger, G., Power Politics (3rd Ed.) (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) p.14.

added "organizational capabilities" (or "power conversion") to Cline's formula instead of the "will to pursue national strategy."<sup>36</sup> Both of them tried to find the objective way of measuring power, but failed because of the inherent limits; power can be measured only in comparative way which is bound to be subjective.

More implicit and abstract criteria are found by Karl Deutsch. He enumerated four dimensions of power; weight, domain, range, and scope.<sup>37</sup> Knowing these components of power is very helpful for the students of international politics to distinguish the small states from others, because "the use of multiple criteria in evaluating the position of [small states] leads to a better understanding of their relative strength," and because small states are generally score low on "most of criteria employed, the

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<sup>36</sup>Michael Handel (1968) p.68. Handel pointed out four different elements that determine the strength of a state. "They are **geographical data**, for example the area of the territory and the nature of the frontiers; **material data**, for instance the absence or presence of natural resources and industrial capacity (technological development and capital); **human resources**, such as the size of the population, ethnic homogeneity and social integration (cohesion and unity), national character and morale; and **organizational capabilities** (or Raymond Aron's terminology, the "collective capacity for action"), administrative capabilities, the qualities of command and military preparedness (military decision-making), the quality of diplomacy, and capacity of adaptation." Also, see; Joseph Nye, (1990) p.27. He considers "power conversion" as much important as power resources; "Power conversion is the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behavior of others."

<sup>37</sup>Karl Deutsch (1978) pp.28-40. He defined the four dimensions of the power; "The weight of the power or the influence of an actor over some process is the extent to which that person can change the probability of its outcome. . . In world politics the **weight** of the power of most governments, and particularly of the great powers, has been declining ever since 1945. No government today has as much as had Great Britain, say, between 1870 and 1935. At present, Britain cannot control its former colonies; the United States cannot control France or Cuba; the Soviet Union cannot control Yugoslavia or China; and China cannot control its neighbors. . . The **domain** of power is the collection of people and resources that are subject and obedient or belong to it. . . **Range** is the difference between the highest reward and the worst punishment which power-holders can bestow (or inflict). [Unlike the weight of the power], in international politics, governments seem to have increased the range both of rewards they offer and of punishments they threaten, in their efforts to control the behavior of other countries and their governments. . . The **scope** of the power is the set of collection of all the particular kinds or classes of behavior relations and affairs that are effectively subjected to it."

lower the [small states] score in comparison to the great and middle powers."<sup>38</sup> Then what is the definition of small states?

## **B . SMALL STATES AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS**

### **1 . Definition of Small States**

Most definitions of small states made by scholars of international politics so far are the results of "identifying characteristics and formulating hypotheses on what differentiates small states from other classes of states," rather than "measuring objective elements of state capability and placing them on a ranking scale."<sup>39</sup> Following definitions are products of those efforts.

"By itself the concept of small state means nothing. A state is only small in relation to a greater one. Belgium may be a small state in relation to France, but Luxembourg is a small state in relation to Belgium, and France is a small state in relation to the United States."<sup>40</sup>

"A small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the small power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics."<sup>41</sup>

"Small powers are almost by definition 'local' powers whose demands are restricted to their own and immediate adjacent areas, while great powers exert their influence over wide areas. In the terminology of Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan the power of small state is narrow in domain, however much or little may be its weight."<sup>42</sup>

"A small state . . . is a state which unable to contend in war with the great

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<sup>38</sup>Michael Handel (1981) p.31.

<sup>39</sup>R.P. Barston, The Other Powers: Studies in Foreign Policies of Small States (New York; Barnes and Noble, 1973) p.15. He, suggested four approaches to define the term 'small state'; (1) setting up an upper limit on, for example, the population size; (2) measuring objective elements; (3) analyzing relative influence; and (4) identifying characteristics and formulating hypotheses on what differentiates small states from others.

<sup>40</sup>Erling Bjøl, "The Analysis of Small Power Politics," in Schou and Bruntland (1971) p.29.

<sup>41</sup>Robert Rothstein (1968) p.29.

<sup>42</sup>Annette B. Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago; Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959) p.3.

powers on anything like the equal terms."<sup>43</sup>

"[Small states are] consumers rather than producers of security."<sup>44</sup>

"The smallness we are talking about when we speak of small powers is smallness relative to the international society they belong to."<sup>45</sup>

Thus, one can say that small states can be defined only in a relative and subjective way. Small States are states that have less power than others in a certain context of relationship, compared by the criteria of measuring power; such as weight, domain, range, and scope. In this way, one can distinguish small states from the powerful in every situation, because all systems inherently have visible or invisible spectrum of states arranged from the most powerful to the least in terms of power.<sup>46</sup> With the same perception for relationship between small states and the international systems, Michael Handel put it;

"The position and relative security of any weak state must be gauged in terms of the specific international system in which it is operating. . . . Even at the same period of history, weak states located in different areas have different neighbors and thus face different problems. . . . Not Russia but the Arab states are the greatest danger to Israel (and vice versa). For India it was Pakistan rather than China. . . . Therefore, when speaking of the ability or inability of a weak state to defend itself, one must immediately ask, 'Against whom?'"<sup>47</sup>

## **2 . Small States and the International Systems**

On the other side of the same coin, international systems provide opportunities as well as restrictions to small states. Because the international system is mainly changed and established by

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<sup>43</sup>Army Vandenvosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," The Journal of Politics, 26 (1964), p.294. Quoted in Handel, (1981) p.36.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup>Martin Wight, Power Politics, Edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York; Holmes & Meier, 1978) p.61.

<sup>46</sup>About this fact, Kenneth Waltz's arguments are insightful. He defined a system as "a set of interacting units," and said, "since structure is an abstraction, it cannot be defined by enumerating material characteristics of the system. It must instead be defined by the arrangement of the system's parts and by the principle of that arrangement." See; Kenneth Waltz (1979) pp.40, 80.

<sup>47</sup>Michael Handel (1981) pp.5, 37.

great powers, and because small states inherently lack the internal countermeasures, they must rely on external sources in order to enhance their strength and improve their position in the system. Yet,

"their ability to turn to other states and draw on their resources is largely a function of the nature of the particular international system in which they operate. Different types of international systems enhance or weaken their bargaining position or leverage, encourage or discourage them from seeking the aid of other states, or isolate them from other states within the system."<sup>48</sup>

Accordingly, small states usually have a narrow range of countermeasures and thus, they are vulnerable to external pressure. "Having less margin of error than more powerful states, the small states must carefully manage its external relations in order to minimize risks and reduce the impact of policy failures."<sup>49</sup> However, small states are "by no means impotent, helpless victims of the system. On the contrary, some of them are quick to take advantage of the opportunities arising from the nature of any given international system."<sup>50</sup> For example, Yugoslavia during the cold war era, Cuba in 1962, Israel in 1973, and North Korea in these days, all these countries have pursued very active and ambitious foreign policies and have not failed to get their objectives or, at least, have not lost their initiative by the pressures of the powerful.

Yet, it is still needed to distinguish the significant small states in terms of the balance of power in the international (global or regional) system from the insignificant ones. For example, Costa Rica is a small state but not significant for the security of the Central America as much as Pakistan is for the South Asian stability. Also, since the international system is changing, so is the significance of small states. The present Belgium is not important for the security of Europe as much as it was in the

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<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, p.171.

<sup>49</sup>R.P. Barston (1973) p.19. This restriction on small states was observed by Rothstein also; "Great powers determine the nature of systemic patterns; as such they can alter the system or perhaps merely ignore its imperatives without suffering grievously. Small powers on the other hand are much more limited in their freedom by the nature of the systemic structure. For the most part they are dominated by the system, in the sense that opportunities they have are dependent on the kind of system which exists. They can rarely create their own opportunities." See his book, Alliances and Small Powers, p.182.

<sup>50</sup>Michael Handel (1981) pp.45-46.



nineteenth century, because the possibility of Franco-German conflict has considerably decreased.<sup>51</sup> One possible way is the geographical approach. Accordingly, the following chapter will examine the significance of small states, especially in terms of geopolitics, and survey their general strategies.

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<sup>51</sup>Also, Joseph Malia said, "Belgium, for example, has been for a long time a buffer state between Germany and France. However, the emergence of a new European order after World War II created a situation in which Belgium was no longer a buffer state." Joseph Malia, "Buffer States; The Issue of Sovereignty," in John Chay and Thomas Ross ed., Buffer States in World Politics (Boulder; Westview Press, 1986) p.30.



### III . ROLES AND STRATEGIES OF SMALL STATES

#### A . THE ROLES OF SMALL STATES : A GEOPOLITICAL APPROACH

With some degree of exaggeration, one might argue that geography decides the fate of a state. Britain and Japan have enjoyed their insular position while Poland, Belgium, and Korea have suffered because of their location between hostile neighbors. Many factors affect the geographic value of a state. Traditionally, they are "the distribution of land and sea, the topography, the hydrographic network, the size of territory, and its aptitude to produce."<sup>52</sup> But, for small states strategic location is more important than any other factors. For example, "Germany attacked Belgium and Holland not because of their inherent weakness but because it was at war with France and Great Britain, and the two small countries happened to be located on the strategic highway to France."<sup>53</sup> However, this vulnerability stemming from location also can be an asset, especially in a time of great power amity.<sup>54</sup> Thus, small states located between great powers enjoy their strategic significance or suffer from it according to great powers' policies. Usually, these small states play significant roles in the international system, as a buffer state, a client, a balancer, and a risktaker.

##### 1 . A Buffer State

The term 'buffer state' is defined as a small independent state lying between two or more larger powers.<sup>55</sup> However, there is a difference between scholars in identifying a buffer state. Martin Wight

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<sup>52</sup>Jean Gottman, "Geography and International Relations," World Politics, Vol. III, No.2, Jan. 1951, pp.157-162.

<sup>53</sup>Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (1981) p.78.

<sup>54</sup>For example, the Dutch were elected to play the role of a strong middle power because "it dominated three international waterways - the Meuse, the Rhine and the Scheldt, and it was flanked by three major European powers viz. Great Britain, Germany and France." However, when the agreement among the powers began to collapse, the strategic location of the Netherlands brought about a crisis. cf. L. G. M. Jaquet, "The Roles of Small States within Alliance Systems," in Schou and Bruntland, Small States in International Relations (1971), p.58.

<sup>55</sup>A.F.K. Organski defined 'buffer state' as "a weak nation located between two large and not too friendly nations. Its function is to keep the two giants apart and thus reduce the chances of friction between them." By the same token, Gerald Ingalls described it as "a small political or administrative unit located between and separating two larger opposing powers." However, their conceptualization is somewhat ambiguous, because it is not clear that "larger states" must be

focused more on the role of neighboring great powers and thus included satellites with trimmers and neutrals in his three types of buffer states, while Thomas Ross emphasized the role of a buffer state as an independent player, pointing out that:

"buffer states are not satellite or puppet states of either of the powerful neighbors, nor are they necessarily strictly neutral states. The concept of a buffer state, in presupposing a free and effective organism in the region interposed, rules out partition or any form of breakup enforced by the great powers on either flanks."<sup>56</sup>

However, both identifications are too extreme; one is too broad, the other is too narrow. Thus, in this study, a buffer state; 1) should be weaker or smaller than *neighboring powers*; 2) should be located between greater powers that *maintain an approximate parity or balance of power*. Thus, once the balance of power or the parity between great powers breaks down, a buffer state tends to lose its autonomy and then its identity as a buffer state. Several cases support this argument.<sup>57</sup> On the

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"great powers." Therefore, It might be more appropriate to follow Martin Wight's definition that: "A buffer state is a weak power between two or more stronger ones, maintained or even created with the purpose of reducing conflict between them. A buffer zone is a region occupied by one or more weaker powers between two or more stronger powers; it is sometimes described as a power vacuum." A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York; Knopf, 1960) p.276; Gerald L. Ingalls, "Buffer States: Outlining and Expanding Existing Theory," John Chay and Thomas Ross ed., Buffer States in World Politics (Boulder; Westview Press, 1986), p.233; Martin Wight, Power Politics, Hedley Bull and Castern Hobraad ed., (New York; Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1978), p.160.

<sup>56</sup>Thomas Ross, "Buffer State: A Geographer's Perspective," Chay and Ross ed., Buffer States in World Politics (1986) p.16.

<sup>57</sup>When the Concert of Europe collapsed and the probability of war increased, most buffer states were endangered and lost their identity, either voluntarily or by force. In the case of Korea, "when the power balance broke down twice near the turn of the century (in 1895 and 1905 at the end of the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, respectively) the buffer system disappeared and with it Korea's independence." Also, as World War II ended and Finland's role as a buffer state between Sweden and Russia or between Germany and Russia was over, Finland entirely fell into the Soviet sphere of influence, "without the existence of any great power to counterbalance Soviet military power. In other words, Finland ceased to be a buffer state and became a rimstate." John Chay and Thomas Ross, "Introduction," Chay and Ross ed., pp.4-5; Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (New York; Routledge, 1988) pp.89-90. Efraim Karsh distinguished a rimstate from a buffer state; "it is a state located along the borders of a great power and coming within its defense perimeter while not being situated between two great

other hand, in terms of conceptual understanding, a buffer state doesn't have to be geographically located between the great powers. In other words, the small states between the ideologically hostile great powers, such as the two superpowers of the Cold War era, can also be defined as buffer states.<sup>58</sup>

## 2 . A Client

Another form of small states which have significant weight in the international systems is a client state. This term has frequently been used for defining the state in the relationship between one of two superpowers and a small state which belonged to one of two blocs.<sup>59</sup> Originated from economics, the term 'client' includes rather different concepts from 'satellite' or 'puppet state.' On the contrary, the patron-client relationship implies a "reciprocal flow of benefits and the absence of coercion in the hold that the patron's leader has over his client states."<sup>60</sup> A client state pursues economic and military aid from the supplier in exchanges for tangible and intangible goods and services such as military bases of commodities and loyalty or deference. A patron state, conversely, tries to buy political leverage over the client or to acquire and keep strategic interests in the region in exchanges for economic and military assistance like the Soviet Union toward Cuba during the Cold War period.<sup>61</sup> However,

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powers. . . [It] does not have the privilege of choosing between two opposing rivals or alignments. . . it must find a working modus vivendi with the power immediately adjoining its territory." (pp.82-83).

<sup>58</sup>Chay and Ross, "Introduction," Chay and Ross, ed. (1986) p.3.

<sup>59</sup>Even though there is a view that "weak states can try to behave as patron of even weaker states," in this paper, a patron-client relationship is used for describing the relationship between a great power and a small state. cf. Michael Handel (1968) p.139.

<sup>60</sup>Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York; Basic Books, 1975) p.25. Quoted in Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East (New York; Praeger, 1987) pp.3-13. At this point, Yaacov-Siman-Tov described the relationship as the 'bargaining relationship' which basically depends on the 'reciprocity.'

<sup>61</sup>To explain the policy of patron states which aimed to drive their clients states to comply by controlling arms transfers, some use 'leverage,' others use 'influence' as the term. While the latter ambiguously defines 'influence' as the "ability to alter the policy of the recipient," the former, distinguishes the concept of 'leverage' from those of 'power' and 'influence,' and defines it as the "manipulation of the arms transfer relationship in order to coerce or induce a recipient state to conform its policy or action to the desires of the supplier." However, both concepts are quite

"although the asymmetry of the patron-client relationship may be regarded as a potential power resource for the patron, its conversion to active influence does not necessarily bring about the desired results. Potential bargaining with a client renders the potential power of the patron less effective."<sup>62</sup> Moreover, a client can penetrate into the internal decision-making process of a patron state. This propensity was intensified in the Cold War system. The competitive bipolar system embodied great opportunities for small states as the competition between the superpowers for allies afforded the clients room to maneuver.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, one can say that the position of a client is determined by "the availability of other patrons who can render the same protection or material support, and the mobility of [the client] between alternative patrons."<sup>64</sup>

The policy options of a client state extend from complete allegiance, like the behavior of the pilot fish,<sup>65</sup> to free-riding, and it chooses its policy according to the environment of the international system. Handel put it;

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different from each other. Following Nachmias' identifications, this paper distinguishes 'leverage' from 'influence'; "Leverage always implies a strategy aimed at controlling another country's policy choices. Influence need not be a strategy. It is a process of interaction in a framework of either friendly or unfriendly relations. By contrast, leverage means manipulation of aid, which is coercive and aimed at limiting the policy choices of the client states. Influence, unlikely leverage, does not depend on a patron-client relationship and does not require dependency." cf. Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov, 1987, pp.15-24; William B. Quandt, "Influence through Arms Supply: The US Experience in the Middle East," pp.121-122; Marvin Feuerwerker, Congress and Israel (Westport, CT; Greenwood Press, 1979) p.11; Nitza Nachmias, Transfer of Arms, Leverage, and Peace in the Middle East (New York; Greenwood Press, 1988) p.10.

<sup>62</sup>Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov (1987) p.12; and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (1977) p.11.

<sup>63</sup>Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov, "Alliance Strategy: US-Small Allies Relationship," The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, Sep. 1980, p.203.

<sup>64</sup>Michael Handel (1968) p.133.

<sup>65</sup>Handel explained the client's voluntary allegiance to the patron using this term; "The client state can develop what biologists call synchronism. They describe the behavior of the pilot fish as following the shark as a piece of iron does a magnet, obeying instantly the incessant and regular changes of direction shown by the shark. . . For example, the Hungarian mission to the League of Nations in the early thirties coordinated its speeches with those of Germany, and the same must have been true for Albania and Italy." cf. *Ibid.*, p.134.

"the more automatic the security promised to a weak state, the more important that state is to the defense system of the superpower, and the fewer of its own resources it has to invest in security. . . [This tendency is] encouraged not only their perception of their importance to the superpower's security, but also two other facts. First, they know that whatever they do, they cannot hold out against the onslaught of an attacking superpower. Hence any investment in their own defense is waste of resources. . . The development of nuclear weapons is a second fact that has encouraged the small states to adopt a strategy of coercive defiance. Many of the weak states believe that mutual nuclear deterrence will prevent a war and that therefore it would be foolish to invest in conventional forces that would never be used or would be unhelpful and irrelevant. . . Paradoxically, the failure of burden sharing is an indication of the faith of the weak state in the superpower with which it is allied."<sup>66</sup>

If the conditions are reversed, the client states should comply on the requests of their patrons. Thus, one can conclude that, like a buffer state, as for a client state, the external factors are more important than its skillful foreign policy or internal sources of strength to play a significant role in the international system.

### **3 . A Balancer or A Holder of the Balance**

A balancer (or a holder of the balance) is another type of role for small states located in geographically significant positions. Generally it is believed that this role is accomplished by a great power able to direct and guide the overall international system, such as Great Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.150-151. One of the prominent example of this argument is the Yoshida Doctrine of Japan. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan from 1948 to 1954, opted for the strategy under which Japan would accept the new constitution and security treaty. He advocated the subordination of Japan's international posture to the requirement of national economic growth, and reliance on a moderate self-defense capability combined with the US security guarantee. cf. Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the US-Japan Security Alliance (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1989) pp.3-4; and Aurelia George, "Japan's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response?", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No.6, Jun 1993, p.560.

<sup>67</sup>Morgenthau said, "By making it impossible for any nation or combination of nations to gain predominance over the others, [*the balancer*] preserves its own independence as well as the independence of all the other nations, and *is thus a most powerful factor in international politics*." Also, Organski noted, "it has become almost *an historical truism* to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and

In such a multipolar system, a powerful balancer was needed, one able to "set into motion. . . various weights and counterweights on all sides of the chandelier."<sup>68</sup> Yet, there is another balance of power system including the balancer as a significant player. It is the system of two approximately equal, and usually rival, powers with the third one, the holder of the balance between them, such as the bipolar system during the Cold War era. It is in this system that small states can play important roles as balancers. Colonel Beck of Poland between Germany and Russia, Tito of Yugoslavia between the West and the East, Sadat of Egypt between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Kim Il Sung of North Korea between China and the Soviet Union. All these politicians understood and utilized the environment by trying to hold the balance between the two opposing great powers. Thus, as Martin Wight put it: "Sometimes a small power, through the accident of the strategic position or the energy of its ruler, can contribute useful if not decisive strength to one side or the other, . . ."<sup>69</sup> However, the practical policies of those small states are not equal, simple or static. Those policies will be examined in the latter part of this chapter.

#### **4 . A Risktaker?**

The last conceivable type of a small state is a risktaker. As Handel put it;

"In general, weak states must take defensive positions against any superpowers. Occasionally, however, a weak state takes a limited offensive posture against a great or superpower, often defying it with a certain degree of success. In fishing disputes, Iceland and Peru have successfully resisted British and American pressures. North Korea challenged the United States with impunity, and went unpunished in the Pueblo incident. Serbia risked the wrath of Austria before World War I."<sup>70</sup>

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now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single state or group at a given time." Hans J. Morgenthau (1973) p.194; A.F.K. Organski (1960) p.279; also see, Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?", World Politics, Vol. V, No.4, July 1953, pp.442-475; and Martin Wight, "Balance of Power," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight ed., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London; George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966) pp.149-175.

<sup>68</sup>Ernst B. Haas, July 1953, p.458.

<sup>69</sup>Martin Wight (1966) p.161.

<sup>70</sup>Michael Handel (1981) p.39.



Moreover, in cases of small states' defiance, "the response of the great power will be determined by the type of threat, the degree of its active involvement elsewhere, and concern lest any retaliatory action might adversely affect its relations with other states in the region."<sup>71</sup> Calculating the costs and benefits very carefully, some leaders of small states have successfully defied the great powers, even the superpowers.

President Syngman Rhee of South Korea was one of them.<sup>72</sup> When the Chinese and North Korean Communists began to show a great willingness to negotiate a truce agreement, especially after the death of Stalin, President Rhee harshly opposed that truce talk and insisted that the war should be ended with the complete reunification of Korea, and even that the UN occupy the territory of Russia and China, until permanent peace was established in the Far East. Furthermore, to prohibit the progress of the truce talk, he released 27,000 anti-Communist North Korean POW. It was an attempt to "discredit the United States in the eyes of the enemy" and, by doing so, "to stop any attempt to reach an agreement with the Communists at Panmunjom."<sup>73</sup> Through this very carefully calculated defiance, President Rhee achieved his primary goals; to make the United States sign a bilateral treaty and to get economic aid for rehabilitation. It was the case of a small state's risktaking defiance against its own patron in order to increase its commitments.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup>R. P. Barston, "Introduction," in R. P. Barston ed., The Other Powers (1973) p.23.

<sup>72</sup>General Mark Clark described about him, "I found myself engaged in a two-front diplomatic battle. . . with the Communists at Panmunjom and with President Syngman Rhee in Seoul, . . . The biggest trouble came from Rhee." cf. Mark Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York; Harper, 1954) p.256. Quoted in Chang Jin Park, "The Influence of Small States upon the Superpower: US-South Korean Relations as a Case Study, 1950-1953," World Politics, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Oct. 1975, p.97.

<sup>73</sup>Chang Jin Park noted; "Rhee's action was hailed in South Korea as an act of great statesmanship. The release of anti-Communist prisoners was the only option available for the Seoul government in its effort to break up the truce talks, and to unify Korea by defeating the enemy militarily. Rhee's daring action was primarily intended to break up the truce talks rather than to undermine the foundation of the US-South Korean alliance. From the American perspective, however, it seemed to sabotage the efforts for peace, and the American Government openly expressed misgivings with regard to Rhee's intentions." Chang Jin Park, 1975, pp.99, 113.

<sup>74</sup>Another similar example is Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet military experts in 1972. By doing that, he "compelled the USSR to supply his country with massive shipments that it had

The other type of defiance is that against its enemy. This can be illustrated by North Korea's direct challenges against the United States in 1968, 1969 and 1976, respectively the Pueblo incident, the shooting down of the EC-121 A/C, and the ax-slating incident at the Panmunjom area. In the case of the Pueblo incident, Kim Il Sung understood the immobility, and also unwillingness, of the United States due to its involvement in the Vietnam War. Also, he knew he could succeed at the negotiation table because North Korea seized a critical 'bargaining card,' the American hostages.<sup>75</sup> Moreover, heightened tension in Korea might well force the withdrawal of nearly 50,000 South Korean troops then fighting alongside the United States.<sup>76</sup> In case of the EC-121 incident, Kim clearly ascertained that the United States would be self-constrained because of the reflection of the Gulf of Tonkin incident and because of the ongoing Vietnam War. In addition, he might calculate that the United States worried that the North Koreans might have reacted in a way that would precipitate a wider war, if she assaulted North Korea.<sup>77</sup> Also, even the case of the ax-slating incident in 1976 when the United States was not bound by the Vietnam War, Kim escaped the crisis with just a verbal concession, saying it was 'regretful.'<sup>78</sup> Other than the show of force with bombers and other air-power assets, no countermeasure was taken by the United States.<sup>79</sup>

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previously refused to provide." cf. Michael Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise: Hitler, Nixon, Sadat (New York; Harvard Univ. Press, 1981) p.3 and pp.241-297.

<sup>75</sup>Peter Grose noted in his editorial for *The New York Times*; "A bold commando sweep into Wonsan harbor to recover the ship might conceivably succeed. But, it was thought, it would only endanger the hostages." *The New York Times*(NYT), "Limitation of Power," Jan. 27, 1968.

<sup>76</sup>NYT, Jan. 28 and 29, 1968.

<sup>77</sup>NYT, May 1, 1969.

<sup>78</sup>Kim said, "It is regretful that an incident occurred in the Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, at this time. An effort must be made so that such incidents may not recur in the future." And, he urged the UN side "to prevent the provocation," pledging that the North Korean side "will never provoke first, but take self-defensive measures only when provocation occurs." cf. NYT, Aug. 23, 1976.

<sup>79</sup>At the time of this writing (Spring 1995) North Korea appears to be repeating this risktaking pattern in its intransigent negotiating behavior in response to U.S. efforts to curtail its nuclear program.

From the perspectives of the great powers, all these roles of small states mentioned so far depend on the geopolitical context of the international systems rather than their leaders' statesmanship. However, to understand the whole international system and to find the *niche* or the window of opportunity for small states may depend on the competence of their statecraft. Then, what are their measures to seize those relatively scarce opportunities?

## **B . STRATEGIES OF SMALL STATES**

### **1 . Aims or National Interests of Small States**

Before searching for the strategic alternatives of small states, it is necessary to understand their general aims or national interests. In a Hobbesian world, the primary goal of a state is to survive. Even though the international system is becoming integrated and institutionalized, the basic unit of it remains the nation-state; and moreover, the basic conception of statesmen will continually be "realistic." Besides, since the inequality of states is inevitable, even if there were an effective international organization in the future, the role of small states will be marginal not just relatively but also absolutely. In this self-help system, small states' practical objective was and still is "simple and clear; to stay out of the hostilities,"<sup>80</sup> or "to avoid conflict with a great power."<sup>81</sup> However, in reality, the survivability of small states has considerably increased. Comparing the twentieth century with other centuries, especially with the nineteenth century when the notion of "the white man's burden" was prevalent, this fact can be clearly observed. On the contrary, a lot of new states were decolonized through this century. Even some states devoured by Russia, such as Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, also achieved their independence.

Then, what is the real issue for small states? What is the most important concern for small states? Obviously, it is sovereignty (or autonomy). Allen Sens noted, "The political life of small power is a struggle for political, economic, and social autonomy as much as it is a struggle for national survival or territorial integrity."<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>80</sup>Annette B. Fox, The Power of Small States (1959) p.181.

<sup>81</sup>David Vital, "The Analysis of Small Power Politics," in Schou and Bruntland (1971) p.29.

<sup>82</sup>Allen Sens, "The Security of Small States in the Post-Cold War Europe," in David Haglund ed., From Euphoria To Hysteria (1993) p.231.

Then, what is sovereignty? It is understood as "the independent right of the state over its own territory and its autonomy vis-a-vis other states,"<sup>83</sup> or as "the preeminence of the national polity in relation to both the larger world polity and various local polities."<sup>84</sup> It means the exclusive right of a state to wield its power over its territory and population without being subordinated to another country. Thus, sovereign states "develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their own decisions about how to meet whatever needs they experience and whatever desires they develop."<sup>85</sup>

However, the concept of sovereignty is not practical but theoretical. John Boli describes it this way: "The essence of sovereignty is thus theoretical, not empirical; it is the theory that the national polity, as organized by the state, is the pinnacle of authority, neither subordinate to the world polity nor defied by local polities or organizations. How much the sovereign state is in fact influenced by external or internal actors is a question of power, status, will, and effectiveness, but not one of authority *per se*."<sup>86</sup> He considered sovereignty as being confronted with the increasing interdependence of the international system;

"As the world polity intensifies, state concern to delimit the polity, reduce the influence of outside actors, and gain greater influence over the outside environments is heightened. Conceptually, this triple concern has two major, contradictory implications; (a) *National Sovereignty becomes an increasingly powerful ideological claim, and (b) The incapacity of the sovereign state acting alone to assure national success becomes increasingly apparent.*"<sup>87</sup>

Actually, though the world has been integrated by several technological development, it could not satisfy or alleviate the inextinguishable demand for the sovereignty of a state (or nation). This can be illustrated by the contemporary crises proclaimed by small states in the name of 'national sovereignty'

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<sup>83</sup>Joseph Malia, "Buffer States: The Issue of Sovereignty," in Chay and Ross, (1986) p.31.

<sup>84</sup>John Boli, "Sovereignty from a World Polity Perspective," presented at the Annual Meetings of The American Sociological Association, Miami, FL, Aug. 1993, p.9.

<sup>85</sup>Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979) p.96.

<sup>86</sup>John Boli, (1993) p.11.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, p.23.

or 'self-determination,' such as the conflicts in the Balkans and in Russia, Iraq's rejection of UN sanctions on oil exports, several Arab and other states' rejection of the extension of NPT, and so on. In other words, it is hard to identify the scope of sovereignty. Sovereignty is a very subjective concept. Thus, on the one hand, it is usually conceived as natural objective of a state, but, on the other hand, it is used as an excuse to legitimize a country's violation or deviation of international norms. Consequently, especially for small states, 'sovereignty' is not only 'indispensable' as an objective of a state but also 'useful' as propaganda. Accordingly, they may use this term more frequently and enthusiastically than great powers do.

Another conceivable aim of small states is 'prestige.' In general, it is believed that prestige is not much related to small states policies. Erling Bjøl put it;

"Time and again considerations of prestige tend to influence great power behavior, both in its relation with its peers, and in relations with small states. This concern with prestige seems much less important in playing the small state role . . . the dimension of security for a small state will often be far wider."<sup>88</sup>

Surely prestige is not the first priority of small states' policies. But, it also can be an aim of them. If one considers the simple meaning of prestige - the recognition of one's strength "by other people" and also "by oneself,"<sup>89</sup> he could find there is no reason to exclude it as an aim of small states.

Actually, several cases can be picked up as illustrations. One of the reasons for Sadat's invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in Oct. 1973 was the calculation that he could be a leader of the Arab world even if he was defeated. One of the intentions of North Korea's several challenges to the United States, previously mentioned, was also aimed at being considered as a leader of the third world seeking freedom of maneuverability unbridled by either Washington or Moscow. Also, South Korea's somewhat excessive efforts to lure the World Cup (soccer game) of the year 2002 is another form of pursuing prestige.

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<sup>88</sup>Erling Bjøl, in Schou and Bruntland, (1971) pp.32-33.

<sup>89</sup>Martin Wight (1978) p.98.

Accordingly, even limited due to the lack of power<sup>90</sup>, in a certain environment and in a certain manner, small states can pursue prestige and implement it as a policy aim. Now, let's look into small states typical strategies to achieve these goals.

## **2 . Strategies of Small States**

Then, what are the strategies of small states to achieve those aims? Obviously, there are two approaches to enhance their power and significance; increasing internal strength and inducing external aid. This paper categorizes them into six items; military build-up and economic independence as for the internal efforts, neutrality, alliance, non-alignment and collective security as for the external efforts.

### ***a . Military Build-Up***

Biologically, all living things have their own last countermeasures to defend themselves from external attacks. So do small states. Nevertheless, like a weak animal unable to defend himself from the attack of a natural enemy, small states cannot generally stand up to attacks from a great power. However, even though it is true, it is still necessary to "avoid becoming just a defenseless prey." Michael Handel and Jacques Freymond put it;

"A weak state needs to be able to hold out long enough to prevent a quick takeover, or until external help from other states can be obtained. Second, and more interesting, is the development of military power by a weak state in order to deter stronger states from attacking it."<sup>91</sup>

"The greater danger for a small country is that of being speedily overrun by a great power, thus establishing a *fait accompli*, which the other powers would be inclined to accept, for fear of being exposed to an atomic [or any other] conflict, for an objective which, in itself, is of no great importance."<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup>Martin Wight said, "[Prestige is] too closely connected with power to be considered as belonging to the moral order. It is the influence derived from power. And unless the power is present power there can be little prestige." *Ibid.*, p.97.

<sup>91</sup>Michael Handel (1981) p.92.

<sup>92</sup>Jacques Freymond, "The Foreign Policy of Switzerland," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thomson ed., Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York; Harper and Row, 1963) p.155 Quoted in Handel, p.92.

This importance of the minimum military build-up in small states is proved to be an obligatory option when Kuwait was taken over by Iraq within hours in August 1990. It was not rapidly responded to by external powers. On the contrary, in the early stage of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel's well-prepared defense system enabled her to check the initiative of the Arab state - Egypt, Jordan and Syria - and to prevent a *fait accompli*. Other successful cases were the military build-up of Sweden and Switzerland. They could "develop large armies without suffering an overwhelming burden by building up their reserve system. Reserves can be called up on short notice, and their quality and training are almost equal to that of the regular units."<sup>93</sup> On the basis of this conceptualization, typically to aid with material support is more convenient for the great powers than to dispatch their troops, the military build-up in small states can be seen as another way of inducing external aid in times of crisis.

In general, it is directly connected with the establishment of domestic military industries, which has several advantages as well as disadvantages in terms of small states;

Advantages: (i) A small state can be less dependent on great power's aid, especially in wartime it does not have to depend on the continued supply of spare parts or maintenance services of a great power. (ii) A small state can have their own weapons system appropriate to their strategic environment.

Disadvantages: (i) It is too expensive. It is not reasonable for small states to produce, maintain, research and develop the modern technological weapons. (ii) A small state cannot produce the most sophisticated weapons.<sup>94</sup>

Thus, the success of this policy depends on the degree of economic and technological development of small states as well as the competence of decision makers.

#### ***b . Economic Independence***

In the earlier stage of the economic development and especially in peacetime, economic dependency on great powers is somewhat necessary for small states. That is, small states may benefit disproportionately by imitating the advances of the great powers. As Robert Gilpin put it;

"In adopting new forms, the backward society is able to skip historical stages, exploit the experience of the more advanced society, and thereby

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<sup>93</sup>Michael Handel (1981) p.79.

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.78-86.

outstrip its predecessors: *Although compelled to follow after the advanced countries, a backward country does not take things in the same order. The privilege of historic backwardness - and such privilege exists - permits, or rather compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, skipping a whole series of intermediate stages.*"<sup>95</sup>

However, if a great power becomes irredentist or becomes protective of small states, their dependence, or interdependence,<sup>96</sup> is doomed to be an Achilles' tendon. This negative result of economic dependence on a great power was illustrated by the case of an Eastern Europe that depended primarily on German products during the interwar period, 1919-1939.

On the basis of this conceptualization, several small states tried to avoid economic dependence by the policy of self-reliance or autarky. Among them the most obvious example is North Korea.<sup>97</sup> This somewhat extreme policy was employed by them due to political reasons rather than economic ones, because they thought economy was not everything. Holsti pointed out;

"Other values - in the Burmese case, national pride and fear of loss of autonomy - are also relevant. Economic gains may be forsaken in order to maximize other values. . . The incidence of international disintegration or more moat-building foreign policies in the future remain problematic. Weak and vulnerable societies involved in highly asymmetrical relationships no doubt find strategies of self-sufficiency and autarky politically, if not economically, appealing; if only to break down dependency and to reduce foreign penetration of their institutions."<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup>Robert Gilpin (1981) p.179. Italic, quoted from Trotsky.

<sup>96</sup>Because usually economic interdependence is also progressed asymmetrically, it is argued that not always does economic interdependence increase the strength of small states of bring about political integration in the international system. K. J. Holsti, "Changes in the International System: Interdependence, Integration, and Fragmentation," in Ole R. Holsti et. al., ed., Change in the International System (Boulder; Westview Press, 1980) p.40.

<sup>97</sup>The *Kim Il Sungism* or *Chuche* Idea, is based on this conception. For studying more detail; cf. Ed Paisley, "Prepared for the West," The Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 10, 1994, p.23; Tony Clifton, "Inside a New Nuclear Nemesis," Newsweek, Feb. 21, 1994, pp.28-29; Chin-wi Chong, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's involvement in the Sino-Soviet disputes, 1958-1975 (Univ.of Alabama Press, 1978) .

<sup>98</sup>K. J. Holsti, "Changes in the International System," (1980) pp.40-46.



Also, E. H. Carr said, "Autarky is not only a social necessity but an instrument of political power. It is primarily a form of preparedness for war . . . and autarky was developed as the natural defensive armament against the weapons of blockade."<sup>99</sup> However, this policy has a critical weakness. That is, it is expensive and also inefficient. Moreover, it is likely doomed to fail, consequently; because it demands abdication of the benefits of the economies of trade and to quarantine oneself from the world of technology and information. Nevertheless, autarky will remain as an alternative for small states who fear the loss of identity as a state or of sovereignty.

These internal efforts, however, are less crucial for small states than external sources of strength and "constitute a relatively [smaller] part of their strength than is the case for the great powers."<sup>100</sup> Thus, it *must* seek external support.

### *c. Neutrality*

Another option is to achieve neutrality. Rothstein explains why a small state wants to be a neutral:

"One reason is that small powers tend to rely on the hope that they can be protected by their own insignificance. If they can appear detached enough, and disinterested enough, and if they can convincingly indicate that they are too powerless to affect the issue, they hope the storm will pass them by."<sup>101</sup>

However, without respect to small states' will, neutrality seems to be conditioned on the acceptance of the great powers:

"Neutrality requires the tolerance, agreement, or approval of the great powers - at least those in the immediate vicinity - to underwrite or guarantee the neutrality of the small state, as in the case of Belgium and the Treaty of London. Several neutrality policies adopted in the interwar period were rendered superfluous when Nazi Germany simply chose not to honor them. Neutrality arrangements are usually founded on the mutual self-interest principle, and if this mutual self-interest on the part of the great powers breaks

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<sup>99</sup>E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (1939) pp.120-123.

<sup>100</sup>Michael Handel (1981) pp.68-70.

<sup>101</sup>Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (1968) p.26.

down, so too does the viability of the neutrality policy."<sup>102</sup>

"[success] depended on convincing the power pressing the small state that its continued neutrality was advantageous to the great power too. The small state's leaders had to make clear that the belligerent's major requirements could be satisfied without the use of force or that the use of force would be too expensive in terms of the benefits sought and the larger dividends available if applied elsewhere."<sup>103</sup>

By the same token, as Efraim Karsh said in terms of the geographical situation of oneself, "neutrality did not constitute a viable foreign policy course for a buffer state," because it "exposes itself to the force of both belligerents at once."<sup>104</sup> This restriction can be illustrated by the experiences of Belgium and the Netherlands.

Neutrality had been the general security policy of Belgium and the Netherlands since the 1815 Congress of Vienna had established that they were to be buffer states against future French expansion. But, with the Belgian War of Independence in 1830, this first version of neutrality collapsed and was replaced at the London Conference of 1839 by the policy that the neutrality of both countries would be enforced and protected by the great powers, especially by the United Kingdom.

Actually, in 1870, when France and Prussia were on the verge of war, Great Britain extracted a promise from both to leave neutral Belgium untouched. The Belgians were saved and their "achievement of noninvolvement and non-immolation created a state of euphoria in the country."<sup>105</sup> However, the experience of World War I changed Belgian security policy. In 1914, the Schlieffen Plan's success depended on Germany's swift defeat of Belgian resistance. This experience of overrun and occupation led the post-World War Belgium to attempt to make bilateral treaties with Britain and France rather than stick to the neutrality syndrome, simultaneously trying to join the League of Nations. The first result was the military accord with France, but the accord did not guarantee

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<sup>102</sup>Allen Sens, "The Security of Small states in Post-Cold War Europe," (1993) pp.236-237.

<sup>103</sup>Annette B. Fox (1959) p.180.

<sup>104</sup>Efraim Karsh (1988) pp.4, 87.

<sup>105</sup>Robert Rothstein (1968) p.66.

automatic military assistance.<sup>106</sup> In 1924, Belgium took part in the Locarno Pact which "strengthened the guarantee provided by Great Britain and the League of Nations and rectified the imbalance exhibited by the accord with France."<sup>107</sup> For Belgium, Locarno meant a return to the past. Belgium could concentrate on other matters, while security was left to the great powers. She "began to feel as secure as under the aegis of the treaties of 1839, and, again, began to make the same mistakes."<sup>108</sup> In late 1930s, Belgium became to perceive the scene changed and proclaimed the new policy of armed neutrality. But, it was too late.

On the other hand, the Netherlands was untouched during the first World War. Thus, her security policy during the inter-war period was "simply a continuation of the successful policy of unarmed neutrality, a moralistic public philosophy stressing the role of international law, and abstentionism from security alliance."<sup>109</sup> By the same token, the Dutch were reluctant to join the League of Nations, since "league members might have to apply sanctions against aggressor states."<sup>110</sup> Thus, despite the increasing insecurity in Europe, they remained firm to declare unarmed neutrality.

#### *d. Alliance*

Another alternative of small states policies is to seek allies. Generally, two different ways are employed; balancing and bandwagoning.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>106</sup>Rothstein said, "the official version of the accord eliminated 'a la fois (at once)'. Hence the accord would come into operation if either Belgium or France were attacked separately." *Ibid.*, p.83.

<sup>107</sup>Luc Reyckler, "The Passive Constrained: Belgian Security Policy in the 1980s," in Gregory Flynn ed., NATO's Northern Allies (London; Rowman & Allanheld Publisher, 1985) p.4.

<sup>108</sup>Robert Rothstein (1968) p.95.

<sup>109</sup>George J. Stein, Benelux Security Cooperation : A New European Defense Community? (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1990) p.4.

<sup>110</sup>Jan G. Siccamo, "The Netherlands Depillarized: Security Policy in a New Domestic Context," in Gregory Flynn ed., (1985) p. 115.

<sup>111</sup>Stephen Walt explained, "When confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger." Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca; Cornell Univ. Press, 1987) p. 17.

### (1) Balancing and Bandwagoning

Traditionally balancing as a way of foreign policy had implied the balance against the emergence of a predominant power. This idea was fashioned during the Renaissance period,<sup>112</sup> and consolidated by the real implementation of it into the international system through interstate agreements, such as the Treaty of Utrecht and the Congress of Vienna. Rather than confirming this belief, Walt reveals the missing point of the traditional balance of power concept. He proposes that "states do not balance solely against power, but they balance against threat," especially in case of a small state, because, in general, they are "indifferent to the global balance of power."<sup>113</sup> Here, the concept of threat is broader than that of power, since "it includes [the several variables, such as] aggregate power, proximity to a target, offensive capability, and perceived intentions."<sup>114</sup>

However, the more important thing for small states is geographic location, as previously mentioned. If a small state is situated in the middle of two confronting great powers, its balancing behavior will be effective. Since its own weight is not heavy enough, a small state can hold the balance of the fulcrum only in the very limited situations. Thus, in most of cases, small states are "likely to bandwagon rather than balance."<sup>115</sup> On the other hand, another view of alliance reveals the

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<sup>112</sup>Alfred Vagts, "The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea," World Politics, Vol. I, No.1, Oct. 1948, p.83. Organski also said that Even though "some writers," [such as Thucydides who many times pointed out that Sparta was responding to the "rising power" of Carthago, "] "have trace the operation of the balance of power back as far as the Greek city states, there is general agreement that the balance of power was operating by the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries are believed to have been the golden age of the balance of power, the period when this complicated international mechanism worked best. The 19th century saw a continuation of the operation of the balance of power. It is only in the 20th century that the mechanism is believed to have broken down, and already, new balances are seen to be emerging." A.F.K. Organski (1960) p.280.

<sup>113</sup>Stephen Walt, (1987) pp.17-32, pp.147-180 He clarified this point, saying "if states were concerned solely with balancing power, we would expect to see many of the current allies of the United States align with the Soviet Union instead," because the United States has been stronger than the Soviet Union in global terms throughout the period since World War II. (p.275)

<sup>114</sup>Robert O. Keohane, "Alliance, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism," International Security, Vol. 13, No.1, Summer 1988, p.171.

<sup>115</sup>Stephen Walt proposed that the weaker the state, the less possible the outside assistance, the more imminent the war, a small state tends to bandwagon. cf. Stephen Walt (1987)

missing point of the Walt's 'balance of power threat' theory. Randall L. Schweller criticizes; "Balance of threat theory is designed to consider only cases in which the goal of alignment is security, and so it systematically excludes alliance driven by profit," in other words, "bandwagoning for profits" or "predatory buck-passing: riding free on the offensive efforts of others to gain unearned spoils."<sup>116</sup> Noticing that "the concept of bandwagoning is not the opposite of balancing," he defined them; "balancing is driven by desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain. . . In the language of systems theory, bandwagoning is a form of positive feedback. By contrast, the purpose of balancing behavior is to prevent systemic disequilibrium or when, deterrence fails, to restore the balance. Balancing is a form of negative feedback."<sup>117</sup> However, his explanation is still ambiguous in terms of small states behavior, since they also bandwagon to avoid losses or to be delivered (passed over) from the crisis, such as the bandwagoning of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria before Hitler's irredentist threat.<sup>118</sup> Therefore to distinguish balancing from bandwagoning in terms of aims, whichever it is to avoid losses or to gain profit, is not worth, because balancing and bandwagoning are simply opposite sides of the same coin. In other words, a coin has two sides, with different designs respectively, but the value of the coin is not affected by its posture, but rather by the general monetary market. Similarly, the two main policies of alliance, balancing and bandwagoning, are

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pp.28-32. Previously, Rothstein put it;

"Small powers threatened by neighboring great powers, or intent on securing benefits for themselves in the course of great power conflicts, were forced to play a perilous game: moving quickly from the lighter to the heavier side of the balance as soon as an apparent victor in any contest could be discerned. . . Small powers conceived as scavengers, forever seeking the crumbs left over from a great power settlement."

Robert Rothstein, (1968) pp.11-12.

<sup>116</sup>Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 74 (footnote), 79.

<sup>117</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.74, 92-93.

<sup>118</sup>Even though Rumania had territorial gain in mind when it joined Hitler's 1941 invasion of Russia, as did Finland, it is overstating that she bandwagoned only for getting that profit without mentioning the intention of avoiding losses or being delivered from Hitler's likely aggression, in case of rejecting to cooperate.

seemingly different. But, the effectiveness of alliance does not depend on the policy itself but on the international system where the alliance belongs to. On the other hand, the types of alliance can be distinguished by the number of members composing it; bilateral, multilateral alliance and alliance among small states.

(2) Bilateral Alliance (with a great power)

Alliance, especially a bilateral alliance, is contracted when both participants have common interests. As for small states, their concerns for security from regional threats (rather than global ones), regional stability and an increase in status make them search out a strong ally.<sup>119</sup> On the other hand, as for great powers, their motives to enter into bilateral alliance with a small state can be summed up; 1) aggregation or addition of power; 2) preclusive alliance, that is, diversion of small state power from alliance with an adversary; and 3) disguise of their control over the lesser ally's actions.<sup>120</sup>

However, despite common interests, there still are several problems for each state, because the small state may "insist on its right to be consulted, but de-emphasize the relevancy of the power contribution it can make" and, on the other hand, the great power, "with interests and responsibilities in a various areas, may seek a narrowly conceived alliance in order to be free to use its noncommitted power elsewhere."<sup>121</sup> Besides, small states would fear unwilling involvement in the conflicts of the great powers, the great power's unilateral abdication of the alliance, the reduction in foreign policy flexibility and freedom, and the great power's economic, social and cultural penetration, and so on. On the other hand, the great powers would also be reluctant to ally with small states

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<sup>119</sup>George Liska, Alliance and the Third World (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1968) pp.27-29; Allen Sens (1993) pp.234-235.

<sup>120</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.30-32. These motives of great powers' involvements into bilateral alliances are well matched with the inherent functions of an alliance. In general, it is said that the functions of alliance are the aggregation of power, inter-allied control, promotion of international order and deterrence by the enhancement of counteraction probability. cf. George Liska (1968) pp.24-25; and Robert Kann, "Alliance versus Entente," World Politics, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, July 1976, pp.616-619.

<sup>121</sup>Robert L. Rothstein, (1968) p.58.

because they tend to shop freely.<sup>122</sup> Then, how can a small state induce a great power and strengthen its commitment to the alliance? Michael Handel answered acutely:

- 1) Strategy of unilateral invoking: The small state will very often clarify the verbal commitments unilaterally, in such a way as to favor its own interests. The great or superpower can do very little about this, short of openly repudiating the weak state's actions and thus further diluting its own commitments.
- 2) Strategy of penetration: The small state can appeal to public opinion in the strong state. There are three ways of penetration achieved through; public officials, lobbyists and foreign propaganda.
- 3) Strategy of trip-wire: The small state can induce the great power to station troops and maintain bases on their territory.<sup>123</sup>

### (3) Multilateral Alliance

Since it is usually a more institutionalized type of alliance, the multilateral alliance has "traditionally been regarded as a favorable option for small states."<sup>124</sup> Several advantages for small states are enumerated: 1) greater deterrent effects; 2) the potential defense capability; 3) heavier political weight in the decision making process among allies; 4) less dependence on a single powerful state within or outside the alliance than a bilateral alliance; 5) expanded role of a small state as mediator among the allies; and 6) increased influence and prestige of small states.<sup>125</sup>

Nevertheless, this type of alliance is hard to achieve, since it is not easy to find the common interests among several states. Moreover, even if there are stakes for all of them, the profit of the alliance does not dispel the problem of the responsibility. The decision making process would be more complex and less flexible. Also, when the crisis emerges, it would be more fragile than the bilateral one. Furthermore, in terms of military operations, it needs hard-to-achieve cooperation, such as combined command and control system, combined doctrine and weapons system, and so on. Thus, it tends to be more nominal than the bilateral one. On the other hand, if the alliance is based on the

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<sup>122</sup>About the disadvantages of the unequal bilateral alliance, see; Michael Handel (1981) pp.127-129; Allen Sens (1993) p.235; and George Liska (1968) pp.3-5.

<sup>123</sup>Michael Handel (1981) pp.123-126; and Stephen Walt (1987) pp.46-47.

<sup>124</sup>Allen Sens (1993) p.235.

<sup>125</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.235-236.

strong leadership of a predominant power and if she is willing to take the burden, like the United States in NATO, the situation, so called "the equilibrium of complementary (global or regional) imbalances under the leadership of a primary world power,"<sup>126</sup> would be very practical and beneficial to small states.

#### (4) Alliance among Small States

Besides alliances with great powers, it is possible for a small state to ally with other small states for coping with the '*regional*' threat.<sup>127</sup> These small states, in general, gather together for the limited purposes of ; 1)"showing the coordinated opposition" to the expansionist state, and thus, enabling her to save face; 2) controlling or preventing other small allies from provoking expansionism; 3) consolidating the economic, political, social and cultural exchanges.<sup>128</sup>

In the case of the security alliance, the aggregation of small states does not yield sufficient weight. On the contrary, it would aggravate the situation, once the threat from a great power emerges, due to the disorder among them. In that case, each member of the alliance would seek another great power instead of consolidating the alliance. Thus, this type of alliance is not fit for confronting serious security threats. The failure of the Little Entente to keep the solidarity among them in the face of the German threat illustrates the weakness of an alliance of small states.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>126</sup>George Liska (1968) p.17.

<sup>127</sup>An alliance among small states is restricted in terms of its capability to meet the threats. Rothstein and Handel put it;

"An alliance of small powers is an instrument of limited utility. It neither can nor is designed to handle major military threats. When small powers are threatened by great powers, they must turn to other powers for support. . . Statesmen are wrong in assuming that a combination of small powers is equivalent to a great power."

"Alliances of weak states are usually created an hoc for a temporally limited goal or a single issue."

Robert Rothstein (1968) pp.169-171; and Michael Handel (1981) p.153.

<sup>128</sup>George Liska (1968) pp.50-53.

<sup>129</sup>Martin Wight summarizes the situation;

"They (Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia) had no common policy towards the other great powers. Czechoslovakia and Rumania established diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union when she adopted



### *e . Non-alignment*

Non-alignment was the by-product of the East-West confrontation. The advocates of non-alignment proclaimed; "The world does not consist of black or white only. There are many grey areas too. Since there is a third choice, why should one color-blindly and inflexibly follow either the black or white path? We will follow our own path separately from the East and the West."<sup>130</sup> Also, it should be differentiated from 'neutrality' or 'neutralism.' Radovan Vukadinovic put it;

"In the first years of their action, the non-aligned countries resolutely refused the policy of neutrality in international relations, emphasizing that they were not passive observers of international relations, but that they wanted to influence by their policy in international relations, a new trend indicating the abolition of the bloc restraint and of the domination of great countries."<sup>131</sup>

Opposing the duopolistic international system, where the two superpowers succeeded in emphasizing their "privileged rights," the advocates of non-alignment policy proclaimed "the universal democratization of international relations"; respect for the sovereignty, independence and equality of all states, and the repugnance of the policy of force and of interference into the businesses of other countries.<sup>132</sup> Accordingly, their power-base was the aggregate veto in the international organizations.

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an anti-revisionist policy and entered the League of Nations in 1934; Yugoslavia oddly refused, because of the Tsarist loyalties of King Alexander and his successor the regent Prince Paul. Czechoslovakia made a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union in 1935, and one of the subsidiary themes of the Munich crisis was uncertainty whether Czechoslovakia's ally Rumania would allow Soviet forces to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia across her own territory that intervened. When the Nazi Revolution began to spread its ripples across Europe, the Little Entente powers did not unite more closely against a danger greater to each of them than the Hungarians." Martin Wight (1978) pp.134-135.

<sup>130</sup>Hae Kwang Chang, Non-alignment: Rhetoric and Behavior: A Study of North Korean Foreign Policy with Special Reference to Titoism, 1955-1975 (Ann Arbor; Univ. Microfilms International, 1984) p.144.

<sup>131</sup>Radovan Vukadinovic, "Small States and the Policy of Non-alignment," in Schou and Bruntland (1971) p.106.

<sup>132</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.103-105, 110.

However, like the alliance system among small states, non-aligned states were inherently unable to cope with threats, especially those from great powers. Thus, once the danger increases in the region, non-aligned states would "veer toward alignment," because they would find that "a free hand" means an "empty and unarmed hand."<sup>133</sup> Actually, non-alignment was not only nominal and propagandistic, such as Cuba's "crypto alignment,"<sup>134</sup> but also a disguise for nationalism, furthered by anti-colonial movements and the emergence of independent small states in the Third World. Moreover, it was also possible only in the diffusive" international system, that is, a less coercive or hierarchical system.<sup>135</sup>

#### *f. Collective Security*

If it works well, the collective security system would be the most favorable one for small states to pursue. It "binds and restricts the great powers, and in the case of potential aggressors, deters them in a fashion the small states could not hope to achieve through bilateral or even multilateral efforts."<sup>136</sup> The idea of collective security came from the critics for the evil nature of balance of power policy. To keep the world out of war, international organizations have been embodied in the name of collective security. The League of Nations and the United Nations were the products. However, this idea inherently lacks understanding of nature of international politics. Inis L. Claude criticized it as just an ideological and too moralistic device:

"Collective security has been adopted but not accepted; it had been vaguely institutionalized but without serious prospect of implementation. The wilsonian drama had been a success at the ideological box office and a flop in the critical circles where policy was determined. . . It requires a belief that what is good for the world is good for the state. . . It's not unrealistic about

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<sup>133</sup>George Liska (1968) p.20.

<sup>134</sup>Cuba was a prominent member of the conferences of the non-aligned countries. But, its actual policy was, geneally speaking, bandwagoning with the Soviet Union.

<sup>135</sup>K. J. Holsti, International Politics (Prentice Hall, 1977) 3rd ed., pp.361-364; Quoted in Hae Kwang Chang, " (1984) p.146.

<sup>136</sup>Allen Sens (1993) p.232.

power but unrealistic about policy."<sup>137</sup>

In addition, even it is working well, the principal requirement of the implementation of its norm is the existence of a leader. This was illustrated by the successful cases of UN operations in Korea and in Kuwait. Conversely, the collapse of the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization) after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the recent disputes in NATO on the issue of the Bosnian crisis are cases that illustrate how much important the leadership role of a great power is in the collective security organization.

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<sup>137</sup>Inis L. Claude, Power and Interantional Relations (New York; Knopf, 1962) pp. 155, 200-204.



## IV . HYPOTHESES

Two different, but possibly complementary, realist interpretations of international relations, structural theories (or systems theories) are relevant to the objective of this study of small states. Both hegemonic theory and balance of power theory can be used to develop hypotheses regarding the role and significance of small states as active and influential players.

### A . HEGEMONIC THEORY

The common starting point of the hegemonic theories is that the international system is continually changing with recurrent patterns, such as Gilpin's four cyclical phases,<sup>138</sup> or with the combined pattern, such as the linear change of the international system from the preindustrial system to the post-industrial stage, accompanied by repetitive changes of war and peace or equilibrium and disequilibrium.<sup>139</sup> This change of the international system is caused by the 'uneven growth' among members owing to the 'diminishing returns' and the 'advantages of peripheries.' Thus, peace can be established and guaranteed only when the control of a hegemonic power is firm;<sup>140</sup> and becomes

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<sup>138</sup>Robert Gilpin categorized the phases of the system (or systemic) change by four stages - stability and change, growth and expansion, equilibrium and decline, and hegemonic war and change. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981) pp.9-49.

<sup>139</sup>A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1960) pp.300-325.

<sup>140</sup>This is another main argument of the hegemonic theory. E.H. Carr's remarks that "any international moral order must rest on some hegemonic power " and "The new international order can be built only on a unit of power sufficiently strong to maintain its ascendancy" are believed to affect Organski's conceptualization of the precondition for peace. He said, "Peace is possible only when those possessing preponderant power are in firm control and are satisfied with [the existing international order]. . . A preponderance of power on one side, on the other hand, increases the chances for peace, for the greatly stronger side need not fight at all to get what it wants, while the weaker side would be plainly foolish to attempt to battle for what it wants." Gilpin also agreed on this point, saying "although the rights and rules governing interstate behavior are to varying degrees based on consensus and mutual interest, the primary foundation of the rights and rules is in the power and interests of the dominant groups or states in a social system." Modelski, Johnson, and Wu also emphasized the 'police actions' of the predominant power and wrote that "we would expect these wars to be relatively more likely . . . when the global system is moving toward multipolarity and losing its capacity for maintaining order, possibly in part because of the strain occasioned by the police actions of an earlier phase." And, these arguments were confirmed again by Robert Keohane's theory of 'a period of hegemonic stability.' cf. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (1939) pp.168,235; A.F.K. Organski (1960) pp.293, 364; Robert Gilpin (1981) p.35;

threatened when challengers have grown strong enough to confront the predominant power. At this point, it is usually hard to avoid hegemonic war, because the "intensification of conflicts among states is the consequence of the closing in of space and opportunities." That is, there is no more free space (or power vacuum) to exploit without being confronted by other powers, because, for the declining power, it is hard to aggregate power by alliances in order to keep its predominance, and because even appeasement cannot satisfy the demands of the challengers. To the contrary, it will only "whet the appetite for still greater concessions."<sup>141</sup>

From this theory, at least two hypotheses are available for small states. At first, *if the international system is stable, that is, if a predominant power controls the whole system firmly, there is no choice for small states but to bandwagon to the hegemonic power (Hypothesis I)*. In this environment, the weight of small states is determined by the will of the hegemon.<sup>142</sup> Loyalty may be the most feasible option for small states. This is based on the conception that, as for the hegemonic

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Modelski, Johnson, and Wu, The Long Cycle and Wars, 1770-1975: A Preliminary Test of Theory (International Studies Association/West, Annual Meeting, Portland, Oregon, 1979) pp.5-6; Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (1977) pp.44-66; Robert Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Ole Holsti et. al. ed., Change in the International System (1980) pp. 132-138; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton; Princeton Univ. Press, 1984) pp. 31-46; Alan C. Lamborn, The Price of Power (1991) pp.35-38.

<sup>141</sup>About the difficulty of the peaceful change, see; Robert Gilpin (1981) pp.188-207 and A.F.K. Organski (1960) pp.323-325. Gilpin writes, "In the absence of shared values and interests, the mechanism of peaceful change has little chance of success."(p.209)

<sup>142</sup>Robert Keohane put it:

"Hegemons may prevent middle-sized state from exploiting small ones and may construct a structure of order conducive to world economic growth; but they may also exploit smaller states economically or distort their patterns of autonomous development through economic, political, or military intervention. The issue of whether hegemony helps poor countries cannot be answered unconditionally, because too many other factors intervene. Until a more complex and sophisticated theory of the relationships among hegemony, other factors, and welfare is developed, it remains an empirically open question."

Robert Keohane (1984) p. 45 (footnote).

power, since there is no imminent threat, there is no reason to stir up other states by punishing a loyal state. Yet, in this system, small states are prone to be ignored.

On the other side of the same coin, one can notice that if the international system is approaching a hegemonic war, that is, if the challenging power has become strong enough to confront the dominant power, or if the latter has weakened so much, due to diminishing returns, that it cannot prevent the challenging power from growing further, the significance of small states may increase, as would their flexibility in security policy. The predominant but declining power tries to aggregate power by allying with other states, even with small states. The former tends to "increase its commitments without a commensurate increase in the resources devoted by its allies to finance those commitments." However, as their capabilities increase by the commitments of the great but declining power, small states "may turn against" it.<sup>143</sup> Thus, during the period between when the predominant power perceives its decline and the necessity of aggregating power, and when the power balance is becoming visibly inclined to one side, small states enjoy greater freedom of maneuverability and possess heavier weight on the 'fulcrum.' Yet, this situation is not exclusively favorable for small states because of increased probability of war. Therefore, one can hypothesize that; *The more unstable the dominance of the hegemonic power, the greater the importance of small states, but the more dangerous to their security, or even survival (Hypothesis II).*

## B . BALANCE OF POWER THEORY

Unlike hegemonic theory, balance of power theory proposes that if power is evenly distributed among states, that is, if there is an international equilibrium in terms of power, there would be peace. Since "war is begun with the expectation of winning,"<sup>144</sup> if there is the parity among states, it would keep a potential transgressor from attacking others. In other words, peace is achieved when power is distributed and balanced among two or more great powers, but not when predominantly possessed

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<sup>143</sup>Robert Gilpin (1981) p.193. Organski, with the similar perception, put it; "They do not possess the power to overturn the international order by themselves. They are dangerous only collectively, if they join the side of a major challenger. . . Therefore, [they] will not become involved in a major war against the dominant nation unless it can team up with a real challenger of considerably great strength." A.F.K. Organski (1960) pp. 330, 334.

<sup>144</sup>Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York; Random House, 1962) p.56.

by one great power.<sup>145</sup> Thus, the balance of power system is likely to protect small states' independence, "for [the balance of power] prevented the rise of any one nation to such power as would have enabled it to destroy the independence of all the others."<sup>146</sup> However, the term 'balance of power' itself is not clear but very abstract and confusing concept.<sup>147</sup> Organski criticized that "the term is used to refer to an equal distribution of power, sometimes to a preponderance of power, sometimes to the existing distribution of power regardless of whether it is balanced or not, sometimes to any stable distribution of power. Worst of all, the term is sometimes used as a synonym for power

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<sup>145</sup>About this argument, there have been a lot of disputes between the hegemonic theorists and the balance of power theorists. Inis Claude examined those disputes in detail. See; *Ibid.*, pp. 11-93. On the other hand, Michael Sullivan carefully described the relationship between power parity and the stability of the international system as: "The more parity nations have with each other, the greater the probability of conflict, but the closer toward a one-to-one relation, perhaps the opposite process may begin to operate, stifling aggressive tendencies because of the fifty-fifty chance of losing. Inequality may be more plausibly linked to a low probability of conflict as well as low levels of intensity in any conflict that does break out; the greater the equality, the greater the probability of conflict breaking out as well as the greater the likelihood of highly intense conflict. However, the closer a dyad is to perfect parity, the probability is that conflict might decrease. At the same time, if conflict were to break out in such an equal situation, the intensity of that conflict would likely be high." cf. Michael Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International Politics (1990) p.79; also confer, Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs Neo-realist Theory," International Security, Vol. 19, No.1, Summer 1994, pp.129-148.

<sup>146</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, p.205 Also, Spykman said, "A small state is a vacuum in a high pressure area. It does not live because of its strength but because of nobody wants its territory, or because its preservation as a buffer state or as a weight in the balance of power is of interest to a stronger nation. When the balance disappears, the small state usually disappears with it." N.J. Spykman, quoted in Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (1981) p. 176.

<sup>147</sup>Martin Wight pointed out this problem, distinguishing the 'balance of power' from the 'pattern of power': "It means thinking of the powers less as pieces on a chessboard than as weights in a pair of scales; we mentally pluck them out of their geographical setting and arrange them according to their alliances and affinities, with the underlying notion of matching their moral weight and internal strength. The pattern of power leads to considerations of strategy; the balance of power leads to consideration of military potential, diplomatic initiative and economic strength." Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," in Diplomatic Investigations (1966) p.149; and also see, Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in Alan James ed., The Bases of International Order (London; Oxford Univ. Press, 1973) pp.85-115; Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" World Politics, Vol. V, No.4, July 1953, pp.447-468.



politics in general. *The balance is all thing to all men.*"<sup>148</sup> For convenience, therefore, in this study, the 'balance of power' system is generally used as an equivalent conception with the 'competitive' system, in other words, a 'non-unipolar' system.

However, this is not to say that, in a competitive system, small states are always more secure and beneficial than in a hegemonic system. Still it should be articulated that the great powers intentions are also important. If they are willing to restrain themselves and cooperate to maintain the balance, that is, if they tend to keep the *equilibrium*, small states would become more dependent on the decisions of great powers, and moreover, lose freedom of maneuver considerably. Many examples illustrate the validity of this argument. Those are the four partitions of Poland, the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 dividing North Africa, the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 dividing Persia, the Munich Treaty, and the Russo-German Non-aggression Pact in 1939.<sup>149</sup> On the other hand, if great powers are more willing to compete for the aggregation of relative power advantages, they would be more favorable to small states. That is, "as long as the great powers fear each other, the small states are assured a certain amount of independence."<sup>150</sup> Actually, this is a more permanent characteristic of the behavior of great powers, because, as Morgenthau pointed out, "all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance - that is, equality - of power, but at superiority of power."<sup>151</sup>

Thus, one can hypothesize that: *If the division of strength between (or among) great powers is almost even - if the system is in tension and there is a state of conflict, that is if the balance of power context is at stake*<sup>152</sup>, *or if all great powers are weakened or not willing to take part in the*

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<sup>148</sup>A.F.K. Organski (1960) p.285. Emphasis added by the author.

<sup>149</sup>Michael Handel (1981) p.177.

<sup>150</sup>A.F.K. Organski (1960) p.279.

<sup>151</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1973) p.208.

<sup>152</sup>From the perspective of the balance of power theorists, a war results from the failure to maintain the balance, or from the calculation that it "is the final method for preserving the balance as a system." cf. Inis L. Claude (1962) p.52; Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making," The Journal of Politics, Aug. 1953, Vol. 15, p.377; George Liska, The International Equilibrium (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1957) p.34; Edward Vose Gulick,

*balance of power system,<sup>153</sup> the significance of small states increases and so does their freedom of maneuver in foreign policy. On the other hand, the greater the gap between (or among) great powers, the less the powerful pay attention to small states (Hypothesis III).* In other words, the more great powers are prone to pursue prestige, namely 'the policy of prestige,' or the "balance of disequilibrium,"<sup>154</sup> the more they are willing to pay to small states to attract them to their side, the greater the benefits small states are able to get. Also, *if "great powers are oriented toward maintaining the Status Quo, or when no agreement can be reached between (or among) them, they neutralize each other (or one another) and thus strengthen the position of small states. [But,] if they can reach an agreement, it would be disadvantageous to small states,"<sup>155</sup> and thus, small states' concerns are likely to be ignored (Hypothesis IV).*

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Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York; Cornell Univ. Press, 1955) p.36.

<sup>153</sup>Michael Handel described this type of system as the "balance of weakness." He put it; "These were the circumstances in which the Baltic States were established at the end of the First World War, when Russia and Germany, the two great Baltic powers, were temporarily defeated and weakened internally, and could not object by force. . . The Danubian states also enjoyed considerable freedom of maneuver during the 1920s as a result of the power vacuum left by the weakening of Germany and Russia. This situation changed once German power revived in the mid-thirties, for the Germans began to penetrate the Danubian and Balkan countries." Michael Handel (1981) p.180.

<sup>154</sup>Nicholas J. Spykman's comment has been usually quoted for describing this term. He put it; "The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. There is no possibility of action if one's strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used. . . The balance desired is the one which neutralizes other states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the deciding voice."

Also, Martin Wight expressed it as "the principle that my side ought to have a margin of strength," and "possessing predominance." cf. Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York; Harcourt, 1942) pp. 21-22; Ernst B. Haas (1953) p.450; Inis L. Claude (1962) pp.14-15; Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France Between Two World Wars* (New York; Harcourt, 1940) pp. 115, 126; and Martin Wight (1966) pp. 158, 165.

<sup>155</sup>Michael Handel (1981) pp.184-185.

On the other hand, while the domain of the international system has expanded from a region to cover the whole world, "there has been steady reduction in the number of great powers." That is, "though the field of the balance of power expanded, the number of decisive weight has decreased."<sup>156</sup> This fact gives us another insight into the relationship between the significance of small states and the number of great powers balancing one another. Simply, if there are three great powers, *i.e.* Power A, B and C, and if Power A and B are willing to aggregate power, it would be natural for them to seek first Power C rather than other small states. The same conception can be applied to an international system that has more great powers. On the contrary, if there are only two hostile great powers, they would compete for allying with small states without any hesitation.

However, this argument may be accused of oversimplification and ambiguity of using the term 'small states.' For example, from the perspectives of the Superpowers during the Cold War era, there was no single smaller state that could turn the balance between them. Yet, it was also true that no one can regard Germany as a small state like India. In other words, all states were small states compared to the two Superpowers, but, among them, there was a stratification of priority the alliance partner for the Superpowers. Accordingly, it would be rational to hypothesize that: *the less the number of the balancing great powers (or group of nations), the more the significance of small states, because a great power is generally "interested in a balance which is in her favor" - "balance of disequilibrium" and is thus willing to aggregate power by allying with the greatest one among others not involved in alliance with her (Hypothesis V).*

Through combining the hypotheses developed so far, one can imagine that the "competitive system," namely the balance of power system, is more favorable to small states than the hegemonic one.<sup>157</sup> It does not mean that the balance of power theory is more viable than hegemonic theory, but

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<sup>156</sup>Martin Wight (1966) p.167.

<sup>157</sup>Michael Handel observes that small states in a hegemonic system "can get protection or material aid in time of need, but in return it has to render services which considerably limit its freedom of action and decision on a large variety of international issues. On almost every issue [they] have to follow the great power's lead and continuously try to please it." On the other hand, he compares the competitive system with the hegemonic system, and identifies small states as great power's assets in three types of competitive systems - multipolar, bipolar, and unit-veto system, where it is "important for the great powers to secure the friendship of the weak states not

it means that if there are two or more conflicting great powers, it would be better for small states as they would enjoy relatively greater freedom of maneuver. *Therefore, from the viewpoints of small states, the more competitive and the more balanced the international system, the more advantageous to them, and thus, the more they are apt to pursue the policy of status quo (a kind of balancing behavior). Besides of this, in this situation they can also seek to change the status quo by enticing a giant power's support (another type of balancing behavior). Accordingly, in the competitive system small states would prefer balancing to bandwagoning in order to maintain the favorable environment last longer (Hypothesis VI).*<sup>158</sup>

Unfortunately, however, this favorable period usually quickly passes away, if there is no consensus and cooperation made among great powers. Also, since small states tend to be more sensitive to even a minimum threat and they are likely to seek "survival" rather than "freedom of maneuver," when one of great powers gets the initiative, they will bandwagon with the most imminently threatening power.<sup>159</sup> Here, one can differentiate between offensive bandwagoning, such as Italy's attack on France in 1940, and defensive bandwagoning, such as Hungary and Finland right before the Second

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only for their positive support and potential contribution to the war effort, but also to prevent them from diverting the strength of the powers to secondary threats of war and thus reducing their ability to concentrate against the major opponents." Michael Handel (1981) pp.132, 183.

<sup>158</sup>George Liska supports this point. He writes, "when, however, the balance is rigid and the withholding power of a smaller state nil, international conflict is likely to diminish yet further the independence and the security of a minor ally." George Liska (1957) p.49.

<sup>159</sup>About this point, Stephen Walt, Paul Schroeder and Randall Schweller all agreed, even though they are opposed as to 'balancing' and 'bandwagoning.' For example, Stephen Walt argued that states are prone to balance against threats not against power, and said "weak states will be concerned primarily with events in their immediate vicinity. Moreover, weak states can be expected to balance when threatened by states with roughly equal capabilities but they will be tempted to bandwagon when threatened by a great power." By the same token, yet merely using different term - "balance of interests," Randall Schweller pointed out states are likely to bandwagon for profit. Thus, it is a kind of common sense that small states are apt to bandwagon with a great power when they are threatened by another great power. But, the difference is that whether the object of bandwagoning is the source of threat (as Walt said) or the source of benefits (as Schweller said). cf. Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliance* (1987) pp.29-30, 158; Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," (1994) pp.74, 88-99; Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs Neo-realist Theory," (1994) pp.121-123


World War. The latter was resulted largely from the willingness to avoid being attacked, while the former was resulted from the intention of sharing interests. ***Ironically, however, this movement, termed as the policy of "escapism"<sup>160</sup> and "anti-balance of power,"<sup>161</sup> may accelerate the destabilization of international system (Hypothesis VII).***

Figure 1 shows the combination of these hypotheses. It is based on two principal assumptions; 1) The international system is shaped and transformed by the politics of great powers; 2) Small states behavior is affected by the type of the international system. The upper graph describes the transition of power and the change of or within the international system. The second one tells the weight of small states changing along with the transformation of the international system. Whatever one follows of the two structural theories - hegemonic theory and balance of power theory, or whatever he believes that which one brings about peace and stability to the international system of the 'police action' or 'leadership' of a hegemonic power and 'balance of power' or 'international equilibrium,' one thing is clear. Even though the figure is very simplified, it still hold a significant message for small state decision makers. That is, in the hegemonic system small states are prone to bandwagon while they are more willing to balance in the competitive system. The following chapter is expected to compare the hypotheses developed so far to the historical reality.

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<sup>160</sup>Handel explained this policy by illustrating the cases of Belgium, Oslo groups (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands), Yugoslavia, and Rumania. "[Their policies] were not detrimental to the European balance of power ---. But their behavior further undermined, even marginally, the stability of the European balance of power, and contributed to an atmosphere which turned away from cooperation and mutual aid." Michael Handel (1981) pp.184-185.

<sup>161</sup>Annette B. Fox, The Power of Small States (1959) p.187. She explains the effect of small states bandwagoning behavior as; "Instead of moving to the side of the less powerful and thereby helping to restore the balance, they tended to comply with the demands of the more powerful and thus accelerated any shifts in the balance of forces caused by changing fortunes of war or prospects of ultimate victory. Viewed in this way, the small states' characteristic behavior may be described as *anti-balance of power* while that of a great power is characteristically *pro-balance of power*."



**Figure 1. System Change and Small States' Policy**

## V . CASE STUDIES

### A . THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

In world history there emerged a peculiar period in the nineteenth century at least in terms of interstate relations. After the Napoleonic Wars which had swept the whole continent of Europe for over twenty years, the great powers created an international system that secured the peace for roughly a century. Unlike others, it is said that in this period "statesmen were more successful in managing and controlling the unavoidable tensions, [and] exercised self-restraint and cooperated in regulating several diplomatic crises that could easily have degenerated into catastrophe."<sup>162</sup> There was no war among the great powers except the period between 1854 and 1871. Jervis has one explanation for this tendency:

"After wars against potential hegemon, the incentives for the former allies to maintain good relations are unusually high. Even if mutual cooperation is the states' second choice and they would all prefer a situation in which they themselves defected while the others cooperated, the gap between the value of their first and second choices is relatively small."

The new international system, the Concert of Europe,<sup>163</sup> thus was achieved by the combination of "evaluation of power and legitimacy."<sup>164</sup> In other words, it was "created more explicitly in the name

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<sup>162</sup>Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics, Vol. XXVIII, No.2, Jan. 1976, p.159.

<sup>163</sup>There have been some disputes about whether the Concert should be distinguished as a peculiar system or not. For example, Elrod said, "Concert diplomacy admittedly accepted and incorporated the principle of the balance of power. But I believe that a distinction must be drawn (and in fact was drawn) between the balance of power, seen simply as a distribution of power among essential members of the state system, and balance-of-power politics, which featured confrontation as the first premise, and which had a natural tendency to seek preponderance rather than balance." On the other hand, Edward Gulick considered the Concert as "just the old balance-of-power system perpetuated in another guise." According to his assumptions of balance of power system - the existence of *state system, framework, and common culture*, the Concert was a kind of balance of power system, not a fundamentally different system. This chapter follows the definition of Elrod. cf. Richard Elrod (1976) p.159 and Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1955) pp.4-10, 156-159.

<sup>164</sup>This 'legitimacy' was well identified by Kissinger as: "it means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible

of balance of power than any other before or since," but "relied the least on power to maintain itself."<sup>165</sup> This multipolar system of five great powers can be divided into four distinguishable subsystems: the restored balance (1815-1848), the shattered Concert (1848-1871), the Bismarckian Concert (1871-1890), and the imperial rivalry (1890-1914).

### **1 . The Restored Balance (1815-1848): The Congress of Vienna**

Soldiers fight in the battlefield to win; diplomats vie at the negotiation table to end a war in their nation's favor. The defeat of Napoleon in Russia brought about hot discussions among the allies as to the matter of the treatment of the defeated and the restoration of balance on the continent. The allies agreed that they should be rewarded according to the degree of their contribution to the victory and that they should not be vindictive toward the French people. Moreover, they asserted on the declaration of Frankfurt that "they wanted France to be strong because French power was one of the *bases fondamentales* of European life."<sup>166</sup> However, there were several controversial issues in drawing the new map of equilibrium. At first, Castlereagh who was largely influenced by Pitt, designed to strengthen Holland to check France and to consolidate the cooperation of the German states, Prussia and Austria, to resist potential threats from east or west.<sup>167</sup>

The objection came from Tsar Alexander. He feared the resurrection of the Kingdom of Poland and also the strong German States. The Tsar proposed that Russia retain Poland; that Prussia receive

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aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, . . . A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope." Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace 1812-1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1973) p.1.

<sup>165</sup>Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994) p.79.

<sup>166</sup>Edward V. Gulick (1955) p.140.

<sup>167</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.208-209. Here Gulick explains, "Two alternatives alone presented themselves for consideration - a union of the two great German powers, supported by Great Britain, and thus combining the minor States of Germany, together with Holland, in an intermediary system between Russia and France (STRONG CENTER) - or a union of Austria, France, and the Southern States against the Northern Powers, with Russia and Prussia in close alliance. . . [Castlereagh] did not want to fall back upon the second choice, because it would be difficult to cement, on account of the fundamental jealousy existing between Austria and France; because it rendered Holland and the Low countries dependent on France for their support, . . ."



Saxony; and that Austria be compensated principally in Italy. Both Castlereagh and Metternich refused this proposal. Castlereagh regarded Alexander's demand "as a threat to the European balance of power and proposed to check it by weakening the bond between Prussia and Russia and substituting an Austro-Prussian nuclear bond."<sup>168</sup> As for Metternich, according to Gulick:

"the cession of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia meant an uneasy proximity of Russian soldiery on the immediate north and northeast frontier of the Hapsburg Empire and a consequent threat to the Austrian military frontier in that sector. It suggested the unwanted necessity of compensating Prussia in Saxony, which would further weaken Austria's northern frontier, enhance Prussian influence in Germany, tend to consolidate the Russo-Prussian bond, and stir the potential enmity of Austria and Prussia."<sup>169</sup>

However, Metternich "did not wish to resist openly since this would cause the brunt of the effort to fall on Austria, the most exposed power, while surrendering the policy of close cooperation with Prussia which Metternich considered the key to Austrian security."<sup>170</sup> Thus, the ball was now in the Prussian court. Even though she was guaranteed her territories of 1805, those, "composed of former provinces or former satellites of France, primarily in the Rhineland, were inadequate. And they were undesirable because of their geographic separation, . . . Thus Prussia came to look toward Saxony, coveted since the time of Frederick the Great, contiguous with its own territories and with a predominantly Protestant population."<sup>171</sup> Thus, Prussia supported the Russian proposal.

This formation of the two blocs (Great Britain and Austria on the one hand and Russia-Prussia on the other hand) increased the weight of France. Having clung to the issue of Saxony and the Prussian expansion, France joined the side of Great Britain and Austria. As a result, "[France] gained

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<sup>168</sup>*Ibid.*, p.205.

<sup>169</sup>Gulick also pointed out that if Alexander's demand is accepted, "Austria would have new common boundaries with Prussia and Russia which together amounted to almost 500 miles. Both Prussia and Russia were formidable military powers, and, more important, both tended to act in concert from the time of their alliance in the Treaty of Kalisch on." *Ibid.*, pp.201, 205.

<sup>170</sup>Henry Kissinger, "The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal," World Politics, Vol. VIII, No.2, Jan. 1956, p.270.

<sup>171</sup>*Ibid.*

something more important, the end of the isolation and the real recognition of its equality."<sup>172</sup> Even though this was frustrated by the Hundred Days of Napoleon's Return, the great powers, except Prussia, were still averse reducing the position of France.

The process of this settlement reveals the fact that "the importance of power-relationship was never lost sight of."<sup>173</sup> In other words, the Concert was not the natural product of the Napoleonic Wars but the fruit of great powers agreement reached through both 'balance of power calculation' and 'self-restraint.' Another implication can be observed is that the Concert meant "great power tutelage over the rest of Europe."<sup>174</sup> As Elrod put it, "it consisted only of the great powers; lesser states were occasionally consulted when their interests were involved, but they possessed few rights and certainly not that of equality."<sup>175</sup> The principle of the Concert was thus that the great powers must not be humiliated," and that "they must not be challenged either in their vital interests or in their prestige and honor."<sup>176</sup> Ironically, during the period of the great powers' peace based on their self-restraint (or legitimacy), small states had little autonomy, especially in terms of foreign relations. As mentioned before, the fates of the quintessential buffer states in the Continent, Belgium and the Netherlands, fell to the whims of the great powers.

## **2 . The Shattered Concert (1848-1871)**

The revolution of 1848 undermined the previous international system, the Early Concert or the Metternichan Concert,<sup>177</sup> which has been based on the balance between conservative and liberal states.

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<sup>172</sup>*Ibid.*, p.277.

<sup>173</sup>*Ibid.*, p.279.

<sup>174</sup>Richard Elrod, "The Concert of Europe," 1976, p.163.

<sup>175</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>176</sup>*Ibid.*, p.166. Once Castlereagh said that he was believing that "the key powers had to operate the balance-of-power system and that the interests of the small powers could justifiably be sacrificed to those of the great if the balancing process demanded it." See; Edward Gulick (1955) p.209.

<sup>177</sup>Craig and George described this earlier Concert; that it had five great powers that maintained the equilibrium of forces by forming two roughly balanced ideological blocs - the Anglo-French entente on the one hand and the combination of the northern courts on the other;

Ironically, the Conservatives were strongly united when confronted by external liberalists but not against the internal contamination of liberalism and nationalism. Here, the latter, even inspired by the former through "the popular government groundswell against Napoleon, . . . had intrinsically a much greater appeal than liberalism."<sup>178</sup> Even though the revolutions of 1848 failed, they destroyed the traditional conservatism which "fostered international consensus" and forced a new conservative synthesis. Rosecrance noted:

"The revolution of 1848 had shown that all conservative states could not co-exist in the face of growing nationalism; when this was realized, the conservatives turned on each other. Previously the Concert had faltered when charged with the task of bringing about co-operation of different ideological camps. After 1848 it could not bring about the co-operation of a single ideological camp."<sup>179</sup>

From this transformation of the principle of foreign policy, modern Realpolitik began to emerge. It was the outbreak of the Crimean War that "opened the way to the fulfillment of the ambitions of Realpolitiker[s]."<sup>180</sup> The French Emperor Napoleon III, having just come to power by a coup and lacking natural domestic solidarity, had to create it. He tried to involve himself in the Balkans, demanding the Turkish Sultan to "grant him the sobriquet of Protector of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, a role of the Russian Tsar traditionally reserved for himself."<sup>181</sup> In response, enraged and unaffected by the revolutionary ideas, the Tsar acted at first without knowing the changes in other conservative states, Austria and Prussia. Furthermore, Russia wanted to gain Constantinople

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and that each bloc was not immune from the inter-penetration of the other. Craig and George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 2nd ed., (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1990) p.35.

<sup>178</sup>Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston; Little & Brown, 1963) p.105.

<sup>179</sup>*Ibid.*, p.110.

<sup>180</sup>Craig and George (1990) p.35. Also, the famous words spoken by Palmerston illustrate the norms of contemporary international relations: "We have no eternal allies and no permanent enemies, but national interests. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow." See; Henry Kissinger (1994) 96.

<sup>181</sup>Henry Kissinger (1994) p.93.

and the Straits while France was eager to break up the Holy Alliance, and Britain was uneasy due to the Russian expansion toward the Strait.

The impacts of the war that ensued from 1853 through 1856 were various. The Holy Alliance of the conservative states collapsed and the hostility and suspicion between Austria and Russia began to grow. In addition, Russia itself was also doomed to change.<sup>182</sup> Thereafter, several successive wars followed until 1870; The Italian War of 1859, The war between Denmark and the German States in 1864, The Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

Once the ideological solidarity began to collapse and each great power pursued its own national interests, certain areas became arenas for power competition: France and Russia over the Balkans, Britain and Russia over the Strait and Turkey, Britain and German states over Denmark, and so on. The disputes over those areas were not new, but those were reified as tangible and critical issues during that period. Now, it seemed that the window of opportunity for small states located in those areas was opened more widely.

However, it was not what happened in reality. The freedom of maneuver of small states was still marginal, because the balance between the great powers was not much changed or threatened until the unification of Germany. By the same token, from the perspective of hegemonic theory, one can say that the British hegemony system was still retained, and furthermore, that the British strategy of 'splendid isolation' was not revised yet. Thus the overall structure of balance-of-power politics was preserved in some degree. In sum, even though attitudes of the great powers were somewhat transformed, small states were still in a familiar international system of general equilibrium.

The cases of the Polish Rebellion in 1863, the Schleswig-Holstein crisis of 1864, and the issues of Belgium's independence support this argument. When the Poles rebelled against Russian rule, neither France nor Britain was in a position to go to war with Russia, despite their traditional

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<sup>182</sup>Rosecrance put it: "The Crimean War was for Russia what the revolutions of 1848 were for Austria and Prussia in that both led to new domestic and international policies - reform domestically and self-protection internationally. The emancipation of the peasants was the Russian equivalent of Prussian liberalism and Austrian constitutionalism, . . ." See; Richard Rosecrance (1963) p.113.

sympathy.<sup>183</sup> Also, Russia couldn't but restrain itself when the German States attacked Denmark, because "though Russia had a traditional connection with Denmark and did not wish to see Prussia increase her territory in the Baltic, the prospect of a British-led Scandinavian bloc was even more unattractive."<sup>184</sup> This kind of great power self-restraint, forced by the international balance of power system, reappeared in 1870. Neither France nor Germany was willing to violate the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands to improve the effectiveness of military operations. Limited warfare aimed at achieving specific objectives was the common interest for all the powerful; and actually wars in the previous century were successfully accomplished like that. Consequently, small states could not attract other powers to meet the threats from a great power. That means that there was no choice for small states but to be subjected to a preponderant power or to imminent threats. The fate of small states remained entirely the product of great powers interactions and calculation. This worked out to the detriment of Poland, Schleswig-Holstein, and a variety of German peripheries, but worked to the advantage of Belgium at least until 1914.

### **3 . The Bismarckian Concert (1871-1890)**

The impact of German unification in 1871 on the other powers was significant. First of all, for France it meant the end of "the old Richelieu formula: France had the right to resist German unification first in the name of the independence of the German States, . . . second, in the name of her own independence, and finally in the name of the European balance."<sup>185</sup> A weak Central Europe had been in France's national interest. The same logic was applicable to Russian security. The buffer zone of the German States now disappeared and she had to meet the descendants of the Teutonic Knights who were willing to pursue "expansionist policies in both Posen and Elsass-Lothringen (the former Alsace-Lorraine)."<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>183</sup>Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1807-1917 (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1967) p.433.

<sup>184</sup>*Ibid.*, p.435.

<sup>185</sup>Henry Kissinger (1994) pp.116-117.

<sup>186</sup>Geoffrey Parker Ed., The Times Atlas of World History, 4th edition (Maplewood, NJ; Hammond, 1993) p.213. The situation was well explained by Rosecrance: "The opportunities for friction between the powers were many after 1870, not only because all of the free territory in

It was the brilliance of Bismarck that enabled Germany to avoid isolation, and to the contrary, to become a center of alliances among the great powers in that unfavorable environment.<sup>187</sup> Kissinger put it:

"Bismarck's diplomacy had produced a series of interlocking alliances, partially overlapping and partially competitive, which ensured Austria against Russian attack, Russia against Austrian adventurism, and Germany against encirclement, and which drew England into resisting Russian expansion toward the Mediterranean. . . . He encouraged French colonial expansion, in part to deflect French energies from Central Europe, but more to embroil France with colonial rivals, especially Great Britain."<sup>188</sup>

Also, Metternich was very cautious not to provoke the British concern for the equilibrium and the Russian interests in the Balkans. His strategy was to be "one of the three on the European chess-board," where five players were engaged. He said, "Nobody wishes to be a minority. All politics reduce themselves to this formula: to try to be one of three as long as the world is governed by an unstable equilibrium of five great powers."<sup>189</sup>

However, since, of the five powers, "France was [irrevocably] hostile, Great Britain unavailable due to its policy of splendid isolation, and Russia ambivalent because of its conflict with Austria [over the Balkans], Germany needed alliance with both Russia and Austria for such a grouping of three. . . . Thus, the relationship between Germany and Russia became the key to the peace of Europe."<sup>190</sup>

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Europe, all of the buffers and shock absorbers, had disappeared with the completion of Italian and German unification (so that the great powers now had common borders and rubbed up against each other uncomfortably), but also because the age of free trade was coming to an end and the age of neomercantilism and imperialism dawning, so that tariff wars and colonial competition between powers would soon be order of the day." See; Richard Rosecrance (1963) p.36.

<sup>187</sup>Rosecrance described this context of alliances as: "The outcomes of the Bismarckian Concert were those of a unipolar international system. Bipolar antagonism did not exist, and there was a single directorship of alliance combinations at Berlin. . . . Bismarckian Germany was in a position of leadership of the entire international system." Richard Rosecrance (1963) pp.252-253.

<sup>188</sup>Henry Kissinger (1994) p.159.

<sup>189</sup>Craig and George (1990) p.38.

<sup>190</sup>Henry Kissinger (1994) p.139.

On the other side of the same coin, besides the interlocking alliance system, the stability of the Bismarckian Concert also depended on great powers' expansionism outside Europe. Imperialism was an outlet for the increasing demands of nationalism and liberalism. Rosecrance pointed out:

"Before 1890 there was colonizable territory left to be seized and possibly taken without bringing on a war between imperial competitors. . . . During the period of the Bismarckian Concert, imperialism was on the whole a beneficent phenomenon reducing European hostilities without creating important ones in Asia or Africa. After the Bismarckian Concert, imperialism was a disastrous movement that instead of reducing conflict, fomented it."<sup>191</sup>

In the Balkans, the two leading imperialistic rivals, Great Britain and Russia, had clear conflicts of interests. British interests were primarily in preventing Russian control of the Straits. Even though she had less interests in general goings-on throughout the Balkans, according to Kissinger, the Balkan crises "laid bare the conflict which would ultimately doom Bismarck's European order and plunge Europe into World War I."<sup>192</sup> In April 1876, an armed rising had broken out in Central Bulgaria against Turkish rule. Turkey responded quickly and the Bulgarian people were subjected to bloodthirsty reprisal by the Turks. Russia threatened to intervene on the side of Bulgarians in the name of Pan-Slavism.<sup>193</sup> This movement stimulated the concern of Britain who "believed that a weakening of the Ottoman Empire must damage British interests, and feared any expansion of Russian power in the Strait area."<sup>194</sup> However, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the British

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<sup>191</sup>Richard Rosecrance (1963) p.41.

<sup>192</sup>Henry Kissinger (1994) p.148.

<sup>193</sup>Pan-Slavism was a concept based on the brotherhood of equal Slav nations. But, the Russian Pan-Slavism was different one. Hugh Seton-Watson noted: "[The Russians] believed that the smaller Slav peoples should accept the Russians as leaders, and doubted the loyalty of those who were not Orthodox. Of the Catholic Slavs, the Poles were regarded as enemies, and the Czechs were distrusted as being too Germanized and Westernized, even if it was admitted that individual Czech scholars or statesmen were good Slavs." Hugh Seton-Watson (1967) p.448.

<sup>194</sup>*Ibid.*, p.451. Also, Kissinger said, "Ever since Canning, British statesmen had observed the maxim that, if Russia controlled the Strait, it would dominate the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, thereby threatening Great Britain's positions in Egypt. Therefore, according to British conventional wisdom, the Ottoman Empire, decrepit and inhuman as it was, had to be preserved even as the risk of war with Russia." See; Henry Kissinger (1994) p.148.

policy of supporting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was abdicated because: 1) British public opinion was becoming less credulous of Turkish promises to reform and thus, maintaining the old policy had become a serious political risk for a cabinet, and 2) tangible compensation must be sought within the Ottoman Empire to offset the Russian influence in the Balkans and the Russian menace in central Asia.<sup>195</sup>

Thereafter, the British policy was changed by Gladstone. Judging foreign policy by moral instead of national interests, he criticized economic imperialism and objected to the use of British troops in Asia and Africa. Also, in the matter of the Balkans, he argued that the nationalism of Bulgarians was in fact legitimate and that as Christian brothers the British should support Bulgarians against the Muslim Turks. About this moralistic implementation, Kissinger stated, "Gladstone's ideas on foreign policy suffered the same fate as Wilson's, in that they stirred his compatriots to withdraw from global affairs rather than greater participation. . . [His policy] had the paradoxical effect of removing the safety net under Bismarck, . . . just as Canning's withdrawal from Europe had driven Metternich toward the Tsar."<sup>196</sup> Thus, the Bismarckian Concert was nearing an end.

What was the status of small states during this period? In general, they suffered once again from the great powers' agreements. For example, at the Congress of Berlin, Britain and France mutually accepted the British occupation of Cyprus and the French rule over Tunisia. The principle of 'compensation' was generally accepted by the powerful:

"powers would accept as accomplished facts - fait accompli, in the language of diplomacy - acts of aggression against weak states, in return for the assurance that similar acts contemplated by them would not be opposed. . . A European power protests against the violation of a weak state's territorial integrity by another European power; but, unable or unwilling to prevent it, the protesting power makes an academic profession of the intention of protecting the despoiled state, in return for which it receives some other

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<sup>195</sup>Herbert Adams Gibbons, An Introduction to World Politics (New York; The Century Co., 1928) pp. 84-86.

<sup>196</sup>Henry Kissinger (1994) p.162. On the other hand, Paul Kennedy considered this policy of Gladstone as a kind of appeasement policy reappeared in the tenure of Chamberlain later on. Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London; George Allen & Unwin, 1983) pp.21-22.



portion of the victim's territory."<sup>197</sup>

Even though there were some cases of disagreements among great powers, they did not want to fight one another. When Great Britain occupied Egypt for securing the Suez Canal, France protested formally against the abolition of the dual control. Then, "the French made trouble for the British in Egypt and encouraged nationalist movement,"<sup>198</sup> but they did it in the extent of not provoking direct confrontation with Britain. Nevertheless, disharmony among the great powers had principally increased compared to the previous Concert of Metternich and Castlereagh.<sup>199</sup>

Consequently, even though the great powers did not have any ideological solidarity among them, they avoided being engaged in conflict with other powers. And it was possible due to the web of alliance systems and due to the alternatives, such as colonies in Asia, the Near East, and Africa. Accordingly, "the small states in Europe were rarely at stake."<sup>200</sup> However, their concerns were apt to be ignored, as mentioned above. In short, compared to the system of the earlier Concert, the Bismarckian Concert offered wider room of maneuverability to small states, but not to the degree of playing a significant role as balancers, because the great powers were not willing to take a risk of direct confrontation with other powers. Thus, the small states were routinely sacrificial to maintain peaceful great power relations.

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<sup>197</sup>Herbert Gibbon (1928) p.87. Craig and George also considered the flexibility of alliance and the principle of compensation as bases for the stability of the Concert. They said, "Permanent, rigid alliances were to be avoided, a rule violated with disastrous consequences in the variant of the system that came into being during the years 1907 to 1914. . . . When one of the great powers acquired - or wished to acquire - additional territory or resources, it was understood that the other powers also had to receive appropriate payoffs of territory, population, or resources, usually *at the expense of weaker states* inside or outside of Europe." Craig and George (1990) p.44.

<sup>198</sup>Herbert Gibbon (1928) p.92.

<sup>199</sup>The comparison of those two Concert systems was made by Craig and George on the basis of the ideological integrity and the degree of domestic influence stemmed out from public opinion or interest groups. See; Craig and George (1990) pp.32-34.

<sup>200</sup>Michael Handel (1981) p.5.

#### 4 . Imperial Rivalry (1890-1914)

The dismissal of Bismarck was followed by significant changes in German foreign policy. The Post-Bismarckian leaders decided to make their foreign policy as "simple and transparent" by dropping the connection with Russia that had been maintained after the Congress of Vienna, and by the secret Reinsurance Treaty consolidating the commitment toward Austria. However, as Kissinger noted, "complexity was inherent in Germany's location and history; no simple policy could take account of its many aspects. It had been precisely the ambiguity of a simultaneous treaty with Russia and alliance with Austria that had enabled Bismarck to act as a balancer between Austrian fears and Russian ambitions for twenty years without having to break with either or to escalate endemic Balkan crises."<sup>201</sup> Thus, the new policy brought about the opposite results, the limitation of German options and the promotion of Austrian adventurism. Furthermore, unlike Bismarckian self-restraint policies with regard to expansion outside Europe, the government of William II pursued an aggressive and offensive policy, involving imperial competition in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The negative impacts of this policy were noticeable. Craig and George enumerated them precisely:

"The Russians, who tended still to be closer ideologically to the Germans than to the western powers and who regarded the British as their chief antagonist in the Middle East, were unpleasantly surprised, at the end of the nineties and the beginning of next decade, to find the Germans moving into their sphere of interest in the Persian Gulf, and they began to revise their views. The British and the French, who were at loggerheads in Africa after 1882 and came uncomfortably close to war in the Sudan in 1898, discovered that Germany was becoming a nuisance and a potential threat to both of them and began to mend their fences."<sup>202</sup>

Actually, once Germany declared its irrevocable commitment to Austria, France and Russian needed each other, "because neither could achieve its own strategic objectives without first defeating, or at least weakening, Germany."<sup>203</sup> Thus, the Franco-Russian alliance was a natural result. In addition, noticing German expansionism and its challenge for maritime supremacy, and

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<sup>201</sup>Henry Kissinger (1994) p.179.

<sup>202</sup>Craig and George (1990) p.41.

<sup>203</sup>Henry Kissinger (1994) p.180.

acknowledging it would not be able to meet the German threats by its own resources, Great Britain, at last, abdicated the policy of 'splendid isolation,' and joined the side of France (1904) and Russia (1907), thereby forming the Triple Entente.<sup>204</sup> Thereafter, the European Continent divided into the two camps of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. One of the most significant effects of this division was the loss of flexibility in terms of alliance. That is, it "prevented the creation of an overpowering coalition against any untoward act."<sup>205</sup>

On the other hand, during this period of great power regrouping, the status and role of small states also changed accordingly. If one looks into small states' situations in the Middle East and the Far East where the imperial rivalry between Britain and Russia was hot before and after the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907, he will find that several hypotheses of this study are confirmed.

Both Great Britain and Russia enjoyed favorable strategic locations. They were virtually immune from invasions, and also less affected by internal uprising of endemic revolutions than other powers. Thus, the two great powers could continually grow and expand. The 'new imperialism' in Britain appeared with the withdrawal of Gladstone who "had publicly espoused Little Englandism and expressed [his] belief in the inevitability of the disintegration of the Empire."<sup>206</sup> The basis of this 'new imperialism' was generally explained in economic terms. The British leaders perceived the economic

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<sup>204</sup>Ludwig Dehio put it: "In order to make certain of the Tsar's help in the case of a war against the two German powers, which Britain had in vain tried to pry apart, she further took the risk of incredible concessions to Russia in the Near East and the Balkans. She sacrificed Turkey, . . . and generously accorded the Russians a large sphere of interest in Persia, regardless of the threat to India. . . ." Another reason was the fear that had always existed in Britain: Other powers would combined against Britain; "possibly Germany and France, as Germany intended in 1897; more probably France and Russia, between whom an alliance looked in the offing from the beginning of the 1890s, though it was not openly acknowledged until 1895." See; Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) p.237; and Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1983 (New York; Longman, 1984) p.125.

<sup>205</sup>Richard Rosecrance (1963) p.160. Craig and George agreed on this opinion; "It is enough to say that in the simplest terms, the First World War resulted from the inflexibility of the alliances and the lack of control by the senior members over the most irresponsible of their partners." Craig and George (1990) p.43.

<sup>206</sup>Arthur P. Newton, A Hundred Years of the British Empire (London; Duckworth, 1947) p.233.

decline of their Empire. Britain was falling back in the world in the 1890s, due to the emergence of strong competitors in the world market. Bernard Porter wrote;

"In the 1880s Britain was overtaken in steel production by the United States, and in the 1890s by Germany. In 1990 Britain was still overall the greatest manufacturing and trading power in the world: but her lead over others was being cut back remorselessly year by year."<sup>207</sup>

Furthermore, generally Britain had chosen, "under the persuasion of *the Wealth of Nations*, to concentrate her productive capacity on the things she produced best."<sup>208</sup> This specialization now became a burden that Britain should always have foreign markets. Also, this economic demand of the markets for capital and goods was intensified with the logic of "Social Darwinism" and "The White Man's Burden." Social Darwinism, seeing foreign hostility and rivalry as a biological imperative, proclaimed:

"Nations may roughly be divided between the living and the dying. . . . For one reason or another - from the necessities of politics or under the pretence of philanthropy - the living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying, and the seeds and the causes of conflict among civilized nations will speedily appear."<sup>209</sup>

Also, like the body, a state should actively involve itself in the competition to maintain or enhance its power.<sup>210</sup> Besides this, some arrogant and jingoistic slogan reflected another logic of imperialism.

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<sup>207</sup>Bernard Porter (1984) p. 120. An economic historian David Landes has put it, "the period leading up to the First World War saw a shift from monarchy to oligarchy, from a one-nation to multi-nation industrial system. In the new oligarchy England was no longer even *primus inter pares*." Quoted in Aaron L. Friedberg, "Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Sep. 1987, p. 332.

<sup>208</sup>Bernard Porter (1984) p. 139.

<sup>209</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 127.

<sup>210</sup>This was articulated as follows: "The stimulus of a great patriotic excitement, the determination to endure burdens and makes sacrifices, the self-abnegation which will face loss, and suffering, and even death, for the commonweal, are bracing tonics to the national health, and they help to counteract the enervating effects of 'too much love of living,' too much ease, and luxury, and material prosperity. . . . Strength is not maintained without exercise." Quoted in Bernard Porter (1984) p. 129.

Kipling's poem, "The White Man's Burden," was frequently quoted at this time. The new imperialists, such as Dilke and Rosebery, believed; that "Britain carried the blessings of civilization to barbaric peoples and thus provide a luxury of statesmen and of warriors to be leaders of the nation"; and that, therefore, "the British Empire was for the interest of the whole human race."<sup>211</sup>

On the other hand, as for Russia, "up to the middle of the nineteenth century, Russian expansion was not, strictly speaking, colonial, but was rather the natural, autonomic development of a unitary political empire."<sup>212</sup> Unlike the other powers, Russia was "not feeling the use of emigration to escape overpopulation, or of developing new lands and exploiting alien peoples to secure raw materials or to provide markets for their surplus protection."<sup>213</sup> However, the efforts to acquire outlets to warm water had incessantly caused Russia to march toward the Black, Baltic, White, and Yellow Seas, the Persian Gulf, and the Adriatic, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas. The march to those seas to obtain ice-free ports proceeded without making "maritime jumps." That is, while Great Britain depended on the maritime capacity to expand and exploit colonies, Russia depended on the construction of the railway. This was instigated by Russian defeat in the Crimean War. Thus, the two expanding powers, Great Britain (a maritime power) and Russia (a continental power) met each other at several points on their imperial peripheries.

One of those points was the Far East, especially China and Korea. Russian advance toward the Far East was accomplished by the extension of railways. From 1895, the Trans-Siberian Railway began to operate section by section. Russia soon gained Vladivostok, but it was icebound in winter. So she demanded the control of all Manchuria and the Liao-Tung Peninsula. During this period, Russia enjoyed support from France and Germany. France financed Russian construction of fleet in Asia hoping it would weaken British power in Africa, and Germany "was strongly encouraging Russia to devote her efforts to Far Eastern affairs, and wished to do as much as possible to clear up Austro-Russian disputes in the Balkans."<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>211</sup>Arthur Newton (1947) pp.241-242.

<sup>212</sup>Herbert Gibbon (1928) p.113.

<sup>213</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.113 & 121.

<sup>214</sup>Hugh Seton-Watson (1967) p.575.

As for Britain, Russia "presented a threat to her interests from the Mediterranean right through the East China Sea. That was extent of her land frontier with British colonies or satellites."<sup>215</sup> This map of the borders between the two empires seems to be an earlier version of the Containment scheme of George Kennan. However, the difference between British containment against Russia and American containment against the USSR is that "Britain's interest there was mainly commercial and there was no substitute for it."<sup>216</sup> Also, Britain was on the way to declining, especially at sea where she had generally commanded the world after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, by controlling the narrow seas. Now, Britain had to cope with new competitors: the United States, Japan, and Germany.<sup>217</sup>

Then, once the German threat in the North Sea was viewed as more imminent than the Russian threat in China, the 'rising sun' was considered as a very attractive alternative for checking Russian expansion in the Far East. Japan, after defeating China on the Korean Peninsula, was now competing with Russia in Korea, and probably further in Manchuria, the quintessential areas for the Russian dream of ice-free ports. Thus, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in 1902. The treaty was compensating Japan with recognition of its 'special interests' in Korea. After the defeat of Russia in 1905, imperial rivalry entered a new phase. Then, Britain could heave a sigh of relief. As Porter wrote:

"Elsewhere the main points of friction with her two main colonial rivalry, France and Russia, were gradually smoothed away by agreement before they could explode into conflict: Persia divided between Russia and Britain in 1907, the Middle East and North Africa similarly demarcated between Britain and France."<sup>218</sup>

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<sup>215</sup>Bernard Porter (1984) p.152.

<sup>216</sup>*Ibid.*, p.154.

<sup>217</sup>Friedberg noted the change of British maritime policy as: "By the close of the nineteenth century a number of naval intelligence officers and fleet commanders had reached the conclusion that long-term British interests could best be served by pursuing a third line of policy, one of accommodation and, perhaps, of alignment with the peripheral powers." Actually Britain did not oppose the US plans to build the Panama Canal and to ally with Japan. See; Aaron L. Friedberg (1987) pp.344-345.

<sup>218</sup>Bernard Porter (1984) p.201.

Here one can extract some lessons for small states.<sup>219</sup> There had been the continuous compensations or give-and-takes between Russia and Britain including other involving powers - France, the United States, and Japan. For example, when Japan advanced the Liao-Tung Peninsula and Formosa, after the victory of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, France, and Germany intervened and made Japan give up the peninsula. Then, "China had to borrow with a Russian guarantee the money to indemnify Japan for the releasing the Liao-Tung Peninsula. The compensation for the guarantee was a railway concession in northern Manchuria."<sup>220</sup> It was a common policy for the great powers in China. She was just a objective for haggling among the great powers. Gibbon put it:

"By becoming creditors of the Chinese government they hoped to gain further economic advantages and to have means of keeping the country in tutelage. China was thus saddled with a debt whose principal, with interest at four per cent, amounted to nearly one and one half billion dollars."<sup>221</sup>

On the other hand, the Chinese government should be condemned for its inaction. When the Russian covetousness for the Liao-Tung Peninsula became obvious by the completion of the railway construction in Manchuria, Yuan-Shih-Kai, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army, suggested to declare war on Russia and invite the cooperation of Japan. But it was not accepted by the government in Peking, where "European representatives worked against an agreement between the two Oriental states."<sup>222</sup> Even though the Chinese government had little option to cope with the crisis, yet a certain resolution to side with one of two conflicting powers in its own land was necessary. The same fault

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<sup>219</sup>At that time, China could be regarded a small state in relative terms, like India at the present.

<sup>220</sup>Herbert Gibbon (1928) p.139.

<sup>221</sup>*Ibid.*, p.151.

<sup>222</sup>*Ibid.*, p.157. Gibbon strongly criticized the failure of the Chinese government to follow the suggestion of Yuan-Shih-Kai: "Chinese statesmen failed to see that by siding with Japan China might have defended her territorial integrity and her sovereignty against all foreign encroachment. While Japan engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Russia, China remained neutral, suffering the ignominy of neutrality with all the inconveniences of belligerency. . . Japanese and Russians lived on the country, and finally made peace with each other, disregarding China and dividing between themselves one of her largest and richest provinces." *Ibid.*

was committed by the Korean government previously, during the Sino-Japanese War. Both Korea and China, "unable to defend their own interests, and unwilling to take sides, simply put up their country as a prize to be fought for and won by the strongest."<sup>223</sup> So, there was room for lesser states to maneuver which they failed to do.

On the other hand, from the cases of Persia and Afghanistan in the same period, we can get some implications for small states caught up in the system of imperial rivalry. For Russia, Persia was a natural route to approach the open sea. Thus the Russians began to build railways to the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan. Britain, which had prevented Russia from getting to the Mediterranean Sea in 1854 and in 1878, felt the threat to her sphere of influence. Also, economically "Britain's trade acquired almost a monopoly of the foreign commerce of the Gulf ports, and maintenance of the British position in the Persian Gulf was regarded as vital to the safety of India."<sup>224</sup> But, Britain had no legal base for stopping the Russian approach to the region. Thus, she had to prevent it indirectly. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was, in part, a result of this calculation.<sup>225</sup> Paradoxically, however, "the defeat of Russia in the Far East led only to the redoubling of [Russian] efforts to open a way to the sea through Persia."<sup>226</sup> Then, a short period of a stalemate followed until both governments felt the threat of German intervention through its projects for building the Berlin-Baghdad Railway system and invading the financial and commercial fields. Now, the British began to reconsider the situation. They thought it would be better to confront Germany with Russia together rather than to fight against each other. Also, Russia was already an ally of an ally, France. Thereafter, Britain and Russia divided the region and moreover prevented interventions by other countries.<sup>227</sup> The provisions of the Anglo-

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<sup>223</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 128.

<sup>224</sup>Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, 1500-1941 (Charlottesville; Univ. Press of Virginia, 1966) p.90.

<sup>225</sup>Herbert Gibbon (1928) p.179.

<sup>226</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.179-180.

<sup>227</sup>Gibbon pointed out, they "not only refused to lend the money, but kept in their own hands the revenues accruing in the zones occupied by them - the richest parts of Persia, including all the customs - and prevented Persian from raising a loan at Paris or Berlin." *Ibid.*, p.182; and Hugh Seton-Watson (1947) p.681.



Russian Convention of 1907 "amounted to *de facto* partition" of Iran, and Britain and Russia destroyed the new Iranian parliament, and furthermore, even controlled the seat of Prime Minister. It was said, "no Prime Minister took office unless he was either their man or would not stand in their way."<sup>228</sup>

At a glance, Afghanistan seemed to have the similar fate with Persia. It was also situated in the geopolitically significant point. David Jenkins put it:

The Afghans, "occupying the area of the Hindu Kush - the 600 mile long natural barrier between Central Asia and India - found themselves almost midway between the expanding power of Britain to the south and Russia to the north. Afghanistan became the classic buffer state, created through diplomacy by the two powers in order to prevent their empires from adjoining physically, and thus theoretically keeping the peace in the region."<sup>229</sup>

As for Britain, India was the "jewel of in the crown of the British Empire,"<sup>230</sup> but it was vulnerable to landward attack. Thus, Afghanistan was a critical state to defend India from the north.<sup>231</sup> On the other hand, Russian interests in Afghanistan were more various, but no more vital than those of Great Britain. Jenkins enumerated them as;

"Russian expansion into Central Asia was based on: need to curb Kazakh raids on Russian caravans and border villages; desire for the agriculturally rich lands of the steppes; greed for the fabled wealth that lay beyond the steppe in Turkestan, India and Persia; the continuing quest for an open, warm water port; and concern about increasing political and commercial penetration by the

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<sup>228</sup>Rouhollah K. Ramazani (1966) pp. 92, 94, 103-111 Also, for more detail, see; Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914 (Berkeley; Univ. of California Press, 1967) pp.384-386.

<sup>229</sup>David B. Jenkins, "The History of Afghanistan as a Buffer State" John Chay and Thomas Ross Ed. (1986) p.171.

<sup>230</sup>*Ibid.*, p.174.

<sup>231</sup>Even though a neutral zone between Britain and Russia in Afghanistan once had been established by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873, the British conservatives called as the new imperialists later on, did not wish to maintain it. Instead, they accepted the 'forward policy' - territorial expansion toward a defensible border.

This hostility was also changed by the result of the Russo-Japanese War and the German threats. At the 1907 Convention, both powers settled the matter of Afghanistan; 1) Russia agreed that Afghanistan was outside its sphere of influence; and 2) Britain agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Here, one can easily find the difference between the cases of Persia and Afghanistan. Unlike the case of Persia, "no territory would be annexed, provided that the Amir also fulfilled his obligations. Russian and Afghan authorities were permitted to establish direct non-political relations. Equal facilities were to be granted to both powers, and the Convention was to be considered in force with the consent of the Amir."<sup>233</sup> Even though the Amir protested against this agreement and his argument was ignored by the two powers, the contents of the agreement were less aggressive than that about Persia. Also, unlike Persia, Afghanistan was preserved as a buffer state rather than divided into zones of influence.<sup>234</sup>

One more point worth mentioning here regards Afghanistan's foreign policy. Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan at the end of the nineteenth century, saw the situation positively and tried to make use of it through balancing between the two great powers. Adamec articulated his strategic thinking;

"To contain Russian expansion, Britain had an interest in the existence of strong Islamic states along Russia's southern borders. Therefore, the Islamic states, trying to preserve their independence, had a community of interest with Great Britain and should seek her alliance. But since Britain was also an absorbing power which might respond to Russian aggression by helping herself to a portion of the land of the Islamic states, a "middle course" policy was required: an alliance with Britain, but not one that would lead to integration; hostility to Russia, but not to an extent as would result in provoking aggression; preservation of an equilibrium which would permit Afghanistan to remain independence if not neutral . . . Since neither Russia nor Britain could take all of Afghanistan without arousing the hostility of the other, the Amir considered the presence of two powerful neighbors as not

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<sup>232</sup>*Ibid.*, p.177.

<sup>233</sup>Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan: A Diplomatic History, 1900-1923 (Berkeley; Univ. of California Press, 1967) p.70.

<sup>234</sup>David Jenkins (1986) p.183.

altogether a bad thing. He felt that although these neighbors are cause of much anxiety to Afghanistan yet, as they are pulling against each other, they are no less an advantage and protection for Afghanistan than a danger and indeed a great deal of the safety of the Afghan Government depends on the fact that neither of these two neighbors can bear to allow the other to annex an inch of Afghan territory."<sup>235</sup>

Even though Abdur Rahman's policy was not well achieved either by him or by his successor Habibullah, that effort was not worthless. Through it, he could demonstrate the possibility of combining with Russia against Britain if the British tried to control Afghanistan again by force in the future. Thus, actually, when the Anglo-Russian agreement was declared and Habibullah vetoed it, Britain depended neither on force nor on domestic intervention - banishing the regime and establishing a new Anglophobe regime, as shown in Persia.

### 5 . Analysis

The Concert of Europe, generally speaking, was a balance of power system. It was a "decentralized, self-regulating system - one in which power and responsibility remained in the hands of the constituent state."<sup>236</sup> Also, the system was established by the self-restraint of great powers who had experienced the disastrous results of the Napoleonic Wars.<sup>237</sup> Thus, even though there was ideological distance between conservative countries and liberal ones, peace among the great powers was maintained. The stumbling of the Concert began to emerge with the revolution of 1848. The impact of this incident was that; "National self-determination, liberalism, democracy, internationalism, and equality all served in various ways to dilute the acceptability of a distinction based solely on power calculations. Of course, the influence of these ideas was more formal than substantive. It

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<sup>235</sup>Ludwig W. Adamec (1967) pp.24-26. Also see; William K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan : A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, 2nd Ed., (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953) pp.150-180.

<sup>236</sup>Craig and George (1990) p.45.

<sup>237</sup>Kissinger described this as: "There was not only a physical equilibrium, but a moral one. Power and justice were in substantial harmony. The balance of power reduces the opportunities for using force; a shared sense of justice reduces the desire to use force." Henry Kissinger (1994) p.79.

primarily affected the ways in which statesmen were required to justify their policies."<sup>238</sup> From then, the principle of international politics became Realpolitik. However, the general picture of the system was not changed yet. Even though ideological solidarity was diluted at that time, the balance or the equilibrium of Europe was the primary aim of the powerful. The case of the preservice the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands during the Franco-Prussian War by both sides illustrates this tendency.

The unification of Germany, however, was one of the most significant incidents in the history of international relations in Europe. The belief system based on 'legitimacy' collapsed. All powers searched for national interests rather than international equilibrium. Furthermore, the experiences of the limited wars in the mid-nineteenth century made the powers consider a war as a somewhat effective instrument of foreign policy. Nevertheless, there were safety devices for the preservation of the system. First of all, the Bismarckian web of the alliances functioned as 'check-and-balance' device itself. Alliance with other powers was the primary security guarantee for oneself. From the viewpoints of small states, however, this tendency did not offer opportunities for them to ally with the powerful, and thus to secure themselves, because the great powers had enough big powers available to ally to cope with other powers' threats (Hypothesis V). Secondly, "the competition among the major actors was not conceived of, or pursued, in terms of a zero-sum game."<sup>239</sup> Peace was not maintained by 'self-restraint' of each power but by the 'self-restraint' of the system itself. This rule continued up to the outbreak of the First World War. During these processes, small states were being "woken up". This period presents potential for the rising of new independent small states and the enhancement of their significance. Revolutionary ideas stimulated their national self-identities. Imperial rivalry offered an opportunity to balance between the great powers (Hypothesis III). The

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<sup>238</sup>Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York; Columbia Univ. Press, 1968) p.16.

<sup>239</sup>Craig and George (1990) p.46. They explained, "the actors viewed each other as limited adversaries: not only was a gain for one necessarily a loss for one, but the principle of compensation was invoked as a means of moderating the competitiveness of the game. . . .the amount of territory and resources available to be contested and divided up among the great powers was not fixed and finite. The struggle over 'who gets what' was alleviated because the European powers were competing for an expanding pie."

case of Afghanistan in 1880s, led by Amir Abdur Rahman, supports this point. Abdur Rahman principally sought the sponsorship of Britain, but also feared Russian interventions from the north. Strategically, to balance against the threat from the north, the Amir had to bandwagon with Great Britain. On the other side of the same coin, Russian threat to the region was inducing the mildness of British policy. Thus, the Amir could enlarge his territories and consolidate his control over there for his tenure.

However, the efforts of small states have inherent limits in themselves. They could not overcome the negative results of great power agreements for partitioning sphere of influence among them (Hypothesis IV). Afghanistan's strategic advantage as a buffer state disappeared with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.

## **B . THE INTERWAR PERIOD**

### **1 . The Collapse of the Old Balance of Power**

The Concert of Europe, which developed after the experience of the Napoleonic Wars, was a historic achievement. The main base on which the Concert was established was a "good deal of transparency in great power relations."<sup>240</sup> However, it was not an institution, and also "the Concert entailed more than balancing power. It entailed the imposition of power."<sup>241</sup> It was a "great condominium, in which the great powers debated and decided on the critical issues of the day; a great power concert explicitly marginalizes the small states."<sup>242</sup>

The experience of the First World War elicited the opposite view from Woodrow Wilson. He "believed that balance of power politics was a contrivance of states that had always been prone to absolutism, militarism, and antidemocratic behavior that the coming of the in 1914 was rooted in its

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<sup>240</sup>Gregory F. Treverton, "Europe's Past, Europe's Future; Finding an Analogy for Tomorrow," *Orbis*, Vol. 37, No.1, Winter 1993, p.4.

<sup>241</sup>*Ibid.*, p.5.

<sup>242</sup>Allen Sens, "The Security of Small States in Post-Cold War Europe," David G. Haglund Ed., *From Euphoria To Hysteria* (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1993) p.233.

acrobatics and intrigues."<sup>243</sup> In addition to this kind of liberalism, the term "self-determination" and the first global international organization were the green signs for small states.

However, this new system of the Versailles Treaty had inherent defects in itself. Ironically, "France's vulnerability and Germany's strategic advantage were both magnified by the Treaty of Versailles despite its punitive provisions. Before the War, Germany had faced strong neighbors in both the East and West. It could not expand in either direction without encountering a major state-France, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or Russia. But after the Treaty of Versailles, . . . [w]ith France weakened, the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved, and Russia out of the picture for some time, there was simply no way of reconstructing the old balance of power, especially since the Anglo-Saxon powers refused to guarantee the Versailles settlement."<sup>244</sup> Furthermore, as a traditional balancer in Europe, Britain suspected the efficiency of the *Cordon Sanitaire*, contrived by France to keep Russia out,<sup>245</sup> and "the British showed periodic disrespect for the pretensions, and even the rights, of small

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<sup>243</sup>Gordon Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft* (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1990) p. 52; *also, see*; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York; Simon & Schuster, 1994) p.222. Kissinger supports this point, "Throughout the nineteenth century, for example, Great Britain and Austria resisted the backup of the Ottoman Empire because they were convinced that the smaller nations emerging from it would undermine international order. To their way of thinking, the smaller nation's inexperience would magnify endemic ethnic rivalries, while their relative weakness would tempt great power encroachment. In the British and Austrian view, the smaller states had to subordinate their national ambitions to the broader interests of peace."

<sup>244</sup>Henry Kissinger, pp.242-243. *Also*, Joseph Rothschild noticed, "The very existence of the newly independent but highly vulnerable states of East Central Europe, endorsed by the victorious Western Allies, proved on balance a political and diplomatic asset to Germany. It (i) initially buffered Germany against a spillover of the Bolshevik Revolution, (ii) then tempted Soviet Russia to collaborate with Germany throughout the 1920s and in the partition of this area in 1939 and 1940, and (iii) ultimately frustrated efforts at Soviet-Western cooperation to halt Nazis in the late 1930s, as the West was then inhibited by its commitments to the successor states from paying the Soviet Union's price for such cooperation - sacrifice of East Central Europe's effective independence to Soviet hegemony." *See*; Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity: The Political History of East Europe Since World War II* (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) p.4.

<sup>245</sup>For example, Lord Balfour, the British foreign minister, said in 1916, "Poland was made an independent Kingdom, becoming a buffer state between Russia and Germany, France would be at mercy of Germany in the next war, for this reason, that Russia could not come to her aid without violating the neutrality of Poland." Quoted in Kissinger, p.243.

states."<sup>246</sup> This British policy, expressed as "a modified form of isolation,"<sup>247</sup> had no commitment beyond the France's frontier.

In addition, there was no strong feeling of solidarity among East European nations. On the contrary, there were territorial disputes between Poland and Czechoslovakia over Teschen, Poland and Lithuania over Vilna, Hungary and Czechoslovakia over the borders of Slovakia and Capatho-Ruthenia, Rumania and Hungary over Transylvania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece over the access to the Aegean, and so on. Even though Eastern European countries had common interest - "the continued independence of the area" or "a continuation of Russian and German weakness,"<sup>248</sup> they could not institutionalize their needs.

For them, "there were two possibilities open ; to gain support from other great powers, more specifically, the victors of the First World War; and to work among themselves in building up their collective strength."<sup>249</sup> Actually, there were two formal alliances made up of small states - the Balkan League of 1912 and the Little Entente. But both alliances were limited to confronting temporary threats of revisionism of the Ottoman Empire and of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, both of which ceased to exist in 1919. The members of the Balkan League, "having successfully eliminated the remnants of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, turned against [one another] again, and remained divided during and after the First World War,"<sup>250</sup> until the second trial of 1934. On the other hand, the latter also had inherent obstacles - exclusion of the Great Powers, lack of faith among members, and its own domestic difficulties.<sup>251</sup> Moreover, there were several elements of disunity between

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<sup>246</sup>Craig and George (1990) p. 55.

<sup>247</sup>A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York; Atheneum, 1961) p.34.

<sup>248</sup>Henry Roberts, Eastern Europe: Politics, Revolution, & Diplomacy (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1970) pp.57, 60.

<sup>249</sup>*Ibid.*, p.61.

<sup>250</sup>Michael Handel (1981) pp.153-154.

<sup>251</sup>Rothstein pointed out that the Little Entente was directed against illusory threats, Hungarian Revisionism, and also it excluded the Great Powers. In addition, the internal disruption

France and Britain on the issues of Reparations, Disarmament, the War Guilt Clause of Article 231, and of the British reluctance to involve itself in the Eastern European problems. All these factors accelerated the collapse of the Versailles Treaty and the creation of the new balance of power system.

## **2 . The New Balance of Power : The Locarno System**

As previously surveyed, the establishment of Locarno system was a natural byproduct of the Versailles Treaty and the geopolitical situation of Eastern Europe. Newman emphasized the importance of Eastern Europe, "this area determined the power of Germany, and hence, the distribution of power throughout Europe. If France and/or Britain should control Eastern Europe, Germany would be weak. If Germany should gain control, France would be weakened by a loss of power to Germany, although French control over the Rhine would continue to give France a strong offensive-defensive position. Thus, as early as 1925, Eastern Europe was vital in the conflict between Germany and France."<sup>252</sup> France feared German revisionism while Britain feared more Bolshevik expansionism than that of Germany. Moreover, the British felt that if they supported France's demand for a permanently diminished Germany, they would have lost their traditional job, holding the balance. At that time, British national interests were resuming economic life without a heavy burden of armaments, maintaining the Commonwealth, and dealing with issues of class conflict. Thus, her slogan was "a minimum of commitment and a maximum of security in Europe."<sup>253</sup> Stresemann, a brilliant politician, knew this gap between the victors and aimed the "peaceful revision of the Versailles Treaty." He was "as determined as the most extreme nationalist to get rid of the whole treaty lock, stock, and barrel; reparations, German disarmament, the occupation of the Rhineland, and the frontier with Poland. --- [He, however,] wanted to do it peacefully. He thought this the safer, the

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of Yugoslavia and Rumania was de-stabilizing factor. *See*; Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York; Columbia Univ. Press, 1968) pp. 139, 169, 176, & 177. *Also, See*; Henry Roberts, (1970) p.64; He said, "Since each of the three members was potentially threatened by a different great power; Czechoslovakia by Germany, Rumania by Soviet Russia, and Yugoslavia by Italy, there was no immediate community of interest."

<sup>252</sup>William J. Newman, The Balance of Power in the Interwar Years, 1919-1939 (New York; Random House, 1968) p.58.

<sup>253</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.



more certain, and the more lasting way to German predominance."<sup>254</sup> At any rate, Stresemann "was in the driver's seat much more than Briand and Chamberlain. In return for renouncing the revisionism in the West, he drew from Briand and Chamberlain an implicit recognition that the Versailles Treaty required revision in the East."<sup>255</sup>

The illusion of the success of the Locarno Treaty might be that it would persist like the Treaty of Vienna, because all participants were satisfied. On the contrary, however, the result of Locarno devalued the collective security of the League of Nations rather than strengthening it.<sup>256</sup> "For, if collective security was in fact reliable, Locarno was unnecessary; and if Locarno was necessary, the League of Nations was, by definition, inadequate to assure the security of even its principal founding members."<sup>257</sup> Obviously, the Locarno Pact shored up the balance of power in the West, but not in the East. From the perspectives of small states, it meant the return to the pre-War system of "Great Powers' Condominium."

Then, having failed to induce a British guarantee over Eastern Europe, France tried to embrace Soviet Russia to check Germany's expansionism in the eastern borders. The result was the Eastern Locarno Pact of 1935. However, unlike the initial plan which Germany, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states were to be signatories with France, the new pact was signed only by France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia. The failure of this effort resulted from the objections of significant players in the region - Germany and Poland. "Germany did not want any extension of French influence in Eastern Europe. The Poles were determined that Russia should not be allowed to re-enter European affairs."<sup>258</sup>

French-Polish relations, another main pillar of French policy for checking Germany, deteriorated also. After Locarno, Polish foreign policy began to change. The leaders of Warsaw directly

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<sup>254</sup>A.J.P. Taylor, (1961) p.51.

<sup>255</sup>Kissinger, (1994) p.274.

<sup>256</sup>Max Beloff, The Balance of Power (Montreal; McGill Univ. Press, 1967) p.54.

<sup>257</sup>Kissinger, (1994) p.275.

<sup>258</sup>A.J.P. Taylor, (1961) p.84.

contracted with their enemies. Having successfully attempted to build up non-aggression pacts with its two powerful neighbors during 1932-1934, Poland endeavored to separate Russia and Germany by making friends with one at the expense of the other (balancing behavior). Yet, the experiences of Four Power Pact and of the formation of the Eastern Locarno made the Poles consider Soviet intervention more seriously, and thus be pro-German.

On the other hand, the Little Entente remained, and even consolidated. Italy's challenge to the French system in the Balkans and its hostility toward Yugoslavia inflicted a significant blow on the Little Entente, and the effect was enhanced after Eastern Locarno.<sup>259</sup> Nevertheless, the Little Entente remained unified for a decade more after the Locarno, because "it was still too early to jump aboard the German ship, or to jump off the French one."<sup>260</sup>

Another attempt of Eastern European countries to sustain their independence was the formation of the Balkan Entente, composed of "Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, but not Bulgaria, which was not willing to accept the premise of no territorial revision, . . . and was very sensitive about being an island of Latinity in a sea of Slavs, as the phrase went."<sup>261</sup> Furthermore, it was aimed to defend the members "against a Balkan aggressor only, not against a great power."<sup>262</sup>

In sum, during the first decade after the Locarno, there were significant changes in international relations in Eastern Europe. Germany and Soviet Russia were returning as great powers. France was diminishing while Italian involvement was increasing. Now, small states in the region had to find or establish a reliable system of alliance. However, there was still unmitigated hostility among them, and furthermore, they could not find an appropriate great power(s) without harming the solidarity among them. In addition, it was still too ambiguous for them to choose the proper partner, because not all

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<sup>259</sup>"Just as Rumania and Czechoslovakia were loath to embroil themselves in the Italian-Yugoslav crisis, and Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the Rumanian-Soviet struggle, so now Rumania and Yugoslavia were reluctant to involve themselves in a situation which threatened the Czechs more than themselves." See; Robert Rothstein, (1968) pp.149-152.

<sup>260</sup>*Ibid.*, p.155.

<sup>261</sup>Henry Roberts, (1970) p.65.

<sup>262</sup>*Ibid.*

options were complementary. Thus, it was hard to calculate the costs and benefits of choosing a great power instead of others.

### **3 . The Collapse of the Interwar Balance of Power**

From 1935, Hitler's ambitions began to be incorporated into Nazi Germany's diplomacy. This period, from 1935 to 1939, can be divided into two phases - 'testing' and 'aggression',<sup>263</sup> or 'half-armed peace' and 'pre-war period'.<sup>264</sup> No matter how it was divided, the prominent incidents of this period were a series of German aggressions and concessions by its counterparts. Germany achieved its objectives; withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, Anschluss in Austria, the acquisition of Sudetenland, the annexation of Czechoslovakia, and the aggression on Poland, with little resistance from other great powers. Among those objectives the reoccupation of the Rhineland was really "a bold gamble on Hitler's part," because "conscription had been in effect for less than a year," thus "German army was far from ready for war."<sup>265</sup> Moreover, it meant the destruction of the Locarno balance.

Nevertheless, Britain insisted on a 'policy of appeasement.' There were two different explanations available. With the hegemony theory, Britain, at that time, sought to arrest its decline by decreasing costs rather than by increasing resources.<sup>266</sup> On the other hand, Newman agreed that appeasement was not an act of weakness, but a right policy for preserving the balance. "In order to do so it was necessary to bring Hitler into the balance and to get him to accept demands, that is, limits on his acts, as well as to make demands."<sup>267</sup> If it was a right policy, then, why did it fail? Newman answered that Britain should have used coercion with appeasement in order to convert Hitler, a risktaker, to deal

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<sup>263</sup>Craig and George, (1990) p.97-98.

<sup>264</sup>A.J.P. Taylor, (1961) p.131.

<sup>265</sup>Kissinger, (1994) p.302.

<sup>266</sup>Robert Gilpin, (1981) p.196-197.

<sup>267</sup>William Newman, (1968) p.165.

in a situation in which he was in a position of military inferiority, but "in the period, 1933-1938, the British tried appeasement without coercion."<sup>268</sup>

As for France also, appeasement became an official policy. "They assumed that a stalemate had been established in Western Europe. They could not impede the advance of German power in Eastern Europe."<sup>269</sup> This was proved by the Maginot Line. "In the event of German aggression, Eastern Europe could only be saved if France adopted an offensive strategy centered on its using the demilitarized Rhineland as a hostage. Yet the Maginot Line indicated that France intended to stay on the defensive inside its own borders, thereby liberating Germany to work its will in the East."<sup>270</sup>

After the Munich Treaty of 1938, the turning point of western policy, small states in Eastern Europe now had more clear alternatives - bandwagoning with Germany, or balancing against Germany by making alliance with the Soviet Union or Britain. Among those alternatives, the most viable one was bandwagoning, because British resolve not only was suspected, but also came too late, and because the Soviet Union was seen as more unreliable than Germany.<sup>271</sup> Thus, "in one form or another, all the states of the region eventually succumbed to German offensives, as resisting victims (Poland, Yugoslavia), as passive victims (Czechoslovakia), as calculating satellites (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria), as ephemerally independent dependencies (Slovakia, Croatian), or as trophies from the midwar collapse of Italy (Albania)."<sup>272</sup>

Exceptionally, Poland resisted to choose neither Germany nor Russia. Taylor criticized at this point. "They regarded themselves as an independent Great Power, and forgot that they had gained their independence in 1918 only because both Russia and Germany had been defeated."<sup>273</sup> In reality,

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<sup>268</sup>*Ibid.*, p.168.

<sup>269</sup>A.J.P. Taylor, (1961) p.188.

<sup>270</sup>Kissinger, (1994) p.280.

<sup>271</sup>Olav F. Knudsen explained about Eastern European anti-Russian feeling in detail. *See*; his article, p.99.

<sup>272</sup>Joseph Rothschild, (1993) p.23.

<sup>273</sup>A.J.P. Taylor, (1961) p.196.

however, Beck was not a megalomaniac. He "did not see the British guarantee as a reversal of his previous policy of negotiating with Berlin, and managed to convince himself that Hitler was a 'timid Austrian' who would not risk alienating Poland and thus drove her into an alliance with Russia."<sup>274</sup> Also, "putting Poland in the secondary category (middle power), - [Beck] always denied that Poland was a great power in the sense of having worldwide interests - he was intent on maintaining an independent course against the infringements of the great powers and the submissiveness of the client states."<sup>275</sup> Beck's policy was somewhat unique one among the policies of small states in the region. He wanted to walk along the middle line between Russia and Germany, while other buffer states chose the rising, aggressive power. In light of the traditional hegemonic theory, Poland had to choose Germany in order to survive. Otherwise, she had to choose Russia in order to keep Germany from being a dominant power, on the basis of the traditional balance of power theory.

Here the dilemma of small states can be seen most clearly. For them, it is too dangerous to be an independent player (or the holder of the balance) in such a crisis, because it means that they are not only friends but also foes of the great powers, at the same time. It is like as "riding two horses at once" which might "lead to some exceptionally strenuous acrobatics."<sup>276</sup> On the other hand, if they cling to the most prominent great power, their movement of bandwagoning would accelerate the process of disequilibrium practically as well as psychologically.

#### 4 . Analysis

World War I and the Versailles Treaty brought about, literally, "systems change." The Ottoman Empire disappeared right after the Great War. The Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated to several nation states. Germany was defeated. Russia retreated from the scene. France tried to keep its position as a continental power, but she had been a secondary position since the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. The situation was worse than before. Britain already passed its apex point as a global power. Now she tried to delay the process of decline. Most of all, the prominent political change was to be

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<sup>274</sup>Martin Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars; A Political History (New York; Longman, 1988) p.306.

<sup>275</sup>Henry Roberts, (1970) p.139.

<sup>276</sup>*Ibid.*, p.156.

found in the establishment of an international organization and in the prevalence of liberalism.

This optimistic period, however, could not last long. As for small states it ended with the Locarno Treaty. During those years, small states could advocate their claims and act as a victor of the war. However, Great Powers, especially Britain and the United States, did not turn their eyes to them, because there was no critical crisis that challenged their national interests. Thus, it is not an overstatement to say that each state in the region had some freedom of maneuverability to focus on the intra-regional issues, *i.e.* territorial disputes, without great powers' intervention (Hypothesis I). This period was "the calm before the storm."

Once Germany and Russia emerged again, the international system of the region turned out to be more competitive. Now, small states' voices could be heard by the Great Powers more seriously. As a traditional buffer-zone between Germany and Russia, Eastern Europe became again the key to Mackinder's heartland (Hypothesis II).<sup>277</sup> Even though there was the equilibrium of power (evenly distributed power in this case) among the great powers, Great Britain, a key power<sup>278</sup> for the balance of Europe was not willing to keep it through actively engaging the crisis. On the contrary, she was striving to preserve the balance by making agreements among the great powers during the most time of the period. Therefore, even though there were hot disputes between France and Germany, this did not affect most of Eastern European small states. Actually in Eastern Europe, Germany was a regional hegemon, inducing states to bandwagon. Thus, generally speaking, small states could not enjoy the advantage of great powers' conflicts, especially after the treaty of Locarno. On the contrary, as studied previously they carefully chose to bandwagon to Germany, except the case of Poland (Hypothesis III & IV). Britain's concerns were primarily focused on the great powers rather than lesser states (Hypothesis V). Nevertheless, despite their anti-Russian feelings, small states did not yet get on the side of Germany totally. Most of them spent some time moving between Great Powers, especially before Locarno.

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<sup>277</sup>Mackinder said, "Who rules Eastern Europe commands the heartland, who rules the heartland commands the world." Quoted in Henry Roberts, (1970) p.204.

<sup>278</sup>Even though Great Britain was losing its power, but it still could hold the balance, if she decided to take part in the crisis earlier.

When Germany became a prominent power, and when small states felt that they could not depend on the promises of the West, they (most of them) decided to bandwagon. Then, they could preserve their national base free from Nazi attack, even though this behavior had accelerated the collapse of the balance (Hypothesis VI & VII). No one can criticize them, because survival of nation (or state) is itself moral. However, what should be noted is that they could have cooperated with each other, thereby avoiding, possibly, what became such a great catastrophe.

The interwar period shows us a period of dynamic change in the international system. This dynamism gave small states in the region not only difficulties but also opportunities. In the time of political change, whatever it is - whether it is systems or systemic or domestic change, the survivor and ultimate winner is always one able to adjust himself to the change. However, it is not a simple task, because it is extremely difficult and burdensome for small states to choose the RIGHT TIME to change sides, even if they know to whom or in what direction they have to move.

Once their survival is confirmed, their next job is to grab sovereignty. Then, small states can play a role as the holder of the balance. This role will not only consolidate their position but also extend the favorable situation (*Status Quo*), evenly distributed equilibrium or the competitive system. Martin Wight said about this role, "It is not the only the great powers that can aspire to the role (holding the balance). Sometimes a small power, through the accident of its strategic position or the energy of its ruler, can contribute useful if not decisive strength to one side or the other, . . ." <sup>279</sup>

## C . THE COLD WAR ERA

The explosion of A-Bombs in Nagasaki and Hiroshima not only ended of the Second World War, the most terrible disaster in the human history, but also presented a premonition of the potential for total destruction in the future. Thereafter the opposing two superpowers, based on their ideological leadership and nuclear capabilities, led world policy. The one common objective of common for both superpower rivals was to prevent World War III. This objective has been successfully achieved by them mainly because the annihilating power of nuclear weapons contributed to the stability of the

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<sup>279</sup>Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight Ed., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London; George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966) p.161.

bipolar world. John Lewis Gaddis argued that;

"The abrupt psychological effect of nuclear weapons was a moment of historical punctuation, in that it represented a sharp acceleration in the trend toward the obsolescence of war, . . . The stability followed - that is, the perpetuation, for over four and a half decades, of a world order dominated by two nations preeminent in nuclear capability - resulted, in large part, from initial shock."<sup>280</sup>

Also, Craig and George agreed on this point, saying that;

". . . critical foreign policy decisions during the Cold War was similar to its employment by the major powers during the old European balance-of-power system. One difference, however, was that the fear of a thermonuclear holocaust, which had no counterpart in the old system, discouraged both the United States and the Soviet Union from resorting to war as a way of preventing an undesired change in the existing balance of power if to do so would result in a direct clash between American and Russian forces."<sup>281</sup>

Another argument about the stability of the Post-World War II era was that the bipolar system "was a simple one that did not require sophisticated leadership to maintain it."<sup>282</sup> This logic was well developed by Kenneth Waltz previously. He put it;

"When possible enemies are several in number, unity of action among them is difficult to arrange. . . Interdependence of parties, diffusion of dangers, confusion of responses: these are the characteristics of great-power politics in multipolar system. . . In a bipolar world there are no peripheries. . . Self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face them: these are the characteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar system."<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>280</sup>John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War (New York; Oxford Press, 1992) p.109. \***Punctuated Equilibrium** : a biological term means sudden shifts in environment can kill off old species and create favorable conditions for the emergence of new ones.

<sup>281</sup>Craig and George (1990) p.122.

<sup>282</sup>John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller Ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge; MIT Press, 1993) p. 10.

<sup>283</sup>Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (New York; Random House, 1979) pp. 171-172.



However, this is not the whole story of the Cold War system. Even without nuclear weapons, John Mueller argued, the destructive capabilities of conventional weapons and the experiences of the two world wars caused by the failure of foreseeing the escalation to wars of attrition would bring about the remarkable durability of the international system. Illustrating this point the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Algeria, and the Falklands occurred where nuclear countries had been militarily challenged based on the belief that the conflict would not escalate.<sup>284</sup> He argued the essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons with the stability of the Cold War system. Thus, according to him, the post-World War II system was maintained not by nuclear weapons but by the fear of the escalation to the war of attrition. On the other hand, regarding the Waltz's argument, there was an opposite view, too. Snyder and Diesing propose that an international system composed of two dominant nations and a number of smaller units is principally unstable: "In bipolarity . . . a power gain for one superpower means a power loss for the other. . . [and] resistance to the opponent's every move, no matter how minor, is . . . the guiding rule of behavior."<sup>285</sup> This hot competition between the two superpowers offered small states greater freedom of maneuver. Yaacov said, "the competitive character of the bipolar system embodies great opportunities for small states as the competition between the superpowers for allies affords the clients room to maneuver between them."<sup>286</sup>

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that both superpowers tacitly or overtly agreed with each other to avoid the Third World War. Unlike the cases of great power agreements at the turn of the century, however, this consensus between the United States and the Soviet Union did not produce peacefully divided spheres of influence. Using limited wars, they competed to expand their own influence to all available states. In some places, one yielded to the other, but in some places of vital interest, they did

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<sup>284</sup>John, Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," Lynn-Jones and Miller Ed., (1993) pp.45-69.

<sup>285</sup>Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton Univ. Press, 1977) p.425. Quoted in Dina A. Zinnes, "Prerequisite for the Study of System Transformation," in Ole Holsti, et. al. Ed., Change in the International System (Boulder; Westview Press, 1980) pp.9-10.

<sup>286</sup>Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East (New York; Praeger, 1987) p.9.

not hesitate to engage in limited war - often a proxy war. As for small states, that situation was not only dangerous; but also offered opportunities.<sup>287</sup> The most common type of opportunity was to obtain the patronage of a superpower. Thus the patron-client relationship was the typical type of 'asymmetrical alliances'.<sup>288</sup> This relationship was considered as a kind of "Autonomy-Security Trade-Off" between a great power and a small state. A great power can offer a small state a large increase in its security, but it demands a high price in autonomy to form an alliance. A small state can offer concessions that increase the counterpart's autonomy.<sup>289</sup>

However, this principle depends on the situation which both parties are in. If a small state is strategically important for a great power, the latter would be willing to offer more even though it can get few concessions from the former. This was the case of the US-Israeli relations. During the Cold War era, the most important region for both superpowers was obviously the European continent. But, in Europe, a general balance or status quo based on conventional and nuclear balance should not be violated. Europe was too sensitive to be changed even a little. The next important region was the Middle East. Here both superpowers engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflicts through supporting arms to their clients. The United States offered Israel a huge amount of aid. Roughly 20% of total US aid

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<sup>287</sup>Craig and George articulated this point: "Crises often offer statesmen opportunities for constructive change. . . . the Chinese character for crisis (危機) has two meanings: the first is the same as the standard meaning of the word in English - that is, threat or danger to important values. The second connotation, however, is something quite different - not threat but opportunity. . . . in the context of international relations, suggests that a crisis can loosen things up; it can lead policy makers to question and to revise if not totally discard some of the old beliefs and policies that led to the impasse; it can make them willing to strike out in new directions." Craig and George (1990) p. 129

<sup>288</sup>James Morrow said, "the typical view of alliances as tools of capability aggregation and threat deterrence alone is incomplete, but it can be subsumed in a more general model. Nations, particularly great powers, can use alliance to further their pursuit of changes in the foreign policy status quo. Weaker parties can offer concessions, such as military bases or the coordination of foreign and domestic policies that increase a stronger ally's freedom of action while increasing their protection from external threats." James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol.35, No.4, November 1991, p.905.

<sup>289</sup>*Ibid.*, p.913.

were headed for Israel after the Yomkippur War (see Table 1). This result cannot be explained only with the Morrow's Trade-Off model. A structural explanation is needed to be employed.

The case study of the US-Israeli relationship will offer an interesting inference; that in some places, even a small state's security matter should be understood at the global context as well as at the regional level. Also, it will show several general rules of the patron-client relations that was the typical type of alliances for small states in the Cold War system, and help to evaluate the hypotheses developed so far.

### **1 . Patron-Client Relationship : The US-Israeli Case**

Since World War II, arms transfers have played a role of making, maintaining and consolidating alliances. Unlike the interwar arms trade system, in the post-war period, as national governments became the suppliers, "arms transfers used as a bargaining tool to gain political influence continued to dominate as a rationale for the major suppliers."<sup>290</sup> In the Middle East, however, stemming from the declaration of Israel's independence, very complicated power relationships have existed between regional countries and between the superpowers as well. As for the United States, in the context of strict confrontation with the USSR, Israel was the most coherent and reliable ally in the Middle East. Therefore, the United States has strongly supported Israel with a great deal of military and economic aid. Nevertheless, there have been many critics of this policy. Some of those who have pessimistic views, but consider arms transfers as tools for political leverage, have pointed out Israel's intransigence and the roles of pro-Israeli interest groups in the United States.<sup>291</sup> Then, which explanations are the more persuasive, to be fitted to the reality in the Middle East and then explored for describing other regions? Also, did political leverage work in the patron-client relationship; and

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<sup>290</sup>In addition, Laurence analyzed that "arms transfers are not a reliable bargaining tool for influencing the short-term behavior of clients in a system where recipients are acquiring arms less for military reasons and more for prestige and regional, political power, especially when they can spread their dependence among several suppliers, develop indigenous systems, or accomplish national security objectives with less modern equipment." On the other hand, he argued that "arms transfers result in structural influence of the patron over the client's medium-term behavior and ensure stability in the dominant supplier-recipient relationship." Edward J. Laurence, The International Arms Trade (new York; Lexington Books, 1992) pp.75-76, 121-123.

<sup>291</sup>Gabriel Scheffer and Menachem Hofnung, "Israel's Image," in Gabriel Scheffer, Ed., Dynamics of Dependence: US-Israeli Relation (Boulder; Westview, 1987) pp.7-36.

if it worked, what factors had influence on the effectiveness of the leverage? Or, if it didn't work, what limitations made it fail?

The United States has surely granted a vast amount of aid to Israel since the late 1960s as Table 1 reveals. Why has the United States so strongly supported Israel? There have been many explanations, but few of them give us a clear understanding, due to the complexity of the international system in the Middle East. Nonetheless, one can roughly sort out the explanations into three categories; domestic, regional and global.

#### *a . Domestic Level*

Many scholars have pointed out the roles of pro-Israeli interest groups in America as the main reason of US support to Israel. Scheffer and Hofnung studied four representative pro-Israeli groups and explained the factors and perceptions influencing pro-Israeli attitudes.<sup>292</sup> Laufer also emphasized the role of the pro-Israeli lobby, especially the AIPAC (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee), the major Israel lobby in Washington. He noted that *The Near East Report*, a weekly newsletter produced under AIPAC's sponsorship that both summarizes and analyzes Mid-East development, is sent to every member of Congress in addition to 60,000 subscribers.<sup>293</sup> Also, Eytan Gilboa examined the public opinion polls on Israel. In his article that covered from 1947 to 1982 and data gathered from eight sources, he concluded that "at least one third of the American people supports Israel even under the most adverse circumstance like the one right after the tragic events in Sabra and Shatilla."<sup>294</sup>

On the other hand, A.F.K. Organski pointed out the weakness of this argument:

"The S-shaped curve traced by the pattern of US assistance does not tell why this fundamental shift occurred. . . . We know that for the entire period of Israel's existence between 1948 and the present public opinion polls find American Jewish support for Israel has been mostly over 90 percent. . . . If one argues that it was American Jewish support that produced the large US assistance to Israel after 1970, one is duty-bound to explain why before 1970

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<sup>292</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.13-21.

<sup>293</sup>Leopold Y. Laufer, "US Aid to Israel," p.149.

<sup>294</sup>Eytan Gilboa, "American Attitude toward Israel," in Gabriel Scheffer (1987) p.126. Sabra and Shatilla were refugee camps, nominally under Israeli control, where massacres occurred.

equally high support had the opposite effect."<sup>295</sup>

This observation suggests the need to use other levels-of-analysis to answer this question.

**Table 1: US Assistance to Israel, 1955-1983\* (mil. of dollars)<sup>296</sup>**

Year	Total US Aid Israel	Total US Aid to	Economic Loans	Economic Grants	Military Loans	Military Grants	Resettlement For Soviet Jewish
1955	4,864	32.7	30.8	21.9	-	-	-
1956	5,402	50.8	35.2	15.6	-	-	-
1957	4,976	40.9	21.8	19.1	-	-	-
1958	4,832	61.2	49.9	11.3	-	-	-
1959	4,954	50.3	39.0	10.9	0.4	-	-
1960	4,804	55.7	41.8	13.4	0.5	-	-
1961	4,737	48.1	29.8	18.3	-	-	-
1962	7,034	83.9	63.5	7.2	13.2	-	-
1963	7,314	76.7	57.4	6.0	13.3	-	-
1964	5,215	37.0	32.2	4.8	-	-	-
1965	5,310	61.7	43.9	4.9	12.9	-	-
1966	6,989	126.8	35.9	0.9	90.0	-	-
1967	6,440	13.1	5.5	0.6	7.0	-	-
1968	6,894	76.8	51.3	0.5	25.0	-	-
1969	6,791	121.7	36.1	0.6	85.0	-	-
1970	6,787	71.7	40.7	0.4	30.0	-	-
1971	8,078	600.8	55.5	0.3	545.0	-	-
1972	9,243	404.2	53.8	50.4	300.0	-	-
1973	9,875	467.3	59.1	50.4	307.5	-	50.0
1974	8,978	2,570.7	-	51.5	982.7	1,500.0	36.5
1975	7,239	693.1	8.6	344.5	200.0	100.0	40.0
1976	6,413	2,229.4	239.4	475.0	750.0	750.0	15.0
1977	7,784	1,757.0	252.0	490.0	500.0	500.0	15.0
1978	9,014	1,811.8	266.8	525.0	500.0	500.0	20.0
1979	13,845	4,815.0	265.0	525.0	2,700.0	1,300.0	25.0
1980	9,694	1,811.0	261.0	525.0	500.0	500.0	25.0
1981	10,549	2,189.0	0	764.0	900.0	500.0	25.0
1982	12,324	2,219.0	0	806.0**	850.0	550.0	13.0
1983	14,202	2,498.0	0	785.0	850.0	550.0	13.0
Total	243,542.0	25,608.2	2,104.9	5,792.3	10,262.5	6,850.0	277.5

\* Does not include Export-Import Bank Loans, American School and Hospital Program, or amounts of less than \$50,000.

\*\* Includes \$21 mil. in economic assis. reprogrammed from the Israeli in FY 81.

Source: Agency for International Development: US overseas Loans and Grants (Annual Reports); Compilation prepared by the Congress Research Service, Library of Congress, Nov. 29, 1982

<sup>295</sup>A.F.K. Organski, The \$36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in US Assistance to Israel (New York; Columbia Univ. Press, 1990) pp.15-16.

<sup>296</sup>Leopold Y. Laufer, "US Aid to Israel," p.126.

### *b. Regional Level*

In the Middle East, the most distinguishable characteristic is extreme hostility between the Israeli and the Arabs. This continuous Arab-Israeli conflict has created a dilemma to US policy makers who have basically been eager to create peace in the region, due to its economic importance - that is, oil. US policies toward the Middle East can be illustrated by two concepts - 'peace in exchange for territories' and 'evenhandedness'.<sup>297</sup> Table 2 shows the evenhandedness policy of the United States.

**Table 2: US Assistance to Arab Front Line States and Primary Backers**

Year	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
FLS&PB	8.9	0.0	42.7	11.1	54.4	77.8	11.9	6.6	9.4	13.7	29.9	6.3
Others	0.7	0.0	0.9	0.5	0.4	3.8	7.4	0.7	1.5	0.6	5.6	
Year	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
FLS&PB	1,125.0	27.3	367.2	114.5	41.5	244.1	66.7	672.9	2,737.7	2,935.2	9,480.1	
Others	217.8	257.3	419.7	200.7	548.7	319.2	761.2	911.1	4,147.2	6,195.1	2,909.9	
Year	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	Total			
FLS&PB	12,120.1	2,883.0	3,549.5	9,393.1	5,764.7	2,398.7	7,374.6	2,605.9	64,174.1			
Others	3,170.9	2,172.4	768.6	852.5	2,998.3	597.3	2,479.3	1,993.8	31,943.1			

Sources: A.F.K. Organski (1990) PP.145, 151-152

If one compares Table 1 and Table 2, he can easily find that US assistance to both Israel and the Arab states has ascended at the same time. To draw the two obstinate 'mules' to the table, the United States had to give both of them carrots. Accordingly, the assistance increased in a spiral shape to compensate both sides. Consequently, the United States has increased the level of assistance to compensate the Israelis, in part for any loss of security from yielding territories, and in part for any loss of balancing from giving arms to the Arab states.<sup>298</sup>

<sup>297</sup>Nachmias noted that Washington and Jerusalem had adhered to conflicting political doctrines because their vital interests are in conflict. She said, "the conflict is, therefore, between two principles; 'peace in exchange for territories,' which is America's first priority, and 'no peace but territories and security,' which is Israel's first priority." Nitza Nachmias, Transfer of Arms, Leverage, and Peace in the Middle East (New York; Greenwood Press, 1988).

<sup>298</sup>Laufer, pp.144-145; and Organski (1990) p.179.

*c . Global Level*

Confrontation with the USSR was another major factor. To keep the Soviet Union out of the region the United States had to set up a strong and intimate ally.<sup>299</sup> One can easily find this fact by examining Soviet military aid to the Arab states, which may have caused the increase in US aid to Israel. As for the United States, there was no alternative than to deal with the radical and whimsical Arab regimes and to cope with the Russian threats, but also to enhance the military capability of its primary ally, Israel. Table 3 shows the arms competition between the two superpowers in the region.

**Table 3 : The changing Percentage of Arms Imported from the US, NATO and the USSR  
by Middle Eastern Countries, '70s - '80s**

Country	% of Arms Imports from the US		from NATO		from the USSR	
	'70s	'80s	'70s	'80s	'70s	'80s
Egypt	3	67	7	22	87	-
Israel	96	99	4	-	-	-
Iran	78	3	20	10	1	-
Iraq	-	5	8	22	90	53
Libya	1	1	18	21	74	72
Saudi Arabia	70	46	26	36	-	-
Syria	-	-	1	-	95	91
Turkey	72	40	28	60	-	-

Source : SIPRI Yearbook '90, p.233

Here, one can find the dilemma of the United States. That is, she had to consolidate Israeli power in order to check the Soviet involvement while it had to grant carrots to the Arab states to persuade them not to return to the USSR. Thus, the United States had to deal with Israel who had sufficient self-defense power and so was obstinate, while it had to compensate Israel for any loss of balance from granting arms to the Arab states.<sup>300</sup> Accordingly, it can be said that US arms transfers to Israel depended on more regional and global strategies than domestic considerations in America.

<sup>299</sup>John C. Campbell said, "In American relationship with the Soviet Union, for example, there is really a double aim; first, to keep the Soviet out of the Middle East, or at least keep their influence from being a danger to American interests there; and second, to take account of the danger of a nuclear war developing out of local conflicts in the Middle East." John Coert Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York; Harper, 1958).

<sup>300</sup>This opinion is well described by Nachmias. See her book, (1988) pp.1-92.

Therefore, one can conclude that the effectiveness of political leverage on Israel was not fully guaranteed despite huge amounts of arms transfers, due to intervening variables such as Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet threats. That is, the United States had to bargain with at least three actors at the same time. Stephen M. Walt offers a convincing conclusion about this matter;

"As a result, a patron's willingness to enforce obedience by restricting the flow of aid will be reduced even more, because it will fear a loss of prestige should the client realign or be defeated. . . . providing aid can be self-defeating, because it strengthens the recipient's position and thus reduces its need to follow the patron's advice. . . . because relations between the superpowers and their regional allies focus primarily on regional issues, the client will usually have a far greater stake in the outcome. Thus the asymmetry of motivation will usually favor clients, even when they are extremely dependent on external support."<sup>301</sup>

## **2 . Rules of the Patron-Client Relations**

Basically, political leverage works by the patron's control over arms transfers, but there is room for debating about its effectiveness, which depends on environments or circumstances of the patron-client relationships. That means it is only exerted in the well-managed situations. Then, when does great power leverage work efficiently?

**Rule 1 : When the client is not sufficiently strong to defend itself at least during the immediate term, leverage works well.**

This includes several strategic or military considerations; "the recipient's threat perception, the degree of self-sufficiency regarding domestic weapons system, the ability to initiate or expand domestic arms production, the degree of self-sufficiency regarding spare parts for imported weapons system, and the degree of self-sufficiency in maintenance, overhaul and repair of imported weapons system."<sup>302</sup> Also, Anne Hessing Cahn articulated that "the supplier's influence is maximized when the recipient:

- 1) has no alternative source of supply; 2) does not occupy a strategic geographical position; 3) perceives a real threat to its national survival; 4) is

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<sup>301</sup>Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca; Cornell Univ. Press, 1987) p.238.

<sup>302</sup>Christian Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; New York; Taylor & Francis, 1988) pp.354-355.



a 'pariah' state within the international community; 5) cannot pay for arms; 6) has no indigenous weapons production capability; 7) does not possess scarce unsubstitutable raw materials; 8) has a limited spare parts storage capacity; 9) requires supplier personnel for weapons maintenance and training; and/or 10) perceives that receiving arms from a particular patron is especially prestigious and has such a strong ideological orientation toward it that a switch to another patron is precluded."<sup>303</sup>

However, this was not the case of Israel. That is, the United States failed several times to exert leverage on Israel, because Israel was not weak enough.<sup>304</sup> Israel has, indeed, built its own arsenals so that it could deter an Arab attack.<sup>305</sup> Therefore, the weaker the client, the better the leverage works, and *vice versa*.

**Rule 2 : When the client depends on a sole patron and is trapped by an urgent situation, it will be more vulnerable to the patron's leverage.**

This concept is very simple and clear. Like a monopoly in commercial market, the supplier can control the price as she pleases. The availability of alternative suppliers is a basic determinant of

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<sup>303</sup>Anne Hessing Cahn, "United States Arms to the Middle East 1967-1976: A Critical Examination," in Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Scheffer, Great Power Intervention in the Middle East (New York; Pergamon Press, 1979) p.106 and Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov (1987) p.7.

<sup>304</sup>For example, President Ford proclaimed the 'reassessment' of relationship with Israel when the Egyptian peace proposal was rejected by Israel in 1975. According to Nachmias, President Ford "could not understand why regardless of the fact that the Israelis were stronger militarily than all their Arab neighbors combined, yet peace was no closer than it had ever been. Indeed, because Israel was strong and well supplied, it could defy American pressures maintain its own independent policy." Also, Efraim Inbar said, "Israel's freedom of action in the short run was guaranteed by the time [Prime Minister] Begin came to power because the IDF was well-equipped, and its stores were full enough to wage war without needing an American aircraft, or to withstand temporary suspensions in the delivery of arms, or other sanctions on the part of the United States." See; Nachmias (1988) p.82; Efraim Inbar, "Israeli Strategic Thinking," The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.6, No.1, Mar. 1983, p.47; and Thomas R. Mattair, "Achieving Peace: Recommendations for US Arab-Israeli policy," Middle Eastern Policy, Vol.1, No.4, 1992, p.4.

<sup>305</sup>Israel's efforts to innovate and produce weapons were well surveyed by Harkavy and Neuman. See; Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, "Israel," in James Everett Katz Ed., Arms Production in Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass.; Lexington Books, 1984) pp.193-223.

recipient dependence.<sup>306</sup> Harkavy mentioned the disadvantages to the recipient nation which is tied to a sole or dominant supplier, exemplifying the case of Israel in the wake of the Six-Day War, "when they were cut off by the French embargo after having built an air force primarily from that source."<sup>307</sup> On the other hand, when the client state is confronted with urgent situations, such as immediate threats and before or during wars, she is vulnerable to the patron's coercion. On October 24, 1973, when Nixon and Kissinger criticized the IDF's transgression of an agreement upon cease-fire line and evoked the issue of arms supplies. Israel had no choice but to desist. Moshe Dayan said that "the shells Israel was firing in the afternoon had only arrived that morning from the United States. In that case, a refusal to comply with the US demand was almost unthinkable."<sup>308</sup>

This rule can be also proved conversely. Contrary to the case of 1973, in 1975 Kissinger's threat during his shuttle in March was futile. "All the promises to withhold arms were not effective because Israel was in no immediate need for arms."<sup>309</sup> That is, "because Egypt was in poor position to resume hostilities, Israel could not be compelled in this military context to conform to American desires."<sup>310</sup> Therefore, the smaller the number of suppliers available, the more urgent the situation which the recipient is met, the better the leverage works, and *vice versa*.

**Rule 3 : When the client's needed costs for complying with the patron's policies are higher than benefits from persisting in its policies, leverage does not work well.**

Generally speaking, however, the Israeli case is not suited to Rule 2, partly due to the complexity of the regional environment and in part due to the discrepancy of strategic considerations for national interests between the United States and Israel, despite the latter's dependence on US support. As for

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<sup>306</sup>Christian Catrina (1988) p.355.

<sup>307</sup>Robert E. Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems (Cambridge; Ballinger Publishing, 1975) pp.105-107.

<sup>308</sup>William B. Quandt, "Influence through Arms Supply: The US Experiences in the Middle East," p.126.

<sup>309</sup>Nachmias (1988) p.87.

<sup>310</sup>Thomas R. Wheelock, "Arms for Israel," International Security, Vol.3, No.2, Fall 1978, p.130.

the United States, concerns for the Soviet threat, the unique and special relationship with Israel, the inevitable evenhandedness policy based on the economic considerations, and the peace settlement between the Arab states and Israel were all important determinants for its policies.<sup>311</sup> As for Israel, the ability to prevent potential challenges from Arab states, and a long-term projection of Israeli power hinged on a solid, unchallenged relationship with the United States.<sup>312</sup> For achieving deterrence, Israel held the territories that it had occupied after June 1967. The Israelis thought their new borders would eliminate the threat to their existence, and enable them to absorb an Arab first strike. Efraim Inbar, citing Yigar Allon's comment, emphasized that;

"only with secure borders could Israel adopt a defensive posture which would enable the small standing army units of Israel's Defense Force to hold back the invading Arab armies, until most of the country's reserves could be mobilized. This 'security zone' would thus guarantee enough time to launch the counter offensive needed to defeat any such aggression."<sup>313</sup>

On the contrary, some argued that Israel has exerted political leverage on the United States. As a small country, Israel could use several strategies; "penetrating the domestic system of the United States; and/or threatening instability."<sup>314</sup> For the United States, it had weaknesses of its own. Snyder and Diesing mentioned them:

"When the client's particular interests are directly and deeply involved, the patron may feel some normative compulsion to defer to it; the superpower may be inhibited from exerting too much pressure on the client for fear that this might endanger the patron-client relationship."<sup>315</sup>

Moreover, the Israelis knew that the United States had an interest in defending them and so that its threat of nonsupport was less credible. This was the US' dilemma. Thus, one can say the perceptions

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<sup>311</sup>John C. Campbell (1958) pp.38-41.

<sup>312</sup>Shibley Telhami, "Israeli Foreign Policy: A Static Strategy in a Changing World," Middle East Journal, Vol.44, No.3, Summer 1990, pp.401, 407-410..

<sup>313</sup>Efraim Inbar (1983) p.38; Yigar Allon, "Israel; The Case for Defensive Borders," Foreign Affairs 55, Oct. 1976, p.44.

<sup>314</sup>Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov (1987) p.9.

<sup>315</sup>Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (1977) pp.29, 442-443.

of national interest, or costs and benefits were more important factors than a patron's tactics of coercion and inducement to make a client to comply.

### 3 . Analysis

The survey of the US-Israeli patron-client relationship offers us several implications. First, the relationship depended on conditions of the international structure more than domestic policies. Strategic location, threat perception, and national interests are primary factors to decide the cohesiveness of the relationship (Rule 1). Secondly, as Stephen Walt argued, a small state is more interested in regional matters than in the global scene. Thus, it is prone to be more affected by regional threats. This tendency usually poses a dilemma for a patron who wants to control its client within the global context of its own. From time to time, this bold movement of a small state makes a crisis worse, but at the same time, it gives more opportunities for a small state also (Rule 2 & 3 --- Hypothesis VII). Thirdly, the relationship is principally affected by the availability of alternatives. If there is any other candidate for being a patron, a small state has larger freedom of maneuver in its foreign policy. That is, the stronger the competition between or among the would-be patrons (the great powers), the more advantageous for a small state in terms of autonomy, *vice versa* (Rule 2 --- Hypothesis III & IV).<sup>316</sup> Also, in a certain circumstance a small state is apt to maintain the crisis longer in order to induce a patron's concern. Because it is more favorable for a small state to stimulate the competition between or among the great powers, she is prone to balance between or among them. But if the threat becomes imminent it would accept a primary power's (or threat's) leverage ( Rule 2 & 3 --- Hypothesis V & VI).

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<sup>316</sup> Gaddis explained this tendency by the parable of giant moose; "the United States and the Soviet Union had developed an elaborate and intimidating set of antlers to make each secure against the other, but each of them soon found that, once deployed, its defense were constantly getting tangled up in the undergrowth, and that the burden of carrying them around all day left little energy for anything else. The exhausted behemoths eventually came to realize that if they were to try to use the weapons they had evolved to protect themselves, they would probably break their own necks. Meanwhile, blissfully unarmed rabbits and mice were quietly invading their pastures, eating up the grass, exhausting the water supply, and reproducing like crazy." John Lewis Gaddis (1992) p.158.

#### **D . THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

The collapse of the Cold War system brought about some difficulties for the security policies of small states. Now, small states have to choose their own partner and strategy, due to the lack of superpower patronage that had been a strong influence on small states' development in economic and security terms. On the other hand, it can also be said in the opposite way: the end of the Cold War released small states from the control and political leverage of the superpowers, and thus they gained greater freedom of maneuver. The emergence of the power vacuum, coincided by the disappearance of the reliable superpowers' patronage that used to be believed in as a tool of political leverage, makes a window of opportunity for small states. Thus, in several regions, some small states have vigorously defied the effort to create the new world order. Among them, the case of Ukrainian and North Korean efforts to develop nuclear weapons were, and continue, in the case of North Korea, against the international norm led by the United States.

There have been several cases of small state defiances to the world order, such as Iraq's invasion into Kuwait, the continuing crisis in the Balkans, and other ethnic and religious conflicts. Iraq's invasion in 1991 ended with victory of the UN. No great power supported Saddam to persist his claims. Collective Security worked better than had ever done before. The result of the game was too obvious to fail to predict. On the other hand, the crisis in the Balkans is still not a global issue to affect the international system itself. However, the nuclear programs of Ukraine and North Korea were different from all these cases. Nuclear issue is not a regional matter. Even though those two countries did not use active forces to achieve their goals, potentially their programs were the most dangerous efforts threatening the world order. Furthermore, one more benefit to select their programs as a case study is that one can get significant implications not only for the hypotheses of this paper but also for the policy of small states through comparing them each other. Then, how could they defy the world order despite they were in worse situation than before 1989, due to the close of the Soviet aid? What made them enable to do?

Both Ukraine and North Korea sought "a substitute safety device" for the loss of their principal patron, the USSR. Thus, the nuclear option was very attractive for them, because it seemed to be an effective and powerful bargaining card to achieve their aims - security guarantee and financial aid. Undoubtedly, both countries became flashpoints in international politics. The objective of this case

study is not to survey the usefulness of the nuclear option itself as a bargaining card, but to figure out the necessary conditions for small states to bargain with the powerful in order to get some security and financial aid from them. With this viewpoint, the comparative study of the nuclear ventures of Ukraine and North Korea is expected to provide very interesting results. Both countries chose to pursue the nuclear option, but the situations of each state were fundamentally different. So were the results of the ventures. Then, what did each state get and lose through the bargaining process? What inferences can be suggested for small states to arouse the interest of the powerful and to achieve their aims?

To answer these questions, at first, this study will employ the method of comparative analysis by using seven variables - threat perception, socio-political aspects, military aspects, nuclear technology, experiences of international negotiations, collective security system, and the existence of a strong sponsor. Then, the results of the study will be applied to the hypotheses developed in Chapter IV.

## **1 . The Nuclear Adventures of Ukraine and North Korea**

### ***a . Ukraine***

"When Ukraine issued its declaration of sovereignty on July 16, 1990, it contained a pledge not to maintain, produce or acquire nuclear weapons."<sup>317</sup> This pledge reflected the overriding anti-nuclear sentiment at that time, influenced by Chernobyl, which led to the emergence of a strong environmental movement opposed to nuclear energy. This propensity was confirmed when Ukraine agreed with Russia in the matter of nuclear weapons on Dec.21, 1991, in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan.<sup>318</sup> Before then, on Oct. 22, 1991, the *Rada* (Ukrainian parliament) had passed legislation to make the country a nuclear-weapon-free zone by 1995.<sup>319</sup> The process was accelerated in Minsk. The

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<sup>317</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine; Europe's Next Crisis?" Arms Control Today (ACT), July/Aug. 1994, p.18 Also, See; John Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Development in Ukraine, (Ottawa, Canada; Ministry of Defense, July 1994) p.127.

<sup>318</sup> The four former Soviet Republics - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine - agreed on the three main issues; 1) any decision to use CIS nuclear weapons shall only be made with the agreement of the four leaders; 2) Ukraine and Belarus would join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states; 3) Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would withdraw all of their tactical nuclear weapons to Russia by July 1, 1992. See; ACT, May 1992, p.27

<sup>319</sup> ACT, Nov. 1991, p.17.

Commonwealth leaders spelt out, in Article 4, that "The decision on the need for their use is made by the president of the Russian Federation in agreement with [the other inheritors], and that nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine shall be under the control of the Combined Strategic Forces Command ---, and be dismantled by the end of 1994, including tactical nuclear weapons by July 1, 1992."<sup>320</sup>

However, the mood was overturned suddenly, when Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk declared on Mar. 12 that he was suspending the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia, stating that "We cannot guarantee that weapons transported to Russia will be destroyed or that they will not fall into undesirable hands."<sup>321</sup> Kravchuk succeeded in arousing US attention to Ukrainian problems, and the United States made several warnings to Ukraine, simultaneously giving Russia \$400 million which would be shared by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine was resumed in April and completed by May 6, 1992. On the same day, during the meeting in Washington, Bush and Kravchuk agreed to a START protocol that commits Ukraine to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons within seven years, by 1999, and to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. In exchange, the United States offered the arrangement of \$120 million for supporting food and nuclear dismantlement.<sup>322</sup>

Thereafter, the road of debate became relatively flat and straight until the negotiation of the Trilateral Agreement.<sup>323</sup> However, during that time, Ukraine consistently tried to bargain with nuclear weapons on its territory. While stalling the parliamentary vote on START I, Ukrainians demanded

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<sup>320</sup> "Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces," ACT, Jan./Feb. 1992, p.39.

<sup>321</sup> That statement was the result of enhanced voices of Ukrainian nationalists in the *Rada* and harsh dispute with Russia over the Crimean issue. See; The Economist, "The Crimean Question: Ukraine," Jan. 11, 1992, pp.45-46; and "A New Crimean War?" Feb. 1, 1992, pp.48-49. Also in March the *Rada's* defense committee resolved to delay the removal of strategic weapons, too. See; ACT, Mar. 1992, p.19; and Apr. 1992, p.23 .

<sup>322</sup> ACT, May 1992, pp.16-17.

<sup>323</sup> Even with Russia, Ukraine signed a wide-ranging agreement that focused on economic concerns in June 1992. The two countries said they would keep open borders, speed up the ratification of the CFE treaty and consult each other over START. See; The Economist, June 27, 1992, p.59.

three things; 1) security assistance from both the US and Russia, "including assurances not to engage in economic coercion against Kiev, such as a cutoff of its energy supplies"<sup>324</sup>; 2) and a share of the proceeds from the sale to the US of HEU, extracted from former Soviet nuclear warheads dismantled in Russia; 3) and reimbursement for the fissile materials contained in nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory.<sup>325</sup>

In July 1993, the policy of Ukraine hardened. The *Rada* passed a new defense doctrine that claimed Ukrainian ownership of all nuclear weapons on its territory. Furthermore, Kravchuk said on July 30 that START I does not cover the 46 SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine and Ukraine will retain those missiles after it ratifies the treaty.<sup>326</sup> There were several reasons of the Ukrainian fickleness. The Nationalist Republican Party of Ukraine favored the retention of the weapons.<sup>327</sup> The money Ukrainians had got was much less(\$175m) than what they had expected(\$2.8b).<sup>328</sup> Also, Russia was in the uncertain political situation.<sup>329</sup> Meanwhile, on Oct.25, 1993, Ukraine signed an umbrella agreement with the US, and thus, it could gain the Nunn-Lugar assistance that would help to remove the ICBMs and to burn liquid fuel safely.<sup>330</sup>

Ukraine conceded more. The *Rada* on Nov.18 ratified START I, but attached 13 conditions to its approval. Among the conditions, the *Rada* reiterated Ukraine's claim to ownership and

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<sup>324</sup> ACT, Jan./Feb. 1993, p.28.

<sup>325</sup> This demand was added and requested in May 1993. ACT June 1993, p.25.

<sup>326</sup> ACT, Sep. 1993, p.25.

<sup>327</sup> FBIS, *New Statesman and Society*, Aug. 6, 1993, Vol 6, No 264, p.15. Also, when the summit at Massandra, in Ukraine's Crimea, they proposed that Ukraine would turn over its half share of 300 ship ex-Soviet Black Sea Fleet, in exchange for the cancellation of Ukraine's debts to Russia (\$2.5 b.), mostly for oil and gas. The nationalists accused Kravchuk of treason and demanded his resignation. The Economist, Sep. 11, 1993, p.53 .

<sup>328</sup> ACT, June 1993, p.25.

<sup>329</sup> The leaders in Kiev concerned that if Yeltsin were ousted from power, he would be replaced by a nationalist leader like Rutskoi, who has repeatedly asserted that the Crimea and Black Sea Fleet belong to Russia, not Ukraine.

<sup>330</sup> ACT, Sep. 1993, p.30 and ACT Oct. 1993, p.21.



'administrative control' over the nuclear forces on its territory, and said that Ukraine does not have a responsibility to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.<sup>331</sup> At the end of the long-standing negotiation, on Jan. 14, 1994, the US, Russia, and Ukraine signed a Trilateral Agreement in Moscow to facilitate the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine. In exchange, Ukraine would get security assurances from both the US and Russia, including commitment to respect Ukraine's existing borders and refrain from economic coercion. In addition, Russia pledged to provide Ukraine nuclear fuel rods.<sup>332</sup> Also, Ukraine joined the PFP (a NATO auxiliary); and the G-7, at its summit in Naples in July 1994, largely agreed to make available to Ukraine some \$4 billion in economic assistance. Moreover, the United States promised, at the US-Ukrainian summit in Washington, an extra present of \$200 million in economic aid, outside of \$700 million assigned before.<sup>333</sup> In return for this, the Rada, with the overwhelming vote (301-8), decided to join the NPT on November 16th, only days after the summit in Washington. Observing this, Garnett said, "The key to success in US policy toward Ukraine was the marriage of US nuclear non-proliferation policy with a broad-based policy that supported economic and political reform and addressed Kiev's security concerns."<sup>334</sup>

#### *b. North Korea*

Since the Korean War, North Korea has had strong fears of nuclear threats coming from the US nuclear presence in the South. In fact, the US has bluffed the use of a nuclear bomb against North Korea several times.<sup>335</sup> Therefore, "such a presence arguably provides an incentive for the North to

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<sup>331</sup> ACT, Dec. 1993, pp.17,26.

<sup>332</sup> Actually, "as of the end of Oct. 1994, Ukraine has transferred over 300 warheads to Russia; Moscow provided Ukraine some 50 tons of nuclear fuel." Ian J. Brzezinski, "After a Rocky Start, US Relations with Ukraine are Improving," The Washington Post, Tuesday, Nov. 22, 1994, p. A21.

<sup>333</sup> The Economist, Nov. 26, 1994, p.27.

<sup>334</sup> Sherman W. Garnett, "Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT," ACT, Jan./Feb. 1995, p.12.

<sup>335</sup> Peter Hayes exemplified several cases of US' bluffs. According to his article, the US threatened North Korea by proclaiming, demonstrating, exercising or moving weapons and forces; in 1966 and 1967 (planning conference), 1968 (*Pueblo* incident), 1975 (after the Vietnam War), and 1979 (evacuation of US forces in Korea). Peter Hayes, "American Nuclear Dilemma in Korea," pp.9-36.

pursue the nuclear option, which, in turn, could be likely to ensure a South Korean response."<sup>336</sup> Thus, North Korea has developed its nuclear program with the help of the Soviet Union in the early stages. The program culminated in the mid-1980s with the completion of a medium-size nuclear reactor, a gas-cooled graphite reactor, built by the North Koreans themselves at Yongbyon.

Pyongyang signed the NPT in Dec.1985. By 1991, however, refused to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea pointed to two major roadblocks; US nuclear weapons in South Korea and 'Team Spirit' exercises.<sup>337</sup> Throughout 1991, Washington and Seoul tried to deprive Pyongyang of those excuses. As a result, on Dec.31, 1991, the two Koreas signed an agreement(the Declaration of NWFZ) banning nuclear weapons on the peninsula.

Only one month after then, North Korea signed a full scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It would require Pyongyang to accept IAEA inspections and monitoring of all its nuclear facilities and activities.<sup>338</sup> The first inspection was conducted from May 25 through June 7, 1992. After the inspection, Hans Blix told reporters at his news conference that "if the building at Youngbyon were completed, he had no doubt the IAEA would consider it a reprocessing plant."<sup>339</sup> Concerned about evidence that North Korea had lied to the IAEA about its plutonium stocks, on Feb.25 the agency called for special inspection of two suspect sites.

The response of Pyongyang was very firm. On Mar.12 North Korea announced that it decided to withdraw from the NPT. North Korea claimed that the resumption of Team Spirit was "a nuclear war rehearsal," and the demand of special inspection of its "military sites" as the reasons for its withdrawal.<sup>340</sup> Moreover, Pyongyang received indirect support from China. On Mar.22, Chinese president Qian Qichen stated his country's opposition to the application of any direct UN-related pressure against North Korea.

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<sup>336</sup> P. Polomka, "The Two Koreas; Catalyst for Conflict in East Asia?" Adelphi Paper 208, London, Summer 1986, p.51.

<sup>337</sup> ACT, July/Aug. 1993, p.8.

<sup>338</sup> ACT, Jan./Feb. 1992, p.42.

<sup>339</sup> ACT, June 1992, p.22.

<sup>340</sup> ACT, Apr. 1993, p.22.

However, progress was restarted by the "carrots" of the US. On June 11, 1993, the US and North Korea signed the "first-ever" joint declaration which contained the North Korea's suspension of its decision to withdraw from the NPT and its admission to the "impartial application of full-scope safeguards," with the exchange of US promises to cancel 'Team Spirit' exercise, to allow North Korean inspections of US bases in the South, and not to attack or threaten to attack North Korea with nuclear weapons.<sup>341</sup> Also, in July, after the bilateral talks with North Korea, the US said it was prepared to support the introduction of LWRs (Light Water Reactors) and to explore with North Korea ways in which LWRs could be obtained.<sup>342</sup> But, in August Pyongyang impeded the special inspection and demanded further discussions with the US. The North Koreans might feel they had conceded too much too easily, or that they could acquire more carrots from the US.<sup>343</sup>

Tedious 'on-again-off-again' negotiations followed. On Feb. 15, 1994, North Korea agreed to accept inspections of its seven declared nuclear facilities and signed a four part agreement, which appeared to form the basis for a third round of talks. In March, nevertheless, IAEA inspectors at the reprocessing facilities in North Korea were blocked again. As a result, Washington canceled the third round talks, and on Mar. 31 the Security Council issued a statement calling on North Korea to honor its non-proliferation commitments. Despite the hard pressure of the US, the presidential statement of the Security Council became milder than what the US had expected, because of China's threats to veto any resolution and its opposition to any tough language against the North.<sup>344</sup> On June 10, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution which deplored North Korea's failure to implement essential elements of its safeguards agreement and ended all non-medical technical assistance with the

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<sup>341</sup> ACT, July/Aug. 1993, p.19.

<sup>342</sup> ACT, Sep. 1993, p.21.

<sup>343</sup> Wolfsthal, a senior analyst of Arms Control Association (ACA), said at the ACA news conference on May 5, "At this point, the focus of the dialogue changed. Until then, IAEA had been trying to acquire historical information about Pyongyang's nuclear program, dating to the beginning of its activities. When North Korea began to restrict regular IAEA inspections, the US was forced to negotiate just to get Pyongyang to live up to basic, regular inspections to maintain the continuity of safeguards and to make they were not losing ground." ACT, June 1994, p.18.

<sup>344</sup> ACT, May 1994, p.16.

North worth approximately \$500,000. On June 13, in response to the IAEA, North Korea withdrew from the IAEA. The tension increased sharply. On June 16, the US Senate approved an amendment calling on the US to "immediately take all necessary and appropriate actions" to enhance its ability to "deter and, if necessary, repel an attack from North Korea."<sup>345</sup>

At this point, former president Carter met with Kim Il Sung. The scene was suddenly changed again. On June 18, Kim said that he had intention to meet Kim Young Sam, the President of South Korea, as soon as possible and to freeze all nuclear activities.<sup>346</sup> Even though Kim Il Sung died abruptly, the US-North Korean high level talks resumed in August, and the two sides agreed the basis for a "final resolution of the nuclear issue."<sup>347</sup> North Korea promised not to produce any additional nuclear weapons-usable materials or reprocess any of the 8,000 spent fuel rods now in storage in a cooling pond. In return for the continued freeze, the US was to provide North Korea LWRs and alternative sources of energy until the LWRs are completed.<sup>348</sup>

Eventually, the two sides reached an accord on Oct.21, 1994. North Korea agreed to eliminate its nuclear reactors and seal and permanently cease operations at its plutonium reprocessing facilities. Also, it agreed to allow 8,000 spent fuel rods to be removed to a third country once components for the first reactor are delivered. In exchange, the US would arrange for the construction of two proliferation-resistant 1,000 megawatt LWRs at a cost of approximately \$4 billion and would normalize economic and diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, which Japan will follow. In addition, the US also agreed to supply 3.65 million barrels of heavy oil per year to North Korea to compensate for projected lost electricity production.

However, there are several negative assessments of that accord. *The Economist* enumerated them very concisely.<sup>349</sup> First of all, the fuel rods in the North could act as another bargaining card.

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<sup>345</sup> ACT, July/Aug. 1994, p.25.

<sup>346</sup> The Korea Times (HanKuk IlBo; HKIB), June 19, 1994.

<sup>347</sup> "Agreed Statement between The US and North Korea," ACT, Sep. 1994, p.23.

<sup>348</sup> The fuel rods were removed from Pyongyang's 5-megawatt reactor in May, and thus, North Korea contain enough plutonium for four or five nuclear weapons.

<sup>349</sup> The Economist, Oct. 22, 1994, pp.19-20.

Secondly, North Korea will not obligate to the NPT "until the promised LWRs are all-but built - perhaps five years from now. Which is where the real trouble starts." Also, there is still an unresolved question of "past cheating."

## **2 . Comparative Analysis**

Ukraine has succeeded in arousing the interests of the West, especially the US, in its security and economic matters. The leaders of Kiev could not expect to get security assurance and economic aid from Moscow. With this conception, one can say Ukraine's nuclear venture was worthy of doing in order to attract US' attention which has been mainly directed toward Russia. However, there are still many sources of conflicts with Russia. Furthermore, it is not believed that Ukraine will be able to bargain with its nuclear warheads again in the near future in order to get more concessions.

On the contrary, even though the nuclear program in North Korea is proclaimed to be ended, the leaders of Pyongyang can still turn the direction of the results.

### ***a . Threats Perceived***

For the Ukrainians, Russia has been the greatest and the most imminent threat to their independence. Russians have never thought Ukraine as a independent state, since Kiev has been one of the oldest Slavic cities. Thus, "For Ukraine, [the CIS] is a temporary arrangement of convenience, primarily designed to facilitate a civilized divorce between Russia and Ukraine. For Moscow, [it] is a more or less permanent institution, intended to facilitate a painless political transition toward a union and legitimize Russian economic, political, and even military dominance over the countries of the former Soviet Union."<sup>350</sup> Mr. Kravchuk said that Ukraine would continue to remain "in bed with an elephant. This is a nightmare. I am afraid that I might accidentally wake him up."<sup>351</sup>

Moreover, during 1992-1993 Russian security policy towards former Soviet republics shifted towards a more conservative and interventionist agenda - a "Russian Monroe Doctrine."<sup>352</sup> In

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<sup>350</sup> Paula J. Dobriansky, "Ukraine; A Question of Survival," The National Interest, Summer 1994, p.66.

<sup>351</sup> Izvestiya, Jan. 6, 1993. Cited by Taras Kuzio, "Russia- Crimea-Ukraine; Triangle of Conflict," Conflict Studies, Jan. 1994, p.6.

<sup>352</sup> The 'Monroe Doctrine' was meant to deal with the rise on aggressive, non-Russian nationalism, separatism of ethnic minorities, economic crisis and nuclear proliferation. In Summer

addition, the issues of the Black Sea Fleet, dual citizenship and the large Russian minority in Ukraine, a "cold-war" between Ukrainian and Russian central banks, Russian threats to cut its energy supplies, and the territorial dispute over Crimea all enhanced the Ukrainian perception of threats. Thus, the nuclear venture of Ukraine "represents an attempt to demonstrate to the West that the question of national security is of paramount importance to Ukraine."<sup>353</sup> As for Ukrainians, nuclear weapons were a valuable bargaining chip "to gain the attention of NATO and the nuclear weapon states, ensure that Ukraine will not be forgotten once the nuclear weapons are gone, and achieve security guarantees against the colossus to the north" as well as to acquire economic compensations.<sup>354</sup>

On the other hand, the North Korean causes of the nuclear venture seems to be more domestically originated ones. In the first place, the economic hardship of North Korea was the critical factor for deciding its behavior. Nowadays North Korea suffers from lack of oil and other materials needed to operate factories.<sup>355</sup> Secondly, Pyongyang's military capabilities also are waning compared to the South. This result is originated from asymmetrical economic development. *SIPRI* data explicitly reveals South Korea has overtaken North Korean military expenditures, since 1972, and moreover,

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1992, the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences drew up a confidential document that proposed new policies toward the former Soviet Republics. The document argued that Russia should isolate Ukraine and restrict its economic growth and independence. See; Taras Kuzio, *op. cit.* pp.4-12.

<sup>353</sup> John Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Development in Ukraine, p.131.

<sup>354</sup> William H. Kincade and Natalie Melnychuk, "Eurasia Letter; Unneighborly neighbors," Foreign Policy, Spring 1994, No 94, p.88.

<sup>355</sup> Ed Paisley, "Prepared for the Worst," The Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 10, 1994, p.23. This magazine reported that "North Korea's agricultural output declined by 9% in 1993, to 3.88 million tons from 4.27 tons the year before. --- Still, the country needs to mine 52 tons of brown, or anthracite, coal a year to provide 84% of the country's energy needs at close to full capacity. But in 1993 the nation produced only 29 million tons of brown coal." Also, See; tony Clifton, "Inside a new nuclear Nemesis," Newsweek, Feb. 21, 1994. pp.28-29 He described the situation. "Motionless construction cranes droop over abandoned building projects. foreigners in the capital say the paralysis is due to mainly lack of Russian oil and former-East-bloc spare parts: North Korea's old suppliers now want dollars instead of barter goods."

in 1991 the gap was expanded to the point that the South expended four times as much as the North did.<sup>356</sup>

Besides these domestic problems, the American nuclear presence in the South had been a great threat to North Korea, as previously mentioned. Also, potential regional instability was another impetus to proliferation. Even if one presumes that there is no willingness to pursue nuclear development in North Korea, there are still many inducements to nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. The primary concern is Japan's rearmament. A secondary concern is that, in the wake of the Cold War, North Korea lacks a plausible "nuclear protection" of either Russia or China.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia wants to sell its old weapons to Southeast Asian countries, which can threaten the oil communication line of Japan. Also, this peril of being suffocated, in these days, has been emphasized by the consolidation of Chinese naval power in the South China Sea, and stimulated Japan to rearm. Moreover, gradual evacuation of US troops from this region, might give an incentive to Japan rearm. As a matter of fact, as for Japan, in long term perspective, there is little reason not to have nuclear weapons when she considers the potential nuclear threats of China and Russia, the latter of which is still classified as the most dangerous potential enemy due to the friction of the Northern territorial debate.<sup>357</sup>

Therefore, one can say that both Ukraine and North Korea chose the nuclear option for their survival. However, there is a point of difference. Ukrainians perceived the threats from Russia as direct and imminent ones to their independence. Meanwhile, North Korea perceived relatively less threat from outside. thus, at least at that time, the biggest concern of Pyongyang was not whether it remain independent or retains sovereignty over its territory, but whether the regime is to be

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<sup>356</sup> Another noticeable weakness of North Korean military forces was pointed out by Bracken. Examining North Korean regular forces' capabilities, Bracken concludes they still considerably lack the ability for waging all-out war due to non-hierarchical and overly complex organization, fuel storage, a Spartan road network, lack of intelligence-gathering ability and sparse command and control system." See; Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," Survival, Vol 35, No 3, Autumn 1993, pp.142-145.

<sup>357</sup> Defense of Japan (Tokyo; Japanese Defense Agency, 1992) pp.35-44.

successfully succeeded and is able to open its market without harming itself.<sup>358</sup> On the basis of this conceptualization, therefore, one can say North Korea had greater freedom of maneuver than Ukraine, when it chose the nuclear option.

#### *b . Socio-political Aspect*

The apparent difference between Ukraine and North Korea is the socio-political context. Ukraine is composed of several nationalities, while North Korea is an unitary nation state. According to the 1989 population census, Ukrainians in Ukraine marked 72.7%, and Russians 22.1%.<sup>359</sup> The more important thing is growing nationalism and the increase of mistrust among the variety of ethnic groups, especially over the Crimean issue. Furthermore, this cleavage has directly affected the political disharmony.<sup>360</sup> Even though the voices of the *Rada* on the nuclear issue was relatively consistent, there is no doubt that the ethnic cleavage diminished the bargaining power of nuclear warheads.

#### *c . Military Aspect*

In the military aspect, there is also comparable difference between the two countries. Russia has overwhelmingly superior military power to Ukraine in all aspects of conventional and nuclear power. Meanwhile, North Korea still maintains a quantitative superiority over the South. Pyongyang's vast and forward-deployed forces, which have large-scale armored and artillery units for use in a blitzkrieg attack are enhancing the bargaining power of its nuclear card. Also, if one considers the underground tunnels in the DMZ (De-militarized Zone), one cannot underestimate the possibility of North Korea's military attack against US's firm response.<sup>361</sup> In addition, North Korea has about

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<sup>358</sup> However, this does not mean North Korea will give up its program once its economy propped up. With a long-term view, nuclear weapons is very attractive alternative for their huge military and, above all, North Korea is close to them.

<sup>359</sup> John Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Development in Ukraine, p.7.

<sup>360</sup> Of the 150 seat Supreme Council, the Communist Party of Ukraine holds the majority with 91 seats, socialist Party of Ukraine 25 seats, and the Agrarian Party 34 seats. The Ukrainian Weekly, Aug. 14, 1994.

<sup>361</sup> Chong-Ki Choi, "Crisis Management within the Context of US-Korean Security Relationship," Seoul National University, 1986, p.9. Choi cited The Chosun Ilbo, the most



100,000 well-trained guerrillas, and it is not believed that even the most accurate smart bomb could penetrate and destroy the underground facilities of North Korea covered by granite mountains.<sup>362</sup>

On the contrary, Ukraine has ethnic problem even in the military. Nearly half of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are composed of Russian officers, and moreover, "the majority of these officers are positioned in key influential billets, with 53% with Russian background working at the Ministry of Defense. Additionally 90% of generals are ethnic Russians as well as approximately 80% of all the officers in the Air Force."<sup>363</sup>

#### *d. Nuclear Technology*

Ukraine inherited its nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union. So, it can be said that they may not even have really had a nuclear card to play. Kincade and Melnyczuk considered them "virtually useless to Ukraine," and said that "Gaining physical and effective operational control of them would probably be beyond Ukraine's technical capacity and would risk Russian military reprisal."<sup>364</sup> Also, it is said that "The missiles in Ukraine are more suitable for striking the US rather than Russia, and Russia might possibly leave behind disabled, rather than functional, nuclear weapons."<sup>365</sup> Furthermore, there are other inabilities and weaknesses of Ukrainian technology. For example, it was reported that "Some Ukrainian ICBMs have overrun scheduled inspection and maintenance dates and that

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popular South Korean daily newspaper, that it reported there were 18 additional underground tunnels in DMZ, except for 4 tunnels which had been found until then. See; The Chosun Ilbo, Nov. 14, 1986.

<sup>362</sup> Chae-Ha Pak, "Will There Be Any Crisis on the Korean Peninsula?" Presented at the 4th Annals Conference of the Council of US-Korean Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, Nov. 1988, p.10. Also, See; ACT July/Aug. 1993, p.9.

<sup>363</sup> Oleh Jaroslaw Holowatyj, "Relevant Ukrainian Military Tradition," NPS, Monterey, Summer 1994, p.26. Also, See; John Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Development in Ukraine, pp.86-87.

<sup>364</sup> William Kincade and Natalie Melnyczuk, "Unneighborly Neighbors," p.87.

<sup>365</sup> Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrence: Debate," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, Vol 72, No 3, pp.79-80.

scheduled technical servicing of nuclear weapons have been violated."<sup>366</sup> Also, Ukraine lacks the capability of producing bomb-making quantities of HEU of plutonium, and is dependent on Russian spare parts or technical expertise to maintain its Arsenal.<sup>367</sup>

On the other hand, the North Korean nuclear program is indigenous. It has built two nuclear reactors and one plutonium separation facilities with its own hands, and also, has three nuclear research centers. Since these capabilities are not to be easily acquired, the development of the North Korean nuclear program seemed to be more threatening to the world community, especially to the IAEA and the NPT

#### *e . Experiences of International Negotiations*

Another variable to compare both countries' ventures is the experience of international negotiation. Historically, Ukraine has had few opportunities to sit at the negotiation table with other nations, except for Russians. Moreover, Ukraine just became independent when the leaders of Kiev began to bargain with Russia and the US. Therefore, it is not irrational to say that Ukrainian diplomatic skill was embryonic. Jack Mendelsohn pointed out the inability and confusion of Kiev, saying "Ukraine needed security assurances, compensation and economic assistance. Unfortunately, the demands were not always specific. The amount of money required varied; the scope of the assurance continued to expand; and also they had a number of demands that were clearly not going to be met."<sup>368</sup>

On the contrary, North Korea has much experience in international negotiations, especially with the US. The leaders of Pyongyang had met with Americans at least three times, for negotiating over the emergent issues of the *Pueblo* incident in 1968, the EC-121 incident in 1969, and the Axe-slaying incident in 1976, before the nuclear issue was put on the table. If one examines the three cases, he could find that North Korea was a very smart and competent bargainer. In addition, North

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<sup>366</sup> Martin J. Dewing, "The Ukrainian Nuclear Arsenal; Problems of Command, control, and Maintenance," MIIS(Monterey Institute of International Studies), Oct. 1993, p.6.

<sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.8,23.

<sup>368</sup> John Mendelsohn, At the ACA news conference on Jan. 28 See; ACT Mar. 1994, p.22.

Korea has skillfully hidden its nuclear development. Camouflaging its ability to its counterparts, bluffing to attack the South when its sovereignty or security is threatened, Pyongyang has managed to keep the initiative in negotiations.<sup>369</sup>

*f. Collective Security System*

Ukraine has continually sought to put its Russian problem in an international context, "increasing bilateral relations with all of the former Soviet republics, searching for allies jointly to confront Russia, increase Ukraine's integration with Central Europe and the West, build up its state apparatus and make Ukraine's presence known on the international stage."<sup>370</sup> Ukraine proposed the establishment of the 'Baltic-Black Sea Zone' or 'CEESEA(Central and Eastern European Stability and Security Area)'. However, it was doomed to fail due to, at least, three reasons. First of all, "Russia regards any Ukrainian alliance with the other ex-communist states-perhaps linked to NATO-as an anti-Russian coalition unless it too is not included."<sup>371</sup> Secondly, knowing the anxiety of Russia, Ukraine's neighbors worry about that if they involve into the collective system, they would be automatically engaged in Kiev's quarrel with Moscow, and moreover, they are much lured by the West, NATO and EU.<sup>372</sup>

On the other hand, North Koreans take advantage of the weak basis for collective security system in the Northeast Asia. A very concise explanation was made by Michael Mazarr: "Collective security organization in Asia could promote peace and allow the US to reduce its military presence on the area. Constructive discussions would have been unlikely, however, in an atmosphere of tension, especially when Russia and China held different opinions from the US on how to deal with

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<sup>369</sup>An Ed-op article of HKIB(The Korea Times) on Mar. 13, 1994, commented that "The US and South Korea just made the North retreated to the posture of Mar. 11, 1993; the situation that North Korea reversed its declaration of withdrawal from the NPT." Using the term "the retreat of 24 hours," the article credited North Korea's negotiation skill.

<sup>370</sup>Taras Kuzio, "Russia-Crimea-Ukraine; Triangle of Conflict," p.13.

<sup>371</sup>William Kincade and Natalie Melnychuk, "Unneighborly Neighbors," pp.84-85.

<sup>372</sup>Stephen J. Blank, "Proliferation and Nonproliferation in Ukraine; Implications for European and US Security," US Army War College, July 1994, pp.1-31.

North Korea.<sup>373</sup> In addition, mutual distrust between Japan and other Asian countries diminishes the possibility of cooperation among them.<sup>374</sup>

*g . A Powerful Sponsor?*

Ukraine never had a strong sponsor during its nuclear venture. Besides Eastern and Central European states, even the West did not back up Ukraine. When Yeltsin said that "We are at one time creating the CIS and statehood in each new state. This is obviously a different process, but it is only skeptics who say the CIS was needed only to dismantle the old union," the West backed Russia, "labelling Ukraine the spoiler republic for opposing reintegration of the former Soviet republics."<sup>375</sup>

On the contrary, North Korea was supported by China throughout the process of the negotiation. As for small states who inherently lack the alternatives to pick up as a bargaining card, the existence of a powerful sponsor could be great encouragement in morale as well as be physical reinforcement.

Generally speaking, there are two alternatives for small states to survive, bandwagoning and balancing. Since small states are generally not able to depend only on their own power, they have to maintain mutually advantageous relationships with the powerful. When the linkage is disconnected or threatened to be disconnected, or when small states cannot take any advantage from it, or when they need to get more advantages from the powerful, they must seek other alternatives. Unfortunately, however, most small states have few and unattractive options.

Then, what principles should small states keep in mind in order to arouse the interest of sponsoring greater powers to help in achieving their goals? First of all, small states should set up clear and acceptable objectives before they sit at the negotiation table, because they are restricted during the bargaining process. Second, they have to make counterparts know their objectives, while

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<sup>373</sup>Michael J. Mazarr, "Lessons of the North Korean Crisis," ACT, July/Aug. 1993, p.10.

<sup>374</sup>Friedberg argued that even economic or cultural linkage in the region is very weak and undeveloped. He said they "lack both a recent memory of cooperation and a tradition of thinking of themselves as members of distinct political entity." See; Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry; Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol 18, No 3, Winter 1993/1994, pp.15-25.

<sup>375</sup>Taras Kuzio, "Russia-Crimea-Ukraine; Triangle of Conflict," p.8.

concealing their restrictions and weaknesses, even with the use of bluff and camouflage. To do this, it may be required that they have the ability to threaten the interests of the counterparts(*i.e.* taking hostages, threatening regional stability essential to greater states, and so on). Third, small states should develop positive bargaining cards which can induce counterparts not to be extremely firm or to give up the negotiation. Fourth, small states must keep a strong sponsor on their side. Without a doubt, this will offer them bargaining power and information about the counterparts' strategies.

### **3 . Analysis**

Simply, the demise of the Soviet Union was a very significant incident for both Ukraine and North Korea. Ukraine could achieve its independence and North Korea became to have greater freedom of maneuver. The North Korean regime, however, became more vulnerable to influence from outside. To keep its regime consolidated, to bargain with the west, and to reduce its vulnerability it has tried to use its increased freedom of maneuver. Because those two countries had not connected with the West and belonged to the Communist bloc exclusively, it can be said that they were under the hegemonic system during the Cold War era. Then, released from the control of a hegemon, they came to have greater freedom of maneuver, and at the same time, to be more vulnerable to external threats (Hypotheses I & II). The option taken by them for reducing this vulnerability was not allying with other powers, as most countries do, but defying the world order and bargaining for advantages. This bargaining depended not only on the capability of each state but also on the international (either regional or global) system. As surveyed, the important thing to decide the character of bargaining was whether there were conflicts between the great powers involved in the discussions (Hypothesis IV).



## VI . CONCLUSION

### A . IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES : THE COMPARISON OF THE TWO THEORIES

Both hegemonic theory and balance of power theory can be applied to figure out the significance and role of small states in the international system. Theoretically, however, in a hegemonic system a small state has no choice but to follow the will of a hegemon. The case of Far Eastern states largely controlled by the Chinese Empire illustrates the argument. On the other hand, as the power of the Chinese Empire decreased and the involvement of Russia and other western powers grew in the late nineteenth century, small states in the region came to have several alternatives. Thus, it is not until a hegemonic power begins to decline that a small state is to be regarded as a somewhat important player in international politics. There is also another shortening of hegemonic theory with regard to small states. Hegemonic theory is principally concerned with great powers, especially about the hegemon and its challengers. Thus small states are usually ignored by the hegemonic theorists.<sup>376</sup>

Nevertheless, hegemonic theory gives us a very clear understanding of the changing process of the international system. Noting the recurrent patterns of systemic change, one can find which stage of development he is on. Then, he could predict the direction of the change. Knowing the changing nature of international system and believing the future decline of the contemporary hegemon and the rise of a new challenger, a small state would endeavor to figure out the particular time to switch patrons and to search out the most viable challenger among would-be hegemons. These are the most important questions for small states' policies. However, unfortunately, the use of only hegemonic theory can not lead one to find answers. Here is the most serious limitation of hegemonic theory for small states, while, on the other hand balance of power theory is quite useful in many ways.

The biggest merit of balance of power theory is that it is applicable to all states no matter how great their power is in a certain international system. It offers a paradigm explaining and predicting movement of states in general not only at the global level, but also at the regional level. From the perspectives of small states, the comparison of the two structural theories can be summarized, as in

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<sup>376</sup>For example, Gilpin in his book did not mention small states to develop and consolidate his hypotheses. See; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981) .

Table 4, using the four categories: the unit of analysis (main actor), and three functions of theory - explanation, prediction, and description.<sup>377</sup>

**Table 4 : The Comparison of The Two Structural Theories**

	HEGEMONIC THEORY	BALANCE OF POWER THEORY
MAIN ACTOR	A Hegemon and Challengers	A State
EXPLANATION	Causes and Processes of change in Leadership of the International System	Behavior Patterns of States in A Certain Environment
PREDICTION	The Next Steps of International Order, such as Stability and Change, Growth and Expansion, Equilibrium and Decline, and Hegemonic War and Change	The Policy of States to Meet Others' Policies (especially, when this means a threat to the former.)
DESCRIPTION	Under the control of a hegemonic power, the international system is stable. Monopoly of power is the most important factor for the stability of the system.	With more than one great power, international system is stable. Equilibrium of power among states is the most important factor.

In addition, the cases previously surveyed reveal the validity of this argument as in the following.

**Table 5 : The Comparison of the Validity of the Hypotheses**

HYPOTHESIS I : If the international system is stable, that is, if a predominant power controls the whole system firmly, there is little choice for small states but to bandwagon to the hegemonic power.

HYPOTHESIS II : The more unstable the dominance of the hegemonic power, the greater the importance of small states, but the more dangerous to their security, or even survival.

HYPOTHESIS III : If the division of strength between (or among) great powers is almost even - if the system is in tension and there is a state of conflict, that is if the balance of power context is at stake, or if all great powers are weakened or not willing to take part in the balance of power system, the significance of small states increases and so does their freedom of maneuver in foreign policy. On the other hand, the greater the gap between (or among) great powers, the less the powerful pay attention to small states.

HYPOTHESIS IV : If "great powers are oriented toward maintaining the Status Quo, or when no agreement can be

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<sup>377</sup>Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (1979) pp.1-17.



reached between (or among) them, they neutralize each other (or one another) and thus strengthen the position of small states. [But,] if they can reach an agreement, it would be disadvantageous to small states," and thus, small states' concerns are likely to be ignored.

HYPOTHESIS V : The less the number of the balancing great powers (or group of nations), the more the significance of small states, because a great power is generally "interested in a balance which is in her favor" - "balance of disequilibrium" and is thus willing to aggregate power by allying with the greatest one among others not involved in alliance with her.

HYPOTHESIS VI : Therefore, from the viewpoints of small states, the more competitive and the more balanced the international system, the more advantageous to them, and thus, the more they are apt to pursue the policy of status quo (a kind of balancing behavior). Besides this, in this situation they can also seek to change the status quo by enticing a giant power's support (another type of balancing behavior). Accordingly, in the competitive system small states would prefer balancing to bandwagoning in order to maintain the favorable environment longer.

HYPOTHESIS VII : Ironically, however, this movement, termed as the policy of "escapism" and "anti-balance of power," may accelerate the de-stabilization of the international system.

	Hegemonic Theory		Balance of Power Theory			Small States' Policy	
Hypothesis #	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Concert of Europe			X	X	X		
Interwar	X*	X*	X	X	X	X	X
Cold War			X	X	<i>a</i>	X	X
Post-Cold War	X**	X**	<i>b</i>	X	<i>c</i>		

X = Hypothesis Confirmed

\* It is true that in the interwar period small states were released from the control of great powers. But they were not released from a hegemonic power because there was not a truly predominant power during the nineteenth century. Great Britain was not predominant on the Continent. Germany and Russia were still vulnerable to the Royal Navy at sea. Thus, through the case study of that period Hypothesis I and II were supported by the release of control from great powers' agreements to exploit small states not by the collapse of a particular hegemon.

\*\* However, the cases of Ukraine and North Korea are more applicable to hegemonic theory, because they were the clients of the Soviet Union and totally not connected with opposite power, the United States. The increase of their freedom of maneuver resulted from the demise of the their hegemon not from the break down of great powers' agreement to keep small states out of the scene.

*a*: In the Cold War era there was no great power to balance against a Superpower. Also, the cohesiveness of them based on ideological consensus was firm enough so that switching blocs was unthinkable. Thus, it can be said that a Superpower did not have to sacrifice small states to concentrate its power to ally with great powers. Even if it was needed, small states would have been cared by a Superpower too, because it had enough surplus of power.

*b and c*: This is clear if one looks at the global system in terms of power politics. There is no power able to challenge to the United States, even though it is too exaggerating to say that the contemporary system is a hegemonic system run by the United States. This is as close to hegemony as the system has ever come.

The above analysis reveals the greater validity of balance of power theory for small states than hegemonic theory. And also, it shows the greatest reliability of Hypothesis IV, because in most case studies it was validated.

Consequently, one can say that it is more valuable for small states to look at the international system through the window of balance of power theory, and that the most important factor for enhancing the prestige of small states is the existence of great power disagreement, even if there is no equilibrium among great powers.

## **B . IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL STATES POLICIES**

Then, what lessons can we get from the case studies, mentioned so far? First of all, a small state should figure out its position not only through the regional context but also through the global context of power relationships. Israel could keep its position, even though sometimes it was against the will of the United States, its exclusive sponsor, because she knew the limit of US alternatives. Small states are not producers of international system, but users. Like the users of a computer, they should follow the rule of the international system. However, as a competent user can maximize their usefulness through acknowledging all basic hardware set of a computer, small states can optimize its positions through understanding the global structure of international system. Sometimes, a regional threat can be an opportunity at the global level.

Second, by the same token, small states should have the ability to balance between the long-term interests and the short-term ones. That is, they should be able to compare the results of bandwagoning with the imminent threat, and of balancing against it. This is extremely hard to achieve. But, one should notice that in a certain situation a very small shift of state policy could bring about the change of the whole international structure.

Third, and probably the most important, a small state should avoid being caught in a power vacuum. Because it means being a defenseless prey for great powers like the small states at the turn of the twentieth century, which fell into the hands of the colonial powers. Even more in the contemporary world, a power vacuum is the worst scenario for small states. Why? Let's look at the Balkans. Now, the West may not perceives vital interest in the region, and thus, it seems that they lack the intention to engage or settle the problems, such as can be seen in the calculations of Britain and the US in the interwar period. Therefore, the small nation-states in the Balkans can proclaim their

needs more freely and without any strong pressure to concede or negotiate. They are like children playing in the school yard without being supervised by a teacher. Also, for achieving their goals, they will try to make alliances with great powers or their enemy's neighbor, or religiously or ethnically fraternal countries. This effort may make the situation more complex. Without perceiving exactly, great powers may be dragged into the region. Let us assume the Greece-Bulgaria-Rumania-Serbia alliance based on the Orthodox Christian religion. What would be the responses of Turkey, Italy, and Russia? Great powers may become attracted by the existence of the 'power vacuum,' as time goes by. Then, compete for the chips. History does not repeat in the same way with the past. But, the important thing is that most decision makers of most of nations DO think about it much.

Then, how can a small state avoid being caught in a power vacuum? Two different ways are conceivable. One is internal balancing. This means the enhancement of its defense power and of its attractiveness as an ally of great powers. With strong military power, however, can a small state attract a great power's attention. It should have some bargaining cards, especially economic inducements in exchange for security guarantee. The other is, of course, external balancing. Not only for security but also for economic reasons, a small state should avoid bandwagoning to one power. Bandwagoning should be reserved as a last option for its survival. Yet, the balancing behavior also should be somewhat different between peacetime and in crisis. In peacetime, It is more beneficial for a small state to ally with more than two powers, especially if they (the powers) are expected to be hostile in the future crisis. That is, the Bismarckian alliance system is one of the most desirable for small states, if they take the positions of Germany, the center of the alliance web. Even though it is difficult to achieve, in peacetime it's not impossible to do. On the other hand, in crisis, in general, it would be more profitable for small states to balance against the imminent threat through allying or bandwagoning with the most powerful state among others. However, this behavior (bandwagoning to the most powerful or balancing against the imminent threat) should not violate the primary principle; "Don't forget to look at the global context."

### **C. THE ROLE OF KOREA AS A BALANCER IN NORTHEAST ASIA : SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICY**

Northeast Asia has become a region where prosperity and uncertainty co-exist, especially since the collapse of the Cold War system. Rapid economic growth, juxtaposed with the end of ideological

confrontation, unleashed regional states from the leverage of the superpowers. Nonetheless, unlike in Europe, there are still gloomy expectations about the future of Northeast Asia.

In general, there are two conflicting opinions. One is that "rapid national economic growth, and the shared feeling of power and entitlement that tend to go with it, may be at least as important a cause of expansionism."<sup>378</sup> The other one is the neo-liberal view, focused on growing economic liberty - free market and trade, division of labor according to comparative advantage, and interdependence - and political liberty as well as the role of international organization.<sup>379</sup>

Generally speaking, to predict and to prepare for the future one must be aware past experience. But this argument still has uncertainty. History has been changed continuously. So has the international political system. No one can say the future will be the same as the past beyond a certain point. From this perspective, one can avoid the failure to look at the "Forest" without failing to pay attention to each "tree."

Then, what are the implications of the past and contemporary situation for the future of Northeast Asia? Is the future of the region really tenuous? And, what suggestions can be proposed to maintain peace in the region? To answer these questions, at first, the author will examine the reliability and validity of contemporary threats through looking into the defense policies and military postures of Japan and China, and propose several policies for security cooperation in the region.

### **1 . Is The Future Really Gloomy?**

Obviously, there are many unfavorable factors in the region; 1)historical distrust among nations, 2)territorial disputes, 3)industrial development and economic growth patterns which might induce expansionism, 4)increasing military expenditures and possibility of arms race, 5)inexperience of cooperation, and 6)nuclear proliferation. But, these threats are not impossible to solve.

#### ***a . Historical Distrust***

When Shin Sakurai, the former environment minister of Japan, denied that his country had waged an aggressive war in the 1930s and 1940s, the South Korean and Chinese governments at once

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<sup>378</sup>Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry; Prospect for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3 ( Winter 1993/94 ) p.16.

<sup>379</sup>Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability; East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3 ( Winter 1993/94 ) p. 38 .

protested against Mr. Sakurai's remarks.<sup>380</sup> Japan's harsh dominion during World War II left a deep scar on neighboring nations. So, many South Korean and Chinese people worry about Japan's growing power in terms of military and political position as well as economic size. This kind of distrust has kept region from making multilateral security alliance such as NATO, even during the Cold War period.

However, this argument has some weaknesses. Japan has changed since World War II. She is not prone to take an aggressive posture. By the same token, Japan has a very uncommon defense structure. Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) is not an independent ministry of government but a subordinate second agency directly controlled by the Prime Minister. Most of important decisions are made by the Security Council which includes second rank officials from the Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Therefore, "in the broadest sense, the Japanese notion of security makes no distinction between economic and military considerations,---in addition, industry seeks certain defense projects for their commercial spin-off and spin-on value."<sup>381</sup>

Moreover, Japanese people have had the propensity for favoring the pacifist "Yoshida Doctrine." In a recent survey, concerning Japanese roles and responsibilities, 63.6% of respondents answered against Japan's commitment to the PKO type of international activities without drawing any demarcation between PKF and PKO in terms of enforcement structures.<sup>382</sup>

Also, if one takes notice on the process of Franco-German military cooperation that culminated in the establishment of the 'Eurocorps,' he may see that no one can deny the possibility of military cooperation in Northeast Asia just with the excuse of historical experience.

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<sup>380</sup>"War Shadows," The Economist, Aug. 20, 1994, p.30. Also, on 7 June 1995, The New York Times reported that the Japanese parliament accepted to apologize their behavior during the World War II. However, it does not really mean an apology. The word 'Hansei' means a reflection and a remorse, which is sometimes used to correct the failure of the former experience (in this case, a remorse for the lost of the war). See; The New York Times, 7 June 1995, A1.

<sup>381</sup>Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the US-Japan Security Alliance, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989) p. xiii.

<sup>382</sup>Takehiko Kamo, "National Security in Japan: Struggling between Continuity and Change," Pacific Focus, Vol. VII, No. 2, (Fall 1992), pp. 100, 111.

### *b . Territorial Disputes*

Considering territorial disputes in Northeast Asia, there are relatively fewer issues than in Southeast Asia - 5 of all 25 issues in East Asia, according to Desmond Ball's calculation.<sup>383</sup> Those are the dispute about the Northern Territories of Japan, the unresolved dispute between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks (Tokdo) in the southern part of the Sea of Japan (East Sea), and the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands in the East China Sea.

Among them, the Northern Territories are the most visible obstacles to reduce the threat perception of Japan. The islands (Kunashiri, Etofuru, Shikotan, and the Habomai group) have been the source of political dispute throughout the post-war period and the dispute is the single issue preventing the conclusion of a full-scale peace treaty between Japan and Russia.<sup>384</sup>

Secondly, the dispute over the Senkaku Islands also poses an immediate challenge to Japan, whose 1891 claim of sovereignty over the inhabited islands had gone largely unchallenged until China adopted the Territorial Waters Law. Brown explained, "China's aggressive pursuit of foreign oil exploration firms to drill the coastal waters thought to contain petroleum deposits puts it squarely in conflict with Japan's claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku and their surrounding waters."<sup>385</sup>

Thirdly, the dispute over Tokdo has been a heated one between South Korea and Japan. The importance of this territory is based on the considerations of fisheries and military use. South Korea claims the sovereignty of these small islands on grounds of historical precedent, and a family of Korean lighthouse keepers reside there.

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<sup>383</sup>Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisition in the Asia-Pacific Region," *International Security*, Vol.18, No.3 (Winter 1993/94) pp. 88-89.

<sup>384</sup>Michael W. Chinworth, "Japanese Security: The Participants and Their Concerns," in *Inside Japan's Defense* (Washington; Brassey's, 1992) pp.7-8. Another fine paper about this dispute is "Japan and The Northern Territories Dispute - Past, Present, Future," which was written by Richard deVilafranca; *Asian Survey*, Vol. xxxiii, No. 6, June 1993, pp.610-624. In this paper he had the propensity of supporting Russian argument rather than Japan's, comparing them in terms of debate between justice (Japan) and law (Russia). He thought that "the idea of resolving the dispute on the basis of law and justice by its nature suggests the possibility, and perhaps the necessity of compromise." See; *Ibid.*, p.620.

<sup>385</sup>Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in The Post-Cold War Era; Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," *Asian Survey*, Vol. xxxiv, No.5, May 1994, p.436.

However, all these disputes are not serious, compared with other disputes in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, these "could be resolved through negotiation, possibly involving the institution of joint surveillance and development zones encompassing the areas of disputation."<sup>386</sup> In addition, because the disputed territories lack material value, even though these issues are related with national pride, the conflicts for territorial sovereignty such as *Yom Kippur* War and the *Falklands* War are not likely to happen.<sup>387</sup> One can easily agree on this argument if he consider costs and benefits of those conflicts. Also, one can be optimistic when observing the changed German conception. Robert Jervis said that Germans may "no longer seem to care that Alsace and Lorraine are French."<sup>388</sup> Therefore, the matter of territorial disputes depends on, in large part, mutual confidence building.

### *c . Industrial Development and Economic Growth*

*The Economist* claims that "China's real GNP has grown by an average of almost 9% a year. By 1994, China's economy is almost sure to be four times bigger than it was in 1978; if China hits its targets, which are reasonable, by 2002 the economy will be eight times bigger than it was in 1978."<sup>389</sup> Also, one report expected that "in terms of global trade, market size and sheer economic bulk, China is becoming a fourth pole in the international system."<sup>390</sup> If they do, the long-term prospects for the balance of power - global as well as regional - would be fundamentally changed, because "If the country ever achieved a per-capita GNP just one-fourth that of the United States (about South Korea's ratio today), it would have a total GNP greater than that of the United States."<sup>391</sup>

When other regional states see China's rapid growth, they cannot but be concerned. Especially, as for Japan, she fears that "[She] will lose its control over the international [or regional]

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<sup>386</sup>Desmon ball, "Arms and Affluence," p.87.

<sup>387</sup>Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," p.27.

<sup>388</sup>Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics; Will It Reasonable the Past?," *International Security*, Vol.16, No.3 (Winter 1991/92) p.53.

<sup>389</sup>"China; The Titan Stirs," *The Economist*, 28 Nov.1992, p.3.

<sup>390</sup>Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72, No.5, (Nov./Dec. 1993) p.61.

<sup>391</sup>Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," p.52.

system, while the rising challenger (China) begins to flex its newfound muscle by demanding self-serving changes in the system."<sup>392</sup>

However, when one turns his eyes to inherent problems of China, he can find that the prospects for China are not necessarily bright. Many articles point out the potential problems of China: a high rate of population growth<sup>393</sup>; low quality of labor<sup>394</sup>; the possibility of fractionalization and continued state ownership of much of China's economy<sup>395</sup>; "bottleneck in the transportation, telecommunications and energy sectors; inflation, gaps between coastal province and the hinterland."<sup>396</sup>

In addition, China's first priority is the economic growth which fundamentally needs foreign investment and political stability. An anecdote said by the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, reveals the present primary concern of Chinese people.

"Two years ago I was in Gansu looking at 2,000-year-old Buddhist caves in grottoes. The governor turned up to accompany me. He was a Soviet-trained engineer, 51 years old, learning English. He was extremely keen to improve his tourist industry because Takeshida had visited the grottoes a year before and given money for a foundation to encourage Japanese scholar to study how Buddhism came to Japan along the Silk Road. He had been to Europe, America, Japan. He was keen to find out about tourism, the oil industry, oil rigs. He heard that we make oil rigs in Singapore. Could he sell us parts? At that age, at that level, deep in the northwest China, on the edge of the Gobi desert, he's thinking of development of tourism, oil rigs, drilling bits."<sup>397</sup>

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<sup>392</sup>Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon: China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol.19, No.1 (Summer 1994) p.165.

<sup>393</sup>K.C.Yeh, "Macroeconomic Issues in China in the 1990s," The China Quarterly, No.131 (Sep.1992) pp.503-511.

<sup>394</sup>Qui Shijin, "High-Tech Industrialization in China," Asian Survey, Vol.xxxiii, No.12 (Dec.1992), p.1133.

<sup>395</sup>Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon?" p.153.

<sup>396</sup>Ji Guoxing, "The Multilateralisation of Pacific Asia: A Chinese Perspective," Asian Defense Journal, July 1994, p.23.

<sup>397</sup>The Economist, 28 Nov. 1992, p.18.



On the other hand, according to Ji Guoxing, there is a new pattern of economic organization in East Asia, called 'the dual-locomotive train pattern.' He explained, "For instance, the East Asian economy looks like a train climbing in mountainous regions, with Japan as the locomotive in the front drawing the train, and with China as the locomotive in the back pushing the train, and the train jointly driven forward by them."<sup>398</sup>

This '*economy-priority-policy*' was confirmed by the CCP's 14th Congress in October 1992, during which the conservative's apprehension of *Huishi Dongxiang* was discarded<sup>399</sup> and several elderly hardliners lost their seats.<sup>400</sup> The Congress also "endorsed the 'socialist market economy' as the new gospel - a phrase which can cover a multitude of meanings, but basically allows Guangdong and the other progressive provinces to carry on with deregulation and profit seeking."<sup>401</sup>

On the other hand, there is another concern about Japan's demand for an active political role in world politics. One report, drafted by the LDP, claims that Japan should be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the security of the world.<sup>402</sup> This tendency makes the neighboring states nervous because the permanent seat will give Japan the veto right.

But, that kind of apprehension is also baseless. If one compares Germany's role in the security of the world after the Versailles Treaty in 1918, and then after the end of World War II, he can imagine that the most dangerous thinking is isolating and quarantining a country from the scene. It is natural, therefore, that, as economic superpowers, Japan and Germany should have a permanent

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<sup>398</sup>Ji Guoxing, "Multilaterlisation of Pacific Asia," p.23 .

<sup>399</sup>This term means China is becoming a immediate ideological enemy of the West, led by the United States, because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

<sup>400</sup>Ji Gouxing, "Multilateralisation of Pacific Asia," p.23 .

<sup>401</sup>"China: Pragmatism Pronounced," Asian Defense Journal, Jan. 1993, p.44.

<sup>402</sup>"Bridge to the 21th Century: A New Course of Politics," a report from the 21th Century Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party, p.9 .

seat. As getting a permanent seat, to the contrary, they will be bound by other powers like as one in the Concert of Europe in 19th Century.<sup>403</sup>

***d. Military Expenditures and Arms Race***

It would be incorrect to say that there is an arms race in the region, but it is true that regional states have been expanding and improving the quality of their armed forces for some years. The most worrying aspect is the fact that most improvements that have been achieved and that are planned involve naval and air forces which are the most suitable for projecting military force in a region where distances are great.

**Table 6 : Defense Expenditures and Percentage of GNP 1984-1993**

	CHINA	JAPAN	N.KOREA	S.KOREA	TAIWAN
1984 A	8.26(1.8)	11.6(1.0)	4.1(16.2)	4.49(5.9)	3.42(6.3)
1984 B	25.0(5.7)	24.0(1.0)	6.5(20.0)	7.39(5.1)	6.91(6.4)
1985 A	8.56(2.1)	12.5(1.0)	4.2(16.0)	4.40(5.3)	4.46(6.6)
1985 B	25.0(3.3)	25.2(1.0)	6.6(20.0)	7.85(5.1)	8.03(7.0)
1986 A	8.51(2.0)	15.1(1.0)	4.3(15.7)	5.11(5.2)	5.02(5.8)
1986 B	25.0(3.3)	26.4(1.0)	6.6(20.0)	8.44(4.8)	8.34(6.5)
1987 A	8.15(1.9)	19.3(1.0)	4.2(15.3)	5.73(4.7)	5.50(6.3)
1987 B	25.0(3.3)	27.8(1.0)	6.6(20.0)	8.63(4.3)	6.54(4.6)
1988 A	7.27(1.9)	24.6(1.0)	4.6(16.2)	7.55(4.3)	6.71(5.5)
1988 B	26.0(3.3)	29.1(1.0)	6.6(20.0)	9.27(4.2)	7.61(4.9)
1989 A	6.67(1.6)	28.4(1.0)	4.2(14.8)	8.96(4.2)	8.18(5.5)
1989 B	25.0(3.3)	30.3(1.0)	6.5(20.0)	10.2(4.3)	8.92(4.3)
1990 A	6.06(1.6)	28.7(1.0)	5.6(20.5)	9.38(3.8)	8.69(5.4)

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<sup>403</sup> Nevertheless, that kind of concert among the contemporary great powers will be different from that of the Concert of Europe, in terms of dealing with small states. The reason is that the contemporary world system is more legal-bound and more institutionalized. Above all, attacking even a small state costs too much to bear unlike the nineteenth century.

1990 B	27.0(3.3)	31.5(1.0)	6.2(20.0)	11.2(4.3)	9.43(5.4)
1991 A	6.11(1.6)	32.7(1.0)	5.6(25.8)	10.2(3.6)	8.50(4.8)
1991 B	26.0(3.3)	32.6(1.0)	4.7(20.0)	10.6(3.8)	9.75(5.2)
1992 A	6.71(1.5)	35.9(1.1)	5.59(26.4)	11.2(3.8)	10.3(4.9)

A=Official(national) data in current US dollars

B=data provided by US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in constant US dollars, using 1991 exchange rates or conversion rates estimated by ACDA

*Source: The Military Balance, Asia: The Rise in Defense Capability 1984-1993(Appendix, Map)*

### (1) Military Posture of Japan

Then, what about the military posture of Japan and China? What types of military construction are being pursued now? The composition of SDF can be apparently characterized as a 'defensive defense' force. As Table 7 shows, Japanese main forces are deployed in the Northern District. Considering Japan's geographical situation, it would appear that the SDF has to have Anti-Surface Missiles, a Marine Corps and Bombers in order to seize the initiative, and have deterrent or preventive power. But, it doesn't. In addition, it has few landing ships (6LST, 4Lct) and cargos(15C-130, 38CH-47, 30C-1) that are essential for attacking.

This means Japan's defense posture is not offensive but defensive. This characteristic is also found from the data which reveals US-Japan combined training in 1991.<sup>404</sup>

Japan's defense policy has been the reflection of the overall US-Japanese relationship, in which the United States has been figured as the controlling power. One of the key purpose of United States's occupation of Japan was to demilitarize the country so that it would not pose a threat in the future. This was clearly reflected in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which stated that, "---, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and

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<sup>404</sup>Michael W. Chinworth, "Performance of Japan-US Combined Training in FY1991," in *Inside Japan's Defense*, pp.230-232. Most of training were defensive such as Anti-Submarine, Air Defense, Electronic Warfare Training. See; Andrew K. Hanami, "The Emerging Military-Industrial Relationship in Japan and the US Connection," *Asian Survey*, Vol.xxxiii, No.6, June 1993, pp.595-596. He cited an American military experts' comment that revealed Japan's training level is not high.

the threat or use of force as means of setting international disputes---, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained."<sup>405</sup> By the same token, Shigeru Yoshida, the Prime Minister from 1948 to 1954, opted for the strategy under which Japan would accept the new Constitution and security treaty. Thus, he advocated the subordination of Japan's international posture to the requirement of national economic growth, and reliance on a moderate self-defense capability combined with the United States security guarantee.<sup>406</sup>

**Table 7 Armed Forces of Japan and China**

	CHINA	JAPAN
TOTAL	ACTIVE; 3,030,000 RESERVE; 1,200,000+a	ACTIVE; 237,700 RESERVE; 46,500
ARMY	2,300,000 MILITARY REGION(7) INF DIV(78) ARMED DIV(10) FIELD ARTY DIV(5) INDEP ARMED BDE(2) INDEP FD ARTY(5) INDEP AA BDE(5) INDEP ENGR REGT(30) RAPID DEPLOYMENT BN(6) AVN; 3GROUP HEL BN, 1 HEL TRG REGT	149,900 ARMY(5), INF DIV(12) ARMD DIV(1), COMPOSITE BDE(2), AB BDE(1), AD BDE(2) ARTY BDE(1) TRG BDE(4) ENGR BDE(5) HEL BDE(1) ATK HEL PL(2) 50% of these troops are deployed in the Northern Territories
NAVY	260,000 SUBS(47) SURF COMBATANT(56) COASTAL COMBATANT(870) MINE WARFARE(126) AMPHIBIOUS(51) MARINES (BDE)(5,000) NAVAL AF -BOBMERS(160) -FGA(100) -FIGHTER(600)	43,100 SUBS (17) SURF COMBATANT(62) COASTAL COMBATANT(8) MINE WARFARE(38) AMPHIBIOUS(6) MSDF AIR ARM(12,000) -CBT A/C(93), -ARMED HEL(75)

<sup>405</sup>Theodore McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," Armed Forces & Society, Vol.13, No.1, Fall 1986, p.82.

<sup>406</sup>Aurelia George, "Japan's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations; Radical Departure or Predictable Response?", Asian Survey, Vol.xxxiii, No.6, June 1993, p.560.

AIR FORCE	470,000 H-6(120), H-5(350), Q-5(500), J-5(400), J-6/B/D/E(3,000), J-7(500), J-8(100), SU-27(20), SU-27B(4) TRANSPORT(600) HELICOPTERS(400)	44,700 F-1(73), F-4EJ(21), F-15J/DJ(158), F-4EJ(72), RF-4EJ(10) E-2C(12) EW(1C-1, 4YS-11) TRANSPORT(79)
STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES	ICBM(14), CSS-4(DF-5;4)W/MIRV CSS-3(DF-4;10) IRBM(90) CSS-2(DF-3;60) CSS-N-3(JL-1;12)	

*Source: The Military Balance 1993/94, p.152-159*

In short, Japan's postwar defense policy was not made by its own doctrine for real self-defense. Japanese people, to the contrary, have had the propensity to favor the Yoshida Doctrine. So, almost all changes in defense policy resulted from external pressures, especially from the United States, and inner political debates which have been more inclined to economic problems.

Surely, Japan has much power, including potential military power, but she still lacks a grand strategy for the long-term. Some scholars pointed out this weakness, saying "Without a long-term strategy, the powerful US-Japanese alliance, Japan's own defense effort and, indeed, Japan's direction in the world would be without chart of compass."<sup>407</sup>

Consequently, Japan's security policy is still largely controlled by civilian officials who each have their own concerns.<sup>408</sup> This arrangement has been endorsed wholeheartedly by Japan's postwar political and economic elites who, on the basis of its prewar experience, retain a profound distrust of the professional military.

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<sup>407</sup>Fred C. Iklé and Terumasa Nakanishi, "Japan's Grand Strategy," p.95.

<sup>408</sup>Peter J.Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security-Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No.4 (Spring 1993), pp.92-93. Japanese security policies are formulated and implemented largely by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Finance(MOF), and International Trade and Industry(MITI), as well as JDA. With regard to the economic security issue, the MITI, the MOF and the MOFA determine the policy while in the military security matters they include the JDA.

In the second place, the Japanese believe that their economic might may be useful 'substitute' for military power, enhancing global stability, provided the United States continued to buttress them militarily.<sup>409</sup> This strong economic concern reinforces the strong political preferences against building up a powerful military. A rough estimate of the costs Japan would incur if it were to build a conventional military force commensurate with its economic strength and the size of its population suggests annual expenditures of 150 to 200 billion dollars for a decade - considerably more, that is, than current estimates of the economic costs of German unification in the 1990s.<sup>410</sup>

Lastly, Japanese political leaders are anxious about Japan becoming a great power in the traditional sense because it will make other countries in the region unstable and stimulate them to pursue a spiral arms race.<sup>411</sup>

## (2) Military Posture of China

On the other hand, Chinese armed forces, which feature a huge army had been mainly constructed to meet the Soviet threat. But, since 1985, they have changed their military policy emphasizing 'modernization.'

The PLA appears to continue to reorganize, with the loss of some units. Nevertheless its equipment is not the most effective. "Artillery tubes wear out rapidly in heavy firing, compromising safety and accuracy. Tires on Chinese vehicles do not hold up, and drive trains and transmission break down with regularity."<sup>412</sup>

The PLA Navy's recent build-up is remarkable. The Chinese Navy is acquiring a new class of destroyer(*Luhu*, or Type 052), upgraded version of the *Luda*-class destroyers, a new class (*Jiangwei*) of missile frigates, and new classes of resupply and amphibious assault ships for

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<sup>409</sup>Deger and Saadet, "The Asia-Pacific Region: the Emerging Powers," in Military Expenditure: The Political Economy of International Security, (Oxford, New York; Oxford University Press, 1990) p.113.

<sup>410</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>411</sup>Takehiko Kamo, "National Security in Japan," p.102.

<sup>412</sup>Larry M. Wortzel, "China and Strategy; China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status," Orbis, Spring 1994, p.171.

sustaining operations farther from shore and for longer periods.<sup>413</sup> In addition, Chinese frigates and destroyers are equipped with sophisticated missiles such as HY-2(Sea Eagle; a radar homing and infrared homing anti-ship SSM), the *Ying Ji*(a shorter-range, active radar homing missile) and PL-8 missile. However, despite of their modernization efforts, "the PLA Navy still hard pressed to absorb new technology. Naval personnel are having trouble mastering the new, sophisticated system."<sup>414</sup> An article in *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports that the first *Luhu* was returned to be rebuilt because the hull would not accept the LM 2500 engines.<sup>415</sup>

Moreover, China lacks a redundant under way replenishment capability prerequisite for power projection. Wortzel said, "With only two *Fuqing* under way replenishment oilers(AORs) in China's inventory, the eighteen-ship task forces that China deployed in 1980 may still be about the limit that can venture out without forward operating bases."<sup>416</sup> This weakness stimulates the Chinese to seek a aircraft carrier.<sup>417</sup> With regard to this matter, however, a scholar pointed out that China has neither the intention nor the ability to sustain the maintenance of the carrier group. He said, "The disintegration of the Soviet Union was due to its economy not to its lack of oceangoing fleet. That is sufficient lesson for China to learn."<sup>418</sup> Therefore, whether China acquires a aircraft carrier or not, its implication would be inevitably limited.

The PLA Air Force is planning to buy "72 SU-27 fighters, 300 MiG-31 interceptors under the manufacture license and SA-10 SAM for which an anti-ballistic missile capability is

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<sup>413</sup>Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence," p.86 .

<sup>414</sup>Larry M.Wortzel, "China and Strategy," p.164 .

<sup>415</sup>Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 Apr. 1993, p.9 .

<sup>416</sup>Larry M.Wortzel, "China and Strategy," p.167 .

<sup>417</sup>One report said, "China is negotiating the purchase of a *Tbilisi* class aircraft carrier named the *Varyag*, which is under construction at the Nikolayev south shipyard in the Ukraine." See: "Beijing's Secret Weapons," Asian Defense Journal, Nov. 1992, p.101 .

<sup>418</sup>Ji Guoxing, "The Multilateralisation of Pacific Asia," p.24 .

claimed.<sup>419</sup> This procurement is a bridge to develop indigenous fighter and combat aircraft manufactures aimed to make the B-6, a licensed version of the Soviet TU-16 twin jet Badger, and A-5 attacker.<sup>420</sup> However, China is not yet able to master systems integration and engine design and manufacturing. Also, it lacks ground attack aircraft needed to landing operations.<sup>421</sup> Therefore, China's military capability is now being modernized, but it still lacks the capability to threaten other nations without "a warning time of a few years."<sup>422</sup>

Defense policy in China has been changed since the end of the Cold War. Now, threats are defined in, aside from military security, economic, technical, and ideological dimensions. Also, the concept of 'People's war' which emphasized protraction, attrition, large land maneuver and whole mobilization has gone. Instead of that, the new concepts are employed, "called *Jubu Zhanahen* (local war) and *Tufa Shijian* (contingencies) associated with quickness, surprise, short duration and limited scope, which requires high quality military training, lethality and variability of weapons used."<sup>423</sup> For achieving these goals, China launched its National Defense Development Strategy (NDDS), which focused on defense science and technology instead of defense infrastructure construction. But, this kind of transition of defense policy is just a matter of course. As for undeveloped and developing countries, including Northeast Asian countries, the Gulf War was a shocking incident. When they saw the high-technology weapons through the CNN news, they might think there was no other way to defend themselves but to have or to keep enemies from having those capabilities.

Nonetheless, the acquisition of high-technology weapons will not lead the region to an arms race. Desmond Ball explained very concisely, saying "This can be regarded as a healthy trend.--- Since the requirements for defense self-reliance cannot be defined without some

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<sup>419</sup>The Military Balance, p. 148 .

<sup>420</sup>Larry M. Wortzel, "China and Strategy," p.169 .

<sup>421</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 172 .

<sup>422</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>423</sup>Weixing Hu, "China's Security Strategy in a Changing World," Pacific Focus, Vol.viii, No.1 (Spring 1993) pp.119,125.



consideration of the capabilities possessed by neighbors and potential adversaries further afield, there must come a point when further acquisitions begin to generate counter-programs to the detriment of both self-reliance and regional security."<sup>424</sup>

*e. Inexperience of Cooperation*

Many reports point out the inexperience of cooperation among Northeast Asian countries as one of the prominent unfavorable factors for multilateral security cooperation. Friedberg argued that even economic or cultural linkage in the region is very weak and undeveloped. He said they "lack both a recent memory of cooperation and a tradition of thinking of themselves as members of distinct political entity."<sup>425</sup>

In fact, unlike European case, in Asia, most treaties have been established on the basis of bilateral relationships. But, one should be cautious to conclude that Asian states lack the will or the ability to cooperate one another. Considering the recent history of Northeast Asia, one can find that there was no opportunity for them to make a foreign policy with their own sovereignty, except Japan from the end of 19th Century through the end of the Pacific War. Even before the regional states set up a full-fledged regimes, there were interruptions such as the Civil War in China and the Korean War. Furthermore, the following ideological confrontation had been a bulwark for making a consensus among them.

But, the whole atmosphere has been changed fundamentally. It is the first time for Japan and China to think through their foreign policy without the immediate threat from Russia, and to feel relatively enhanced freedom of maneuver. As for South Korea, now it has confidence in its own ability to defend itself from North Korea's threat. Thus, despite the concerns of many pessimists, Northeast Asian countries are now more readily consulting each other and discussing political and security issues. Yoichi Funabashi, a journalist of Asahi Shimbun, remarked "Since the end of the Cold War, some political commentators have suggested that Asia is being rediscovered

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<sup>424</sup>Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence," p.104.

<sup>425</sup>Aaron L.Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," pp.15-25. He distinguished Asia from Europe in terms of the prospects for the cooperation. He employed three levels of analysis - state, linkage, and costs and benefits - and compared Asia with Europe. But, his arguments agree too pessimistic so that he couldn't avoid some weaknesses.

or 're-Asianized.' On the contrary, the spirit of these times is predominantly affirmative and forward-thinking, not reactionary or nostalgic. The region is not being 're-Asianized;' it is being Asianized.---Economic vitality and interdependence have given Asia new confidence."<sup>426</sup> Also, the possibility of cooperation was confirmed by the successful cooperation in Cambodia, where a Chinese lieutenant colonel had some supervisory role over a Japanese major.<sup>427</sup>

#### *f. Nuclear Proliferation*

No one can doubt that the most immediate threat to the security of Northeast Asia is North Korea's nuclear development program. As a political bargaining card rather than a military tools, North Korea may want to sell its program at the price of economic assistance and the normalization guaranteed by the West, especially by the United States and Japan. In a short-term view, this is the matter of a bargain at the negotiation table. But, considering this matter in a long-term view, one cannot but apprehend the possibility of Japan's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

One report claims that the Chinese warn that "evolution of regional and international situation could compel Japan to develop nuclear weapons," citing three factors that could propel Tokyo to go nuclear; "1)North Korea's alleged nuclear capability; 2)the possibility of several nuclear-capable republics in the CIS; and 3)nuclear proliferation from the CIS to the Middle East, South Asia, and other regions."<sup>428</sup> This apprehension was intensified by the fact that Japan planned and accomplished the first shipment of importing 50 tons of highly toxic plutonium from France.<sup>429</sup> Also, another article reveals the secret document written by Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1969. On that document, it was revealed that the Foreign Policy Planning

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<sup>426</sup>Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.5 (Nov/Dec 1993) pp.77-78.

<sup>427</sup>David I. Hitchcock, Jr., "East Asia's New Security Agenda," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.17, No.1, Winter 1994, p.96.

<sup>428</sup>Bonnie S.Glaser, "China's Security Perceptions; Interests and Ambitions," Asian Survey, Vol.xxxiii, No.3, Mar.1993, pp.258-9.

He excluded China's nuclear threat as one of factors threatening and stimulating Japan to develop nuclear bombs, maybe because he wrote the paper on the Chinese perspective.

<sup>429</sup>"Tokyo's Import of Plutonium Threatens Region," Asian Defense Journal, July 1992, p.84.

Committee proposed the necessity of acquiring nuclear bomb technology and of the ability to reject the intervention of other nations when Japan tries to develop a nuclear bomb.<sup>430</sup>

However, such a policy might well induce several other countries in the region to form an alliance against Japan. Moreover, it would have to overcome deeply embedded opposition from the nation's own people. Also, if Japan begins the nuclear development program, Ikle and Nakanishi claimed, "It would take some ten years or more to build a survivable nuclear force. If the decision were taken in response to a sudden threat to the nation, that ten-year delay would be far too long."<sup>431</sup>

Therefore, there is little reason for Japan to pursue nuclear weapons unless the US-Japanese alliance system has no guarantee to protect her from nuclear or conventional threats. It is irrational to think Japan will discard its long-standing *Yoshida Doctrine* in the name of national pride, in spite of abandoning the benefits.

On the other hand, China is a unique nuclear power in the region. Lewis and Hua reported that China is developing the DF-31, a mobile land-based version of the JL-2 SLBM, and projected that the new 8000-km range ICBM will become operational in the mid-to late 1990s. Also, they assert that Beijing is developing a three-stage solid propellant missile called the DF-41, which will be deployed between the year 2000 and 2010.<sup>432</sup> This article also pointed out that China planned to develop MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) for its mobile ICBMs.<sup>433</sup> As for its navy, China is expected to deploy the new 8000-km JL-2 SLBM on its second-generation 09-4 *Xia* class nuclear-powered submarine in the mid- to late 1990s.<sup>434</sup>

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<sup>430</sup>"Japan's Secret Document; to have a nuclear bomb," The Korea Times (Hankuk Ilbo), 2 Aug. 1994.

<sup>431</sup>Fred Charles Ikle and Terumasa Nakanishi, "Japan's Grand Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol.69, No.3, Summer 1990, p.91.

<sup>432</sup>Lewis, J.W. and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: technologies, strategies, goals," International Security, Vol.17, No.2 (Fall 1992) pp.28-29.

<sup>433</sup>*Ibid.*, p.30.

<sup>434</sup>*Ibid.*, p.29.

**Table 8 : Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1993<sup>435</sup>**

BOMBERS	LAND BASED MISSILE	SEA BASED MISSILE	BOMBS	TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS	TOTAL
H-6(120) H-5 (30) Q-5 (30)	DF-3/3A (50) DF-4 (20) DF-5/5A (4) DF-21/21A (36)	JL-1 (24)	150	150	434

Source: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1964-1993, *Nuclear Databook Volume v* (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1994) p.359

Besides, according to the expectations of the recently published "*Nuclear Databook Volume V*, China (1)will continue to maintain a triad of nuclear forces; land-based-missiles, bombers, and sea-based-missiles; (2)will improve the survivability of the missile forces by reducing the prelaunch time period, to find less vulnerable basing modes, and to make general improvements in accuracy, guidance, and control; (3) will probably devote a declining share of its national budget to military programs in general and a steady portion to nuclear weapons maintenance and development; (4) However, a significant increase in nuclear weapons funding or research and development is not anticipated.<sup>436</sup>

Consequently, China is considering nuclear weapons as very useful for achieving deterrence. Thus, she will maintain a nuclear force and develop the technology. But, there is no reason for China to spend too much money for those objectives, because the main purpose of doing that is becoming more dependent on economic concerns.

As surveyed so far, Northeast Asia is confronted with many problems. But, they are not unpredictable or insoluble. Historical distrust can be overcome by establishing transparency of each nation's security policy. Territorial disputes could also be resolved by negotiation rather than

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<sup>435</sup>Current number of warheads of other nations are like the following: the United States (10,500 active, 6,000 awaiting disassembly), CIS (15,000 active, 17,000 awaiting disassembly), Britain (200), and France (524).

<sup>436</sup>Robert S.Norris, Andrew S.Burrows, and Richard W.Fieldhouse, "British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons," *Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V* (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1994) pp.372-376.

confrontation in terms of costs and benefits. In addition, except for North Korea, the regional states' military postures are still defensive, and there is no immediate threat of expansionism. Expansionism is just one of many possible scenarios. Even North Korea doesn't have the ability to wage all-out war against the South with reasonable prospect for success. This argument can be applied to the matter of nuclear weapons proliferation in the same way. Also, the problem of inexperience of cooperation is now being solved by making multi-channel webs of negotiation.

Obviously, all nations in the region, including North Korea, are considering economic issues as a top priority. If there is a confrontation, it could be an economic one rather than a military conflict. Generally speaking, economic discord is prone to depend on negotiation rather than military or political or ideological dispute is, because the former has more options than the latter has.

## **2 . Suggestions**

### ***a . Balancing***

South Korea is now generally in favorable situation, even though the threat from the North is continuing. The probability of a war on the Korean Peninsula considerably decreased after 1989. If North Korea invades the South, it would have to fight alone, possibly against a defending coalition. Furthermore, the North is rapidly losing its power relative to the South. This continuing change of the balance gives the South more freedom of maneuver regarding the North Korean threats that have largely bound the South in the ideological framework of bipolarity. Thus, especially since 1989, South Korea has expanded its domain and range of activities over the other part of the world.

However, there is also an unfavorable development. The collapse of the Soviet Union makes the United States hesitate to be firm, even when confronted with nuclear threats that might not have been tolerated before. Had the nuclear program of North Korea emerged in the Cold War system, with the sponsorship of the Soviet Union, it might have been dealt by the United States even without asking South Korea to pay for solving it. The global problem in the Cold War system is prone to be regarded just as a regional issue in the Post-Cold War era. Thus, South Korea now should take more burden than before for its security.

In this more complicated situation, then, which policies should Korea take? Let's try to apply the previously suggested policies for small states. First of all, Korea now has to prepare for balancing in the future multipolar world.<sup>437</sup> This means that Korea should prepare for balancing among greater powers. As history shows us, balancing behavior needs acute calculation of the situation and strong resolve based on the belief that the calculation is right. Above all, however, to be a balancer requires the proper weight of power. For this, Korea should first be unified. Internal conflict between the two Koreas will make a power vacuum on the Korean Peninsula in certain circumstances. This will be the worst scenario, repeating the history of the early twentieth century. The unified Korea would be powerful enough to hold the balance, or even to mediate the conflict in the region.

The second way to have the proper weight of power is a policy of external balancing. Korea has to develop a situation where it can play as a balancer by creating the Bismarckian version of an alliance system. As surveyed previously, it is not impossible. The time is ripe for the establishment of new security cooperation. President Clinton announced, when he visited South Korea, that "There is no need for us to create one single alliance. The Challenge for the Asia Pacific in this decade, indeed, is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities. ---[it will function] like overlapping plates or armor individually providing protection and together covering the full body of our common security concern."<sup>438</sup>

Then, what kind of cooperation system would be the most proper one for this region? First of all, it should be a multi-layer cooperation which means the system incorporated by both bilateral and multilateral relations as well as connected with the global and other regions' systems. This kind of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia basically needs the leading role of the United States within the system as a guarantor or a balancer or an arbitrator who is connecting

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<sup>437</sup>The strong impression of contemporary changes is written in The Economist: "the world has turned back to the riskier maneuvering of a multi-power system. The 21st century will in this respect be more like the 19th century than like the dying 20th century." The Economist, "Situation, Mission, Execution," December 24, 1995, p.17.

<sup>438</sup>Address of President Clinton to the Korean National Assembly, July 10, 1993. Quoted by David I. Hitchcock, Jr., "East Asia's New Security Agenda, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.17, No.1, Winter 1994, p.104.

with each nation and linking each nation to others. As we can find a lesson from the success of NATO, multilateral cooperation basically demands a leading power. That should be the United States because any one else in the region does not want to see other states leading. In addition, once the regional cooperation system is inaugurated, it should keep pace with the United Nations. A group of Japanese scholars support this conception that one journalist termed "Japan-US security plus alpha".<sup>439</sup>

Then, who should be included? There are several suggestions for this matter.<sup>440</sup> The cooperation should be started with conformity. So, it is more comfortable that the cooperation would include Taiwan with 'two + four,' because the reunification, or even stabilization, of Korea and China would be the first step into creating genuine cooperation in a situation of enemy absence.

Second, the system should be a multi-channel one. That is, it should include all disputes, such as the issues of the environment, transportation, trade, arms control, military doctrine, refugee movement, piracy, terrorism, and so on. Besides, it should be "webbed" by both a governmental and non-governmental network. Surely, it is not easy to establish this kind of multicooperation, but also it is not impossible. Brian Bridges' comment is proper as a concluding remark for this matter. He said, "For the immediate future informal and ad hoc discussions will

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<sup>439</sup>Liyoshi Hasegawa, "World Trends: Creating Framework Toward Asian Security," Nihon Keizai, Nov. 23, 1992., in DSJP, Dec.8, 1992. Quoted by Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," p.443.

<sup>440</sup>Joseph Nye proposed a Northeast Asia Security and Cooperation Conference for Japan, China, Russia, the United States, and two Koreas, and presumably including Mongolia. See; David I.Hitchcock, Jr., "East Asia's Security Agenda," p.103. Also Polomka, warning the danger of 'the Japanese-Republic of Korea-US security cooperation,' suggested 'two+four' system which is the same with Nye's proposal. See; Peter Polomka, "Towards a Pacific House," Survival, Vol. xxxiii, No.2, Mar./Apr. 1991, p.180. Those two scholars emphasized the resolution of the matter of unification on the Korean Peninsula as a primary task. On the other hand, Japan planned to suggested for Asian Arms Conference composed of ten countries except Russia. See; "Japan plans for Asian Arms Conference," Asian Defense Journal, Mar. 1993, p.98.

remain the norm,--- but the growing recognition that stability and security has to be founded on mutual confidence rather than just military hardware *per se* gives grounds for optimism."<sup>441</sup>

Another viable way to have the proper weight is keeping the United States on its side. This suggests balancing by allying with the United States or supporting the United States to hold the balance in the region - "offshore balance of the United States." Retaining the commitment of the United States in the region should be first priority at least in the short-term. Several reasons support this argument.

Surely, the impact of US forces' evacuation would be so great that other regional states may step into the arena of arms racing. One article reported that even the North Korean authority seemed to accept the necessity of a positive US role for maintaining peace in the Northeast Asia.<sup>442</sup> On the other hand, the US forces in Japan have eased the concerns of Japanese themselves and other nations. Above all, it helps dispel the impression that the United States, the 'cap in the bottle,' might withdraw from Asia, leaving a vacuum that Japan might fill.<sup>443</sup> In addition, reducing naval and air forces supported out of Japan, which operate throughout Asia and even into the Persian Gulf, would eliminate major geographical advantages for the United States and require the nation to rely on CONUS-based forces for the region.<sup>444</sup>

Moreover, the evacuation or reduction of the forces in the region doesn't guarantee the enhancement of increased US competitiveness, the improvement of the United States balance of trade, or the reduction of her national debt. On the contrary, it would be a threat to US longer-term interests and access, because there are a host of international challenges such as the environmental issue, international drug trade, refugees, poverty and disease in the developing world, more importantly, and the United States needs Japanese economic commitment. Therefore,

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<sup>441</sup>Brian Bridges, "Nurturing a New Order in Northeast Asia," Asian Defense Journal, Jan. 1993, p.47.

<sup>442</sup>Chang-Il Ohn, "South Korea's New Defense Policy and Military Strategy," Korea Observer, Vol.xxv, No.1, Spring 1994, p.29.

<sup>443</sup>William J.Growe, Jr. and Alan D.Romberg, "Rethinking Security in the Pacific," p.13.

<sup>444</sup>William T. Pendley, "US Security Strategy in East Asia for the 1990s," p.13.



the reduction of US forces should keep pace with the confidence building and the establishment of a multicooperation system in the region.

### ***b . Bandwagoning***

This policy should be the last resort. However, in the face of an imminent threat to its survival, Korea should not hesitate to make minor concessions for preserving itself. The opposite two experiences of the century illustrate this argument. When Korea became unable to balance among great powers any more at the end of the nineteenth century, it should have bandwagoned with the rising power, Japan, at least until the Sino-Japanese War. On the other hand, bandwagoning with the United States during the Korean War and the Cold War era was the right policy in order to survive in the face of the threat from the Communists. Thus, in future crises, Korea should simplify all complicated alliance and bandwagon with the most powerful to survive. However, one should remind also that to choose the right time to so this is as difficult as it is to select the right power with which to bandwagon.

### **3 . Conclusion**

As estimated so far, the future of Northeast Asia is not so gloomy. All nations of the region want to progress. All of them have the aim and direction to pursue; full-fledged industrialization, welfare, or sovereignty. Therefore, in order to examine the region, one should be careful not to overlook the overall movement and atmosphere.

Especially for the South Korean government, the author would like suggest not to be nervous about the contemporary situation. Instead, she should adapt to new ideas and circumstances. Most of all, the Korean-US relationship should be firmly maintained, including military cohesion, even while Korean armed forces pursue modernization. Secondly, South Korea should move toward a closer military relationship with Japan. There are several measures. One of them might be a combined naval exercise such as anti-submarine warfare and minesweeping. Others could be joint intelligence gathering operations, exchanges of officer corps for education, periodic friendship-sports games, and so on. Thirdly, South Korea also should not exclude China from the list of military cooperators. One possible approach may be participating in the conversion of Chinese military industries. Foreign policy is not a zero-sum game. Even if one obtains 'A', that doesn't mean the other loses 'A,' but, to the contrary, it can be a good opportunity for him to get

'B.' Whether or not 'B' is worthier than 'A' is the matter of ability to deal or negotiate. South Korea's many options suggest, finally, that small states may, indeed, be "holder of the balance."

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